Contested Lands: Land Disputes in Semi-Arid Parts of Northern Tanzania : Case Studies of the Loliondo and Sale Divisions

This study Contested Lands: Land disputes in semi-arid parts of northern Tanzania. Case Studies of the Loliondo and Sale Division in the Ngorongoro District concentrates on describing the specific land disputes which took place in the 1990s in the Loliondo and Sale Divisions of the Ngorongoro District in northern Tanzania. The study shows the territorial and historical transformation of territories and property and their relation to the land disputes of the 1990s'. It was assumed that land disputes have been firstly linked to changing spatiality due to the zoning policies of the State territoriality and, secondly, they can be related to the State control of property where the ownership of land property has been redefined through statutory laws. In the analysis of the land disputes issues such as use of territoriality, boundary construction and property claims, in geographical space, are highlighted. Generally, from the 1980s onwards, increases in human population within both Divisions have put pressure on land/resources. This has led to the increased control of land/resource, to the construction of boundaries and finally to formalized land rights on village lands of the Loliondo Division. The land disputes have thus been linked to the use of legal power and to the re-creation of the boundary (informal or formal) either by the Maasai or the Sonjo on the Loliondo and Sale village lands. In Loliondo Division land disputes have been resource-based and related to multiple allocations of land or game resource concessions. Land disputes became clearly political and legal struggles with an ecological reference.Land disputes were stimulated when the common land/resource rights on village lands of the Maasai pastoralists became regulated and insecure. The analysis of past land disputes showed that space-place tensions on village lands can be presented as a platform on which spatial and property issues with complex power relations have been debated. The reduction of future land disputes will succeed only when/if local property rights to land and resources are acknowledged, especially in rural lands of the Tanzanian State.

Strategic Information Acquisition: Applications to Herding and Auctions

The information that the economic agents have and regard relevant to their decision making is often assumed to be exogenous in economics. It is assumed that the agents either poses or can observe the payoff relevant information without having to exert any effort to acquire it. In this thesis we relax the assumption of ex-ante fixed information structure and study what happens to the equilibrium behavior when the agents must also decide what information to acquire and when to acquire it. This thesis addresses this question in the two essays on herding and two essays on auction theory. In the first two essays, that are joint work with Klaus Kultti, we study herding models where it is costly to acquire information on the actions that the preceding agents have taken. In our model the agents have to decide both the action that they take and additionally the information that they want to acquire by observing their predecessors. We characterize the equilibrium behavior when the decision to observe preceding agents' actions is endogenous and show how the equilibrium outcome may differ from the standard model, where all preceding agents actions are assumed to be observable. In the latter part of this thesis we study two dynamic auctions: the English and the Dutch auction. We consider a situation where bidder(s) are uninformed about their valuations for the object that is put up for sale and they may acquire this information for a small cost at any point during the auction. We study the case of independent private valuations. In the third essay of the thesis we characterize the equilibrium behavior in an English auction when there are informed and uninformed bidders. We show that the informed bidder may jump bid and signal to the uninformed that he has a high valuation, thus deterring the uninformed from acquiring information and staying in the auction. The uninformed optimally acquires information once the price has passed a particular threshold and the informed has not signalled that his valuation is high. In addition, we provide an example of an information structure where the informed bidder initially waits and then makes multiple jumps. In the fourth essay of this thesis we study the Dutch auction. We consider two cases where all bidders are all initially uninformed. In the first case the information acquisition cost is the same across all bidders and in the second also the cost of information acquisition is independently distributed and private information to the bidders. We characterize a mixed strategy equilibrium in the first and a pure strategy equilibrium in the second case. In addition we provide a conjecture of an equilibrium in an asymmetric situation where there is one informed and one uninformed bidder. We compare the revenues that the first price auction and the Dutch auction generate and we find that under some circumstances the Dutch auction outperforms the first price sealed bid auction. The usual first price sealed bid auction and the Dutch auction are strategically equivalent. However, this equivalence breaks down in case information is acquired during the auction.