Matti Laurila : Jääkäriupseeri, suojeluskuntapäällikkö, rintamakomentaja

Matti Laurila (1895 1983) This is a biographical research of a Jaeger officer, a Civil Guard Chief, a Field Commander Matti Laurila. A broader practice of qualitative methods was utilized in the research. The main aim is a permanent reconstruction and reinterpretation of past events through the experiences of the study object. The life and times of Laurila are intertwined with the crucial events that led to the Finnish Declaration of Independence. Afterwards he helped to ensure that the young republic also stayed independent. As a Jaeger in the winter of 1917 Laurila witnessed an incident he would never forget. After disobeying a direct order, Sven Saarikoski from Lapua was shot dead by his commanding officer, K. A. Ståhlberg, on the ice of the river Aa. Laurila faced the horrors of war at closer quarters, for he lost his father and his brother in the battle of Länkipohja on 16th March 1918. This battle was a major turning point for Laurila and profoundly influenced the rest of his life. The relationship between Laurila and his superiors was problematic almost throughout his military career, haunted as he was by the memory of Sven Saarikoski's execution and the losses in Länkipohja The position of Laurila as an authority in South Ostrobothnia was a key factor in preventing the extreme right from rallying enough Civil Guard troops to escalate the embryonic Mäntsälä rebellion of 1932. After the rebellion Laurila routinely opposed anything he saw as a threat to the independence of the Civil Guard. He would flatly refuse to even consider the integration of the Civil Guard into the national defence force. His uncompromising stand in this matter annoyed some among the higher ranking officers. After the Winter War Laurila got himself into a dispute with Jaeger Colonel H. E. Hannuksela that would have long-lasting consequences. The conflicts between them became widely known in the attack phase of the Continuation War in 1941 at the latest. Laurila had to give up his military career at the end of 1944. In the years that followed he did what he could to ensure that the South Ostrobothnia Civil Guard patrimony remained in the province. Laurila's position as a respected authority in South Ostrobothnia remained unchanged until his death.

Itsenäisen Suomen puolesta : Sotilaskomitea 1915-1918

For Independent Finland. The Military Committee 1915–1918 In the course of the First World War, several organizations were founded with the purpose of making Finland independent or, at least, restoring her autonomous status. The Military Committee was the most significant active independence organization in Finland in the First World War, in addition to the activist student movement, i.e., the Jaeger Movement. The Military Committee was an organization founded in 1915 by officers who had attended the Hamina Cadet School, with the goal of creating a national army for a liberation war against the Russian troops. It was believed that the liberation war should succeed only with the help of the German Army. With the situation in society continually tensing up in the autumn 1917, the Military Committee also had to figure on the possibility of a Civil War. The activities of the Military Committee started in the early part of 1915 when they were still small-scale, but they gained significant momentum after the Russian Revolution in March 1917. In January 1918, the Military Committee formed the general staff for the White Army, the Senate’s troops. The independence-related activities of the Hamina cadets in the years of the First World War were more extensive and multifaceted than has been believed heretofore. The work of the Military Committee was divided into preparations for a liberation war in Finland, on one hand, and in Stockholm and Berlin, on the other hand. In Finland, the Military Committee took part in intelligence gathering for Germany and in supporting the recruiting Jaegers, and later in founding the civil guard organization, in solving the law and order authorities issue, and finally in selecting the Commander-in-Chief for the Senate’s troops. The member of the Military Committee, especially Captain Hannes Ignatius of the Cavalry contributed greatly to the drafting of the independence activists’ national action plan in Stockholm in May 1917. This plan preceded the formation of the civil guard organization. The Military Committee’s role in founding the civil guards was initially minor, but in the fall of 1917, the Military Committee started to finance the activities of the civil guards, named several former officers as commanders of the civil guards and finally overtook the entire civil guard movement. In Stockholm and Berlin, the representatives of the Military Committee were in active contact with both the high command of the German Army and with the representatives of the Swedish Army. Colonel Nikolai Mexmontan, who was a representative of the Military Committee, collaborated with Swedish officers and Jaeger officers in Stockholm in coming up with comprehensive and detailed plans for starting the Liberation War. Under Mexmontan’s leadership, there were serious negotiations to enter into a confederation with Germany. Lieutenant Colonel Wilhelm Thesleff, on the other hand, became the commander of the Jaeger Battalion 27. The influence and importance of the Military Committee came to the forefront in independent and conflict-torn Finland. The Military Committee became a Senate committee on the 7th of January 1918, with its chairman, for all practical purposes, as the Commander-in-Chief in an eventual war. Lieutenant General Claes Charpentier was the chairman of the Military Committee from mid-December 1917 onwards, but on the 15th of January 1918 he had to resign in favour of Lieutenant General Gustaf Mannerheim. Soon after that, Mannerheim got an order from the chairman of the Senate P. E. Svinhufvud to organize and assume the leadership of the law and order authorities. The chairman of the Military Committee became the Commander-in-Chief of the Senate troops in January 1918, and the Military Committee became the Commander-in-Chief’s general staff. The Military Committee had turned from a clandestine organization into the first general staff of the independent Finnish Army.

The British Intervention in South Russia 1918-1920

Soon after the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, a three-year civil war broke out in Russia. As in many other civil wars, foreign powers intervened in the conflict. Britain played a leading role in this intervention and had a significant effect on the course of the war. Without this intervention on the White side, the superiority of numbers in manpower and weaponry of the Bolsheviks would have quickly overwhelmed their opponents. The aim of this dissertation is to explain the nature and role of the British intervention on the southern, and most decisive, front of the Civil War. The political decision making in London is studied as a background, but the focus of the dissertation is on the actual implementation of the British policy in Russia. The British military mission arrived in South Russia in late 1918, and started to provide General Denikin s White army with ample supplies. General Denikin would have not been able to build his army of more than 200,000 men or to make his operation against Moscow without the British matériel. The British mission also organized the training and equipping of the Russian troops with British weapons. This made the material aid much more effective. Many of the British instructors took part in fighting the Bolsheviks despite the orders of their government. The study is based on primary sources produced by British departments of state and members of the British mission and military units in South Russia. Primary sources from the Whites, including the personal collections of several key figures of the White movement and official records of the Armed Forces of South Russia are also used to give a balanced picture of the course of events. It is possible to draw some general conclusions from the White movement and reasons for their defeat from the study of the British intervention. In purely material terms the British aid placed Denikin s army in a far more favourable position than the Bolsheviks in 1919, but other military defects in the White army were numerous. The White commanders were unimaginative, their military thinking was obsolete, and they were incapable of organizing the logistics of their army. There were also fundamental defects in the morale of the White troops. In addition to all political mistakes of Denikin s movement and a general inability to adjust to the complex situation in Revolutionary Russia, the Whites suffered a clear military defeat. In South Russia the Whites were defeated not because of the lack of British aid, but rather in spite of it.