6 resultados para Bavaria (Germany). Army.
em Helda - Digital Repository of University of Helsinki
Resumo:
Empire is central to U.S. history. When we see the U.S. projecting its influence on a global scale in today s world it is important to understand that U.S. empire has a long history. This dissertation offers a case study of colonialism and U.S. empire by discussing the social worlds, labor regimes, and culture of the U.S. Army during the conquest of southern Arizona and New Mexico (1866-1886). It highlights some of the defining principles, mentalities, and characteristics of U.S. imperialism and shows how U.S. forces have in years past constructed their power and represented themselves, their missions, and the places and peoples that faced U.S. imperialism/colonialism. Using insights from postcolonial studies and whiteness studies, this work balances its attention between discursive representations (army stories) and social experience (army actions), pays attention to silences in the process of historical production, and focuses on collective group mentalities and identities. In the end the army experience reveals an empire in denial constructed on the rule of difference and marked by frustration. White officers, their wives, and the white enlisted men not only wanted the monopoly of violence for the U.S. regime but also colonial (mental/cultural) authority and power, and constructed their identity, authority, and power in discourse and in the social contexts of the everyday through difference. Engaged in warfare against the Apaches, they did not recognize their actions as harmful or acknowledge the U.S. invasion as the bloody colonial conquest it was. White army personnel painted themselves and the army as liberators, represented colonial peoples as racial inferiors, approached colonial terrain in terms of struggle, and claimed that the region was a terrible periphery with little value before the arrival of white civilization. Officers and wives also wanted to place themselves at the top of colonial hierarchies as the refined and respectable class who led the regeneration of the colony by example: they tried to turn army villages into islands of civilization and made journeys, leisure, and domestic life to showcase their class sensibilities and level of sophistication. Often, however, their efforts failed, resulting in frustration and bitterness. Many blamed the colony and its peoples for their failures. The army itself was divided by race and class. All soldiers were treated as laborers unfit for self-government. White enlisted men, frustrated by their failures in colonial warfare and by constant manual labor, constructed worlds of resistance, whereas indigenous soldiers sought to negotiate the effects of colonialism by working in the army. As colonized labor their position was defined by tension between integration and exclusion and between freedom and colonial control.
Resumo:
This study analyzes the war-time rations the Finnish soldiers received on the front from 1939 until 1945. The main objective was to determine the contents of the rations and how they affected the soldiers' nutrition and morale. The information concerning food and feeding is mainly based on the official documents found in the Military Archives. Some additional material was from the historical literature, some from memoirs, or from the veterans who personally experienced the front. The documents in the Archives of Military Medicine provided information on the soldiers' deficiencies. During the Winter War, which took place from 30 November 1939 until 13 March 1940, ample food was available. The cold climate caused problems and the fresh food got frozen. However, no severe deficiency cases were reported and the morale was high. By contrast, during the Continuation War, which began in June, 1941 and ended in September, 1944, difficulties were experienced. At the time farming in the country faced serious problems due to the shortage of labour, fuel, etc. Furthermore, importing food was generally not possible. However, importing food mainly from Germany saved the Finns from hunger. In addition, the self activity of the soldiers on the front added somewhat to the food production. But the rations had to be reduced. Their energy values were consequently low, especially for the young men. Food was monotonous and occasionally caused complaints. The main sources of protein, vitamins and minerals were the whole cereal foods. Butter was fortified with vitamin A and vitamin C tablets were also distributed, to compensate for the scant food sources. Only approximately 300 serious deficiency cases required hospital care during the three years time, out of a total of 400 000 soldiers. Feeding the young soldiers during the war (1944 - 1945) in Lapland, which had been destroyed, was problematic but the increased rations also saved them from deficiencies. In spite of the severe difficulties experienced occasionally in feeding the soldiers during the wars, the system worked all the time. The soldiers were fed, the cases of nutritional deficiency and epidemics caused by food were kept very limited and the morale of soldiers remained high.
Resumo:
In order to fully understand the process of European integration it is of paramount importance to consider developments at the sub-national and local level. EU integration scholars shifted their attention to the local level only at the beginning of the 1990s with the concept of multi-level governance (MLG). While MLG is the first concept to scrutinise the position of local levels of public administration and other actors within the EU polity, I perceive it as too optimistic in the degree of influence it ascribes to local levels. Thus, learning from and combining MLG with other concepts, such as structural constructivism, helps to reveal some of the hidden aspects of EU integration and paint a more realistic picture of multi-level interaction. This thesis also answers the call for more case studies in order to conceptualise MLG further. After a critical study of theories and concepts of European integration, above all, MLG, I will analyse sub-national and local government in Finland and Germany. I show how the sub-national level and local governments are embedded in the EU s multi-level structure of governance and how, through EU integration, those levels have been empowered but also how their scope of action has partially decreased. After theoretical and institutional contextualisation, I present the results of my empirical study of the EU s Community Initiative LEADER+. LEADER stands for Liaison Entre Actions de Développement de l'Économie Rurale , and aims at improving the economic conditions in Europe s rural areas. I was interested in how different actors construct and shape EU financed rural development, especially in how local actors organised in so-called local action groups (LAGs) cooperate with other administrative units within the LEADER+ administrative chain. I also examined intra-institutional relations within those groups, in order to find out who are the most influential and powerful actors within them. Empirical data on the Finnish and German LAGs was first gathered through a survey, which was then supplemented and completed by interviewing LAG members, LAG-managers, several civil servants from Finnish and German decision-making and managing authorities and a civil servant from the EU Commission. My main argument is that in both Germany and Finland, the Community Initiative LEADER+ offered a space for multi-level interaction and local-level involvement, a space that on the one hand consists of highly motivated people actively contributing to the improvement of the quality of life and economy in Europe s countryside but which is dependent and also restricted by national administrative practices, implementation approaches and cultures on the other. In Finland, the principle of tri-partition (kolmikantaperiaatte) in organising the executive committees of LAGs is very noticeable. In comparison to Germany, for instance, the representation of public administration in those committees is much more limited due to this principle. Furthermore, the mobilisation of local residents and the bringing together of actors from the local area with different social and institutional backgrounds to become an active part of LEADER+ was more successful in Finland than in Germany. Tri-partition as applied in Finland should serve as a model for similar policies in other EU member states. EU integration changed the formal and informal inter-institutional relations linking the different levels of government. The third sector including non-governmental institutions and interest groups gained access to policy-making processes and increasingly interact with government institutions at all levels of public administration. These developments do not necessarily result in the empowering of the local level.
Resumo:
Anti-Semitism existed in Finland during the whole period covered by this study. The immoral acts associated with Jews in the articles were mostly regarded as universal habits, qualities and/or modes of action, that is, unconnected with any particular Finnish Jew. Researchers have tried to explain anti-Semitism in several ways. The theory of Jews as outsiders has been a popular explanation as well as xenophobia, chimerical anti-Semitism and the socio-economic models. The main sources of this study have been over 400 Finnish periodicals and magazines, literature and text books published between 1918 and 1944. This vast number of magazines includes those of the army and the civil guard, religion, humour and the papers of the Finnish extreme right. One can see a distinct foreign and especially German influence in the subjects and phraseology of Finnish anti-Semitic writings between 1918 and 1944. Several known Finnish anti-Semitic writers had some kind of link with Germany. Some Finnish organisations and societies were openly anti-Semitic during this period. There had been cycles in the activity of anti-Semitic writing in Finland, obvious peaks appearing in 1918 1919, 1929 1931, 1933 1938 and 1942 1944. The reason for the 1918 1919 activity was the civil rights which were granted to the Jews in Finland, and the Russian Bolshevik revolution. The worldwide depression from 1929 to 1932 seem to be the reason for new anti-Semitic writing activity. The rise of National Socialism in Germany and the influence this phenomenon had in Finland was the reason for the peak during 1933 1938. During the continuation war 1942 1944 National Socialist Germany was fighting side-by-side with Finland and their anti-Semitic propaganda found easier access to Finland. Of the 433 magazines, journals and newspapers which were used in this study, 71 or 16.4 per cent had at least one article that can be identified as anti-Semitic; especially the magazines of national socialists and other extreme right parties were making anti-Semitic annotations. There were about 50 people known to have written anti-Semitic articles. At least half of these known writers had studied at the university, including as many as 10 priests. Over and above these, there was an even larger number of people who wrote under a pseudonym. The material used suggested that anti-Semitism was not very popular in Finland between 1918 and 1944. Anti-Semitic articles appeared mostly in the magazines of the extreme right, but their circulation was not very large. A proof of the slight influence of these extreme right anti-Semitic ideas is that, beside the tightening of policy towards Jewish immigrants in 1938 and the handing over of eight of these refugees to Germany in 1942, the official policy of Finland never became anti-Semitic. As was stated before, despite the cycles in the number of writings, there does not appear to have been any noticeable change in public opinion. One must also remember that most Finns had not at that period actually met a Jew. The material used suggests that between 1918 and 1944 the so-called Jewish question was seemingly unimportant for most Finns and their attitude to Jews and Jewishness can be described as neutral.
Resumo:
For Independent Finland. The Military Committee 1915–1918 In the course of the First World War, several organizations were founded with the purpose of making Finland independent or, at least, restoring her autonomous status. The Military Committee was the most significant active independence organization in Finland in the First World War, in addition to the activist student movement, i.e., the Jaeger Movement. The Military Committee was an organization founded in 1915 by officers who had attended the Hamina Cadet School, with the goal of creating a national army for a liberation war against the Russian troops. It was believed that the liberation war should succeed only with the help of the German Army. With the situation in society continually tensing up in the autumn 1917, the Military Committee also had to figure on the possibility of a Civil War. The activities of the Military Committee started in the early part of 1915 when they were still small-scale, but they gained significant momentum after the Russian Revolution in March 1917. In January 1918, the Military Committee formed the general staff for the White Army, the Senate’s troops. The independence-related activities of the Hamina cadets in the years of the First World War were more extensive and multifaceted than has been believed heretofore. The work of the Military Committee was divided into preparations for a liberation war in Finland, on one hand, and in Stockholm and Berlin, on the other hand. In Finland, the Military Committee took part in intelligence gathering for Germany and in supporting the recruiting Jaegers, and later in founding the civil guard organization, in solving the law and order authorities issue, and finally in selecting the Commander-in-Chief for the Senate’s troops. The member of the Military Committee, especially Captain Hannes Ignatius of the Cavalry contributed greatly to the drafting of the independence activists’ national action plan in Stockholm in May 1917. This plan preceded the formation of the civil guard organization. The Military Committee’s role in founding the civil guards was initially minor, but in the fall of 1917, the Military Committee started to finance the activities of the civil guards, named several former officers as commanders of the civil guards and finally overtook the entire civil guard movement. In Stockholm and Berlin, the representatives of the Military Committee were in active contact with both the high command of the German Army and with the representatives of the Swedish Army. Colonel Nikolai Mexmontan, who was a representative of the Military Committee, collaborated with Swedish officers and Jaeger officers in Stockholm in coming up with comprehensive and detailed plans for starting the Liberation War. Under Mexmontan’s leadership, there were serious negotiations to enter into a confederation with Germany. Lieutenant Colonel Wilhelm Thesleff, on the other hand, became the commander of the Jaeger Battalion 27. The influence and importance of the Military Committee came to the forefront in independent and conflict-torn Finland. The Military Committee became a Senate committee on the 7th of January 1918, with its chairman, for all practical purposes, as the Commander-in-Chief in an eventual war. Lieutenant General Claes Charpentier was the chairman of the Military Committee from mid-December 1917 onwards, but on the 15th of January 1918 he had to resign in favour of Lieutenant General Gustaf Mannerheim. Soon after that, Mannerheim got an order from the chairman of the Senate P. E. Svinhufvud to organize and assume the leadership of the law and order authorities. The chairman of the Military Committee became the Commander-in-Chief of the Senate troops in January 1918, and the Military Committee became the Commander-in-Chief’s general staff. The Military Committee had turned from a clandestine organization into the first general staff of the independent Finnish Army.
Resumo:
This study explores the decline of terrorism by conducting source-based case studies on two left-wing terrorist campaigns in the 1970s, those of the Rode Jeugd in the Netherlands and the Symbionese Liberation Army in the United States. The purpose of the case studies is to bring more light into the interplay of different external and internal factors in the development of terrorist campaigns. This is done by presenting the history of the two chosen campaigns as narratives from the participants’ points of view, based on interviews with participants and extensive archival material. Organizational resources and dynamics clearly influenced the course of the two campaigns, but in different ways. This divergence derives at least partly from dissimilarities in organizational design and the incentive structure. Comparison of even these two cases shows that organizations using terrorism as a strategy can differ significantly, even when they share ideological orientation, are of the same size and operate in the same time period. Theories on the dynamics of terrorist campaigns would benefit from being more sensitive to this. The study also highlights that the demise of a terrorist organization does not necessarily lead to the decline of the terrorist campaign. Therefore, research should look at the development of terrorist activity beyond the lifespan of a single organization. The collective ideological beliefs and goals functioned primarily as a sustaining force, a lens through which the participants interpreted all developments. On the other hand, it appears that the role of ideology should not be overstated. Namely, not all participants in the campaigns under study fully internalized the radical ideology. Rather, their participation was mainly based on their friendship with other participants. Instead of ideology per se, it is more instructive to look at how those involved described their organization, themselves and their role in the revolutionary struggle. In both cases under study, the choice of the terrorist strategy was not merely a result of a cost-benefit calculation, but an important part of the participants’ self-image. Indeed, the way the groups portrayed themselves corresponded closely with the forms of action that they got involved in. Countermeasures and the lack of support were major reasons for the decline of the campaigns. However, what is noteworthy is that the countermeasures would not have had the same kind of impact had it not been for certain weaknesses of the groups themselves. Moreover, besides the direct impact the countermeasures had on the campaign, equally important was how they affected the attitudes of the larger left-wing community and the public in general. In this context, both the attitudes towards the terrorist campaign and the authorities were relevant to the outcome of the campaigns.