Puolustuskykyinen valtio vai Ruotsin hälytyskello? : Suomen sotilasstrateginen asema kylmän sodan alkuvuosien asiantuntija-arvioissa

The doctoral thesis deals with Finnish and foreign expert s analyses of Finland s military strategic position and defence capability, dating back to the early years of the Cold War. Finland s military high command prepared assessments of the country s strategic position and of the capability of the Defence Forces as grounds for defence planning. Since Finland was located on the Cold War dividing line, the foreign powers were also monitoring the development of Finland s situation. The research carried out had access to the armed forces internal assessments, as well as to analyses prepared by the military intelligence services of Sweden, Britain and the United States. One of the working hypotheses was that after the WWII the ability military leadership to estimate the security political needs of the country and the organisation of its defence was severely weakened so that the dangers of the international development were not perceived and the gradual erosion of defence capability was partly unnoticed. This hypothesis proved to be wrong. Even if the Finnish military intelligence was much weaker than during the war, it was able to provide the military leadership with information of the international military development for the most part. The military leadership was also fully aware of the weakening of the defence capability of the country. They faced the difficult task of making the country s political leadership, i.e. President Paasikivi and the government, also understand the gravity of the situation. Only in the last years of his term in office Paasikivi started to believe the warnings of the military. According to another hypothesis, outside observers considered the Finnish armed forces to primarily act as reinforcements for the Soviet Red Army, and they believed that, in the event of a full-scale war, the Finns would not have been able or even willing to resist a Soviet invasion of Sweden and Norway through Finland. The study confirmed that this was approximately the view the Swedes, the British and the Americans had of the Finnish forces. Western and Swedish intelligence assessments did not show confidence in Finland s defence ability and the country was regarded almost as a Soviet satellite. Finland s strategic position was, however, considered slightly different from that of the Soviet-occupied Eastern European countries. Finland had been forced to become part of the Soviet sphere of interest and security system and this was sealed by the Finno-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance in 1948. Finland had little importance to the military interests of the Western powers. In Sweden s defence planning, however, Finland played a significant role as an alarm bell of a possible Soviet surprise attack, as well as defensive frontline and buffer zone.

European Union and the developing nations' external debt : EU-15's debt policy, 1960–2008

This Master's Thesis defines the debt policy of the current European Union Member States towards the developing nations. Since no official policy for debt exists in the EU, it is defined to include debt practices (loans and debt relief in development cooperation) and debt within the EU development policy framework. This study (1) describes how the issue of external debt appears in the development policy framework, (2) compares EU Member States' given loans and debt relief to grants for the developing nations (1960s to the 2000s), and (3) measures the current orientation in ODA of each EU Member State between grant aid and loan aid using the Grant-Loan Index (GLI). Theoretical aspects include reasons for selecting between loans (Bouchet 1987) and grants (Odedokun 2004, O'Brien and Williams 2007), policy context of the EU (Van Reisen 2007) and the meaning of external debt in the set-up between the North and the South. In terms of history, the events and impact of the colonial period (where loans have originated) are overviewed and compared in light of today's policies. Development assistance statistics are derived from the OECD DAC statistics portal and EU development policy framework documents from the EU portal. Methodologically, the structure of this study is from policy analysis (Barrien 1999, Hill 2008, Berndtson 2008), but it has been modified to fit the needs of studying a non-official policy. EU Member States are divided into three groups by Carbone (2007a), the Big-3, Northern and Southern donors, based on common development assistance characteristics. The Grant-Loan Index is used to compare Carbone's model, which measures quality of aid, to the GLI measuring the structure of aid. Results indicate that EU- 15 countries (active in debt practices) differ in terms of timing, stability and equality of debt practices in the long-term (1960s to the 2000s). In terms of current practices, (2000-2008), it is noted that there lies a disparity between the actual practices and the way in which external debt is represented in the development policy framework, although debt practices form a relevant portion of total ODA practices for many EU-15 Member States, the issue itself plays a minor role in development policy documents. Carbone’s group division applies well to the Grant – Loan Index’s results, indicating that countries with similar development policy behaviour have similarities in debt policy behaviour, with one exception: Greece. On the basis of this study, it is concluded that EU development policy framework content in terms of external debt and debt practices are not congruent. The understanding of this disparity between the policy outline and differences in long-term practices is relevant in both, reaching the UN’s Millennium Development Goals, and in the actual process of developing development aid.