Sustainable forest management : ecologically sound and socially accepted

This dissertation explored the ecological dimension of ecologically sustainable forest management in boreal forests, and factors of the socio-cultural dimension that affect how the concept of ecologically sustainable forest management is defined. My approach was problem-oriented and generalistic-holistic. I examined associations between the abundances of wildlife groups (grouse, large predators, small predators, ungulates) and Siberian flying squirrels, and their co-occurrence with tree structural characteristics at the regional level. The trade-offs between ecological, social and economic sustainability in forestry were explored at the regional scale. I identified a potential 'shopping basket' of regional indicators for ecologically sustainable forest management, combining the relative abundance of Siberian flying squirrels, a wildlife richness index (WRI) for grouse, diversity indices of saw-timber trees, tree age classes and the proportion of old-growth (> 120 yr) forests. I suggest that the close association between forestry activity, the proportion of young forests (< 40 yr) and a WRI for small predators can be considered as potential 'alarm bells' for regions in which the creation of trade-offs (negative relationships) between economic and ecological components of sustainable forestry is ongoing. Explorative analyses revealed negative relationships between forestry activity and a WRI of 16 game species, the WRI for grouse and tree age diversity. Socially sustainable communities compete less intensively with ecological components of forests than communities where forestry is important. Interestingly, forest ownership types (farmers, other private forest owners, the forestry industry, the State) correlated significantly with the co-occurrence of flying squirrels, grouse and diverse forest structural characteristics rather than, for instance, with the total number of protection areas, suggesting that private forest ownership can lead to increased ecological sustainability. I examined forest actors’ argumentation to identify characteristics that affect the interpretation of ecologically sustainable forest management. Four argumentation frame types were constructed: information, work, experience and own position based. These differed in terms of their emphasis on external experts or own experiences. The closer ecologically sustainable forest management is to the forest actor’s daily life, the more profiled policy tools (counselling, learning through experiences) are needed to guide management behaviour to become more ecologically sound. I illustrated that forest actors interpret, use and understand information through meaningful framing. I analysed the extent to which ecological research information has been perceived in the Forestry Development Centre TAPIO’s recommendations and revised PEFC Finland criteria. We noticed that the political value for decaying wood was much lower in PEFC Finland critera (4 m3) than could be expected as a socially acceptable level (9 m3) or ecologically sound (10-20 m3). I consider it important for scientists to join political discourses and become involved in policy making concerning sustainable forest management to learn to present their results in a way that is reasonable from the user’s perspective.

Puolustuskykyinen valtio vai Ruotsin hälytyskello? : Suomen sotilasstrateginen asema kylmän sodan alkuvuosien asiantuntija-arvioissa

The doctoral thesis deals with Finnish and foreign expert s analyses of Finland s military strategic position and defence capability, dating back to the early years of the Cold War. Finland s military high command prepared assessments of the country s strategic position and of the capability of the Defence Forces as grounds for defence planning. Since Finland was located on the Cold War dividing line, the foreign powers were also monitoring the development of Finland s situation. The research carried out had access to the armed forces internal assessments, as well as to analyses prepared by the military intelligence services of Sweden, Britain and the United States. One of the working hypotheses was that after the WWII the ability military leadership to estimate the security political needs of the country and the organisation of its defence was severely weakened so that the dangers of the international development were not perceived and the gradual erosion of defence capability was partly unnoticed. This hypothesis proved to be wrong. Even if the Finnish military intelligence was much weaker than during the war, it was able to provide the military leadership with information of the international military development for the most part. The military leadership was also fully aware of the weakening of the defence capability of the country. They faced the difficult task of making the country s political leadership, i.e. President Paasikivi and the government, also understand the gravity of the situation. Only in the last years of his term in office Paasikivi started to believe the warnings of the military. According to another hypothesis, outside observers considered the Finnish armed forces to primarily act as reinforcements for the Soviet Red Army, and they believed that, in the event of a full-scale war, the Finns would not have been able or even willing to resist a Soviet invasion of Sweden and Norway through Finland. The study confirmed that this was approximately the view the Swedes, the British and the Americans had of the Finnish forces. Western and Swedish intelligence assessments did not show confidence in Finland s defence ability and the country was regarded almost as a Soviet satellite. Finland s strategic position was, however, considered slightly different from that of the Soviet-occupied Eastern European countries. Finland had been forced to become part of the Soviet sphere of interest and security system and this was sealed by the Finno-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance in 1948. Finland had little importance to the military interests of the Western powers. In Sweden s defence planning, however, Finland played a significant role as an alarm bell of a possible Soviet surprise attack, as well as defensive frontline and buffer zone.