The Far Eastern Question at the Washington Conference (1921-1922) with an outline of its implications for internal politics in China

This dissertation is a narrative account of the negotiations concerning the question of the Far East and the Shandong issue at the Washington Conference, leading to treaties, agreements and resolutions. In this dissertation, a certain stress is laid on the interaction between the Conference and the internal situation in China, particularly concerning the question of the implications of the Conference for Cabinet politics in Peking. Through the narrative account of the Conference, the general aim is an attempt to reassess the achievements of the Washington Conference. Too often the Washington Conference has been viewed negatively. The political aim behind the legal framework was to open the door to China as a sovereign State member of the international community whose territorial integrity was internationally recognized, despite its chaotic internal situation. It is undeniable that the Washington Conference opened a new chapter in modern Chinese history. The violations of the agreements concerning China that occurred in the 1930s should not lead to the belief that these agreements were of no value. Peace may not be lasting and evolves according to circumstances; agreements are transitory, and new situations need new arrangements. This dissertation tries to demonstrate that the agreements in themselves were not the cause of their failure, but the failure was due to the lack of determination on the part of the Signatories Powers to defend them.

Corporate Governance Mechanisms and Firm Performance:Evidence from Finland

This paper examines the association between corporate governance attributes and firm performance of Finnish firms during 1990 – 2000. The empirical results suggest that corporate governance matters for firm performance. First, univariate test results indicate that firms characterized by a high (efficient) level of corporate governance have delivered greater stock returns, are higher valued based on the measure of Tobin’s Q, and exhibit higher ratios of cash flow to assets, on average, in comparison to their counterparts characterized by a low (inefficient) level of corporate governance. Second, controlling for a number of well-known determinants of stock returns, we find evidence that firms categorized by inefficient corporate governance have delivered inferior returns to shareholders during the investigation period. Finally, after controlling for several common determinants of firm value, we find that firms characterized by efficient corporate governance have been valued higher during the investigation period, measured by Tobin’s Q.