Strike Hard, Strike Sure - Operation Musketeer : British Military Planning during the Suez Crisis, 1956

This study analyses British military planning and actions during the Suez Crisis in 1956. It seeks to find military reasons for the change of concepts during the planning and compares these reasons with the tactical doctrines of the time. The thesis takes extensive advantage of military documents preserved in the National Archives, London. In order to expand the understanding of the exchange of views during the planning process, the private papers of high ranking military officials have also been consulted. French military documents preserved in the Service Historique de la Defence, Paris, have provided an important point of comparison. The Suez Crisis caught the British armed forces in the middle of a transition phase. The main objective of the armed forces was to establish a credible deterrence against the Soviet Union. However, due to overseas commitments the Middle East playing a paramount role because of its economic importance the armed forces were compelled to also prepare for Limited War and the Cold War. The armed forces were not fully prepared to meet this demand. The Middle Eastern garrison was being re-organised after the withdrawal from the Canal Base and the concept for a strategic reserve was unimplemented. The tactical doctrines of the time were based on experiences from the Second World War. As a result, the British view of amphibious operations and the subsequent campaigns emphasised careful planning, mastery of the sea and the air, sufficient superiority in numbers and firepower, centralised command and extensive administrative preparations. The British military had realized that Nasser could nationalise the Suez Canal and prepared an outline plan to meet this contingency. Although the plan was nothing more than a concept, it was accepted as a basis for further planning when the Canal was nationalised at the end of July. This plan was short-lived. The nominated Task Force Commanders shifted the landing site from Port Said to Alexandria because it enabled faster expansion of the bridgehead. In addition, further operations towards Cairo the hub of Nasser s power would be easier to conduct. The operational concept can be described as being traditional and was in accordance with the amphibious warfare doctrine. This plan was completely changed at the beginning of September. Apparently, General Charles Keightley, the Commander-in-Chief, and the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee developed the idea of prolonged aerial operations. The essence of the concept was to break the Egyptian will to resist by attacking the oil facilities, the transportation system and the armed forces. This victory through air concept would be supported by carefully planned psychological operations. This concept was in accordance with the Royal Air Force doctrine, which promoted a bomber offensive against selected target categories. General Keightley s plan was accepted despite suspicions at every planning level. The Joint Planning Staff and the Task Force Commanders opposed the concept from the beginning to the end because of its unpredictability. There was no information that suggested the bombing would persuade the Egyptians to submit. This problem was worsened by the fact that British intelligence was unable to provide reliable strategic information. The Task Force Commanders, who were responsible for the tactical plans, were not able to change Keightley s mind, but the concept was expanded to include a traditional amphibious assault on Port Said due to their resistance. The bombing campaign was never tested as the Royal Air Force was denied authorisation to destroy the transportation and oil targets. The Chiefs of Staff and General Keightley were too slow to realise that the execution of the plan depended on the determination of the Prime Minister. However, poor health, a lack of American and domestic support and the indecisiveness of the military had ruined Eden s resolve. In the end, a very traditional amphibious assault, which was bound to succeed at the tactical level but fail at the strategic level, was launched against Port Said.

Spirometric studies on the adult general population of Helsinki : bronchodilation responses, determinants, and intrasession repeatability of FEV1, FEV6, FVC, and forced expiratory time

Spirometry is the most widely used lung function test in the world. It is fundamental in diagnostic and functional evaluation of various pulmonary diseases. In the studies described in this thesis, the spirometric assessment of reversibility of bronchial obstruction, its determinants, and variation features are described in a general population sample from Helsinki, Finland. This study is a part of the FinEsS study, which is a collaborative study of clinical epidemiology of respiratory health between Finland (Fin), Estonia (Es), and Sweden (S). Asthma and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD) constitute the two major obstructive airways diseases. The prevalence of asthma has increased, with around 6% of the population in Helsinki reporting physician-diagnosed asthma. The main cause of COPD is smoking with changes in smoking habits in the population affecting its prevalence with a delay. Whereas airway obstruction in asthma is by definition reversible, COPD is characterized by fixed obstruction. Cough and sputum production, the first symptoms of COPD, are often misinterpreted for smokers cough and not recognized as first signs of a chronic illness. Therefore COPD is widely underdiagnosed. More extensive use of spirometry in primary care is advocated to focus smoking cessation interventions on populations at risk. The use of forced expiratory volume in six seconds (FEV6) instead of forced vital capacity (FVC) has been suggested to enable office spirometry to be used in earlier detection of airflow limitation. Despite being a widely accepted standard method of assessment of lung function, the methodology and interpretation of spirometry are constantly developing. In 2005, the ATS/ERS Task Force issued a joint statement which endorsed the 12% and 200 ml thresholds for significant change in forced expiratory volume in one second (FEV1) or FVC during bronchodilation testing, but included the notion that in cases where only FVC improves it should be verified that this is not caused by a longer exhalation time in post-bronchodilator spirometry. This elicited new interest in the assessment of forced expiratory time (FET), a spirometric variable not usually reported or used in assessment. In this population sample, we examined FET and found it to be on average 10.7 (SD 4.3) s and to increase with ageing and airflow limitation in spirometry. The intrasession repeatability of FET was the poorest of the spirometric variables assessed. Based on the intrasession repeatability, a limit for significant change of 3 s was suggested for FET during bronchodilation testing. FEV6 was found to perform equally well as FVC in the population and in a subgroup of subjects with airways obstruction. In the bronchodilation test, decreases were frequently observed in FEV1 and particularly in FVC. The limit of significant increase based on the 95th percentile of the population sample was 9% for FEV1 and 6% for FEV6 and FVC; these are slightly lower than the current limits for single bronchodilation tests (ATS/ERS guidelines). FEV6 was proven as a valid alternative to FVC also in the bronchodilation test and would remove the need to control duration of exhalation during the spirometric bronchodilation test.