Itämafia : Uhkakuvapolitiikka, rikosilmiöt ja kulttuuriset merkitykset

The Eastern Mafia Threat policy, crime phenomena, and cultural meanings An interdisciplinary research on the crime phenomena and the threat policy relating to the organized crime and the mafia of Russia and Estonia is based on 151 expert interviews, statistics, documents, research literature, and press material. The main part of the material consists of interviews of the Finnish, Estonian and Russian police authorities specialized in the problem of organized crime, and the reports on the crime situation drawn up in the Finnish diplomatic representations in Tallinn and St Petersburg. The interviews have been gathered in the years 1996-2001. The main theoretical tools of the research are constructivist research on social problems, and political psychology. Definitional processes of social problems and cultural semantic structures behind them are identified in the analysis and connected to the analysis of the crime cases. Both in the Anglo-American and Russian cultural frames there appears an inflated and exaggerated talk, according to which the mafia rules everything in Russia and is spreading everywhere. There is the traditional anti-Semitic paranoia in the core of this cultural symbiosis produced by Russian legal nihilism, the theory of totalitarianism of Sovietology, and the inertia of Russian anti-capitalism. To equate the Sicilian Mafia with Russia is an anachronism, since no empirical proof of systematic uncontrolled violence or absolute power vacuum in Russia can be found. In the Anglo-American policy of threat images, "the Russian mafia" was seen as a commodified conspiracy theory, which the police, the media, and the research took advantage of, blurring the line between fact and fiction. In Finland, the evolution of the policy of threat images proceeded in three phases: Initially, extensive rolling of refugees and criminals from Russia to Finland was emphasized in the beginning of the 1990's. In the second phase, the eastern mafia was said to infiltrate all over Finnish society and administration. Finland was, however, found immune to this kind of spreading. In the third phase, in the 21st century, the organized crime of Finland was said to be lead from abroad. In Finland, the policy of threat images was especially canalised to moral panics connected to "eastern prostitution". In Estonia, the policy of threat images emphasized the crime organized by the Russian authorities and politicians in order to weaken Estonia. In Russia, the policy of threat images emphasized the total criminalizing of society caused by criminal capitalism. In every country, the policy of threat images was affected by a so-called large-group identity, a term by Vamik Volkan, in which a so-called chosen trauma caused a political paranoia of an outer and inner danger. In Finland, procuring, car theft, and narcotics crimes were at their widest arranged by the Finnish often with the help of the Estonians. The Russians had no influence in the most serious violent crimes in Finland, although the number of assassinations were at least 5, 000 in Russia in the 1990's. In Russia, the assassinations were on one hand connected to marital problems, on the other hand to the pursuit of public attention and a hoped-for effect by the aid of the murder of an influential person. In the white-collar crime phenomena between Finland and Russia, the Finnish state and Finnish corporations gained remarkable benefit of the frauds aimed at the states of the Soviet Union and Russia in 1980's-21st century. The situation of Estonia was very difficult compared to that of Russia in the 1990's, which was manifested in the stagnation of the Estonian police and judicial authorities, the crimes of the police and the voluntary paramilitary organization, bomb explosions, the rebellion called "the jaeger crisis" in the voluntary paramilitary organization, and the "blood autumn" of Eastern Virumaa, in other words terror. The situation of Estonia had a powerful effect on the crime situation of Finland and on the security of the Finnish diplomats. In the continuum of the Finnish policy of threat images, Russia and the Russians were, however, presented as a source of a marked danger.

Trust and Collectives

"Trust and Collectives" is a compilation of articles: (I) "On Rational Trust" (in Meggle, G. (ed.) Social Facts & Collective Intentionality, Dr. Hänsel-Hohenhausen AG (currently Ontos), 2002), (II) "Simulating Rational Social Normative Trust, Predictive Trust, and Predictive Reliance Between Agents" (M.Tuomela and S. Hofmann, Ethics and Information Technology 5, 2003), (III) "A Collective's Trust in a Collective's action" (Protosociology, 18-19, 2003), and (IV) "Cooperation and Trust in Group Contexts" (R. Tuomela and M.Tuomela, Mind and Society 4/1, 2005 ). The articles are tied together by an introduction that dwells deeply on the topic of trust. (I) presents a somewhat general version of (RSNTR) and some basic arguments. (II) offers an application of (RSNTR) for a computer simulation of trust.(III) applies (RSNTR) to Raimo Tuomela's "we-mode"collectives (i.e. The Philosophy of Social Practices, Cambridge University Press, 2002). (IV) analyzes cooperation and trust in the context of acting as a member of a collective. Thus, (IV) elaborates on the topic of collective agency in (III) and puts the trust account (RSNTR) to work in a framework of cooperation. The central aim of this work is to construct a well-argued conceptual and theoretical account of rational trust, viz. a person's subjectively rational trust in another person vis-à-vis his performance of an action, seen from a first-person point of view. The main method is conceptual and theoretical analysis understood along the lines of reflective equilibrium. The account of rational social normative trust (RSNTR), which is argued and defended against other views, is the result of the quest. The introduction stands on its own legs as an argued presentation of an analysis of the concept of rational trust and an analysis of trust itself (RSNTR). It is claimed that (RSNTR) is "genuine" trust and embedded in a relationship of mutual respect for the rights of the other party. This relationship is the growing site for trust, a causal and conceptual ground, but it is not taken as a reason for trusting (viz. predictive "trust"). Relevant themes such as risk, decision, rationality, control, and cooperation are discussed and the topics of the articles are briefly presented. In this work it is argued that genuine trust is to be kept apart from predictive "trust." When we trust a person vis-à-vis his future action that concerns ourselves on the basis of his personal traits and/or features of the specific situation we have a prediction-like attitude. Genuine trust develops in a relationship of mutual respect for the mutual rights of the other party. Such a relationship is formed through interaction where the parties gradually find harmony concerning "the rules of the game." The trust account stands as a contribution to philosophical research on central social notions and it could be used as a theoretical model in social psychology, economical and political science where interaction between persons and groups are in focus. The analysis could also serve as a model for a trust component in computer simulation of human action. In the context of everyday life the account clarifies the difference between predictive "trust" and genuine trust. There are no fast shortcuts to trust. Experiences of mutual respect for mutual rights cannot be had unless there is respect.

Group Beliefs : Studies on the Nature and Logic of Collective Doxastic Attitudes

This thesis studies the nature and logic of collective doxastic attitudes, or what is referred to in ordinary language as "group beliefs". Beliefs and other intentional attitudes are attributed to groups and collections of people, and such attributions are used to explain and predict the actions of groups. The thesis develops an understanding of group beliefs as voluntarily adopted views or acceptances rather than as ordinary beliefs. Such an understanding can provide new answers to questions concerning collective knowledge and justification of group beliefs, and it allows developing modal logics with collective doxastic and epistemic notions. The thesis consists of six articles. The first three articles are philosophical studies concerned with the nature of group beliefs. The last three articles are logical studies that aim at developing proof-theoretical calculi for reasoning about collective doxastic attitudes.

Humanitaarisuuden varjossa : Poliittiset tekijät lastensiirroissa Ruotsiin sotiemme aikana ja niiden jälkeen

The evacuation of Finnish children to Sweden during WW II has often been called a small migration . Historical research on this subject is scarce, considering the great number of children involved. The present research has applied, apart from the traditional archive research, the framework of history-culture developed by Rüsen in order to have an all-inclusive approach to the impact of this historical event. The framework has three dimensions: political, aesthetic and cognitive. The collective memory of war children has also been discussed. The research looks for political factors involved in the evacuations during the Winter War and the Continuation War and the post-war period. The approach is wider than a purely humanitarian one. Political factors have had an impact in both Finland and Sweden, beginning from the decision-making process and ending with the discussion of the unexpected consequences of the evacuations in the Finnish Parliament in 1950. The Winter War (30.11.1939 13.3.1940) witnessed the first child transports. These were also the model for future decision making. The transports were begun on the initiative of Swedes Maja Sandler, the wife of the resigned minister of foreign affairs Rickard Sandler, and Hanna Rydh-Munck af Rosenschöld , but this activity was soon accepted by the Swedish government because the humanitarian help in the form of child transports lightened the political burden of Prime Minister Hansson, who was not willing to help Finland militarily. It was help that Finland never asked for and it was rejected at the beginning. The negative response of Minister Juho Koivisto was not taken very seriously. The political forces in Finland supporting child transports were stronger than those rejecting them. The major politicians in support belonged to Finland´s Swedish minority. In addition, close to 1 000 Finnish children remained in Sweden after the Winter War. No analysis was made of the reasons why these children did not return home. A committee set up to help Finland and Norway was established in Sweden in 1941. Its chairman was Torsten Nothin, an influential Swedish politician. In December 1941 he appealed to the Swedish government to provide help to Finnish children under the authority of The International Red Cross. This plea had no results. The delivery of great amounts of food to Finland, which was now at war with Great Britain, had automatically caused reactions among the allies against the Swedish imports through Gothenburg. This included the import of oil, which was essential for the Swedish navy and air force. Oil was later used successfully to force a reduction in commerce between Sweden and Finland. The contradiction between Sweden´s essential political interests and humanitarian help was solved in a way that did not harm the country´s vital political interests. Instead of delivering help to Finland, Finnish children were transported to Sweden through the organisations that had already been created. At the beginning of the Continuation War (25.6.1941 27.4.1945) negative opinion regarding child transports re-emerged in Finland. Karl-August Fagerholm implemented the transports in September 1941. In 1942, members of the conservative parties in the Finnish Parliament expressed their fear of losing the children to the Swedes. They suggested that Finland should withdraw from the inter-Nordic agreement, according to which the adoptions were approved by the court of the country where the child resided. This initiative failed. Paavo Virkkunen, an influential member of the conservative party Kokoomus in Finland, favoured the so-called good-father system, where help was delivered to Finland in the form of money and goods. Virkkunen was concerned about the consequences of a long stay in a Swedish family. The risk of losing the children was clear. The extreme conservative party (IKL, the Patriotic Movement of the Finnish People) wanted to alienate Finland from Sweden and bring Finland closer to Germany. Von Blücher, the German ambassador to Finland, had in his report to Berlin, mentioned the political consequences of the child transports. Among other things, they would bring Finland and Sweden closer to each other. He had also paid attention to the Nordic political orientation in Finland. He did not question or criticize the child transports. His main interest was to increase German political influence in Finland, and the Nordic political orientation was an obstacle. Fagerholm was politically ill-favoured by the Germans, because he had a strong Nordic political disposition and had criticised Germany´s activities in Norway. The criticism of child transports was at the same time criticism of Fagerholm. The official censorship organ of the Finnish government (VTL) denied the criticism of child transports in January 1942. The reasons were political. Statements made by members of the Finnish Parliament were also censored, because it was thought that they would offend the Swedes. In addition, the censorship organ used child transports as a means of active propaganda aimed at improving the relations between the two countries. The Finnish Parliament was informed in 1948 that about 15 000 Finnish children still remained in Sweden. These children would stay there permanently. In 1950 the members of the Agrarian Party in Finland stated that Finland should actively strive to get the children back. The party on the left (SKDL, the Democratic Movement of Finnish People) also focused on the unexpected consequences of the child transports. The Social Democrats, and largely Fagerholm, had been the main force in Finland behind the child transports. Members of the SKDL, controlled by Finland´s Communist Party, stated that the war time authorities were responsible for this war loss. Many of the Finnish parents could not get their children back despite repeated requests. The discussion of the problem became political, for example von Born, a member of the Swedish minority party RKP, related this problem to foreign policy by stating that the request to repatriate the Finnish children would have negative political consequences for the relations between Finland and Sweden. He emphasized expressing feelings of gratitude to the Swedes. After the war a new foreign policy was established by Prime Minister (1944 1946) and later President (1946 1956) Juho Kusti Paasikivi. The main cornerstone of this policy was to establish good relations with the Soviet Union. The other, often forgotten, cornerstone was to simultaneously establish good relations with other Nordic countries, especially Sweden, as a counterbalance. The unexpected results of the child evacuation, a Swedish initiative, had violated the good relations with Sweden. The motives of the Democratic Movement of Finnish People were much the same as those of the Patriotic Movement of Finnish People. Only the ideology was different. The Nordic political orientation was an obstacle to both parties. The position of the Democratic Movement of Finnish People was much better than that of the Patriotic Movement of Finnish People, because now one could clearly see the unexpected results, which included human tragedy for the many families who could not be re-united with their children despite their repeated requests. The Swedes questioned the figure given to the Finnish Parliament regarding the number of children permanently remaining in Sweden. This research agrees with the Swedes. In a calculation based on Swedish population registers, the number of these children is about 7 100. The reliability of this figure is increased by the fact that the child allowance programme began in Sweden in 1948. The prerequisite to have this allowance was that the child be in the Swedish population register. It was not necessary for the child to have Swedish nationality. The Finnish Parliament had false information about the number of Finnish children who remained in Sweden in 1942 and in 1950. There was no parliamentary control in Finland regarding child transports, because the decision was made by one cabinet member and speeches by MPs in the Finnish Parliament were censored, like all criticism regarding child transports to Sweden. In Great Britain parliamentary control worked better throughout the whole war, because the speeches regarding evacuation were not censored. At the beginning of the war certain members of the British Labour Party and the Welsh Nationalists were particularly outspoken about the scheme. Fagerholm does not discuss to any great extent the child transports in his memoirs. He does not evaluate the process and results as a whole. This research provides some possibilities for an evaluation of this sort. The Swedish medical reports give a clear picture of the physical condition of the Finnish children when arriving in Sweden. The transports actually revealed how bad the situation of the poorest children was. According to Titmuss, similar observations were made in Great Britain during the British evacuations. The child transports saved the lives of approximately 2 900 children. Most of these children were removed to Sweden to receive treatment for illnesses, but many among the healthy children were undernourished and some suffered from the effects of tuberculosis. The medical inspection in Finland was not thorough. If you compare the figure of 2 900 children saved and returned with the figure of about 7 100 children who remained permanently in Sweden, you may draw the conclusion that Finland as a country failed to benefit from the child transports, and that the whole operation was a political mistake with far-reaching consequenses. The basic goal of the operation was to save lives and have all the children return to Finland after the war. The difficulties with the repatriation of the children were mainly psychological. The level of child psychology in Finland at that time was low. One may question the report by Professor Martti Kaila regarding the adaptation of children to their families back in Finland. Anna Freud´s warnings concerning the difficulties that arise when child evacuees return are also valid in Finland. Freud viewed the emotional life of children in a way different from Kaila: the physical survival of a small child forces her to create strong emotional ties to the person who is looking after her. This, a characteristic of all small children, occurred with the Finnish children too, and it was something the political decision makers in Finland could not see during and after the war. It is a characteristic of all little children. Yet, such experiences were already evident during the Winter War. The best possible solution had been to limit the child transports only to children in need of medical treatment. Children from large and poor families had been helped by organising meals and by buying food from Denmark with Swedish money. Assisting Finland by all possible means should have been the basic goal of Fagerholm in September 1941, when the offer of child transports came from Sweden. Fagerholm felt gratitude towards the Swedes. The risks became clear to him only in 1943. The war children are today a rather scattered and diffuse group of people. Emotionally, part of these children remained in Sweden after the war. There is no clear collective memory, only individual memories; the collective memory of the war children has partly been shaped later through the activities of the war child associations. The main difference between the children evacuated in Finland (for example from Karelia to safer areas with their families) and the war children, who were sent abroad, is that the war children lack a shared story and experience with their families. They were outsiders . The whole matter is sensitive to many of such mothers and discussing the subject has often been avoided in families. The war-time censorship has continued in families through silence and avoidance and Finnish politicians and Finnish families had to face each other on this issue after the war. The lack of all-inclusive historical research has also prevented the formation of a collective awareness among war children returned to Finland or those remaining permanently abroad.. Knowledge of historical facts will help war-children by providing an opportunity to create an all-inclusive approach to the past. Personal experiences should be regarded as part of a large historical entity shadowed by war and where many political factors were at work in both Finland and Sweden. This means strengthening of the cognitive dimension discussed in Rüsen´s all-inclusive historical approach.

Tuloverotuksen reaalinen muuttuminen Suomessa : Kuusikymmentä vuotta verojen vuoristorataa

The study seeks to find out whether the real burden of the personal taxation has increased or decreased. In order to determine this, we investigate how the same real income has been taxed in different years. Whenever the taxes for the same real income for a given year are higher than for the base year, the real tax burden has increased. If they are lower, the real tax burden has decreased. The study thus seeks to estimate how changes in the tax regulations affect the real tax burden. It should be kept in mind that the progression in the central government income tax schedule ensures that a real change in income will bring about a change in the tax ration. In case of inflation when the tax schedules are kept nominally the same will also increase the real tax burden. In calculations of the study it is assumed that the real income remains constant, so that we can get an unbiased measure of the effects of governmental actions in real terms. The main factors influencing the amount of income taxes an individual must pay are as follows: - Gross income (income subject to central and local government taxes). - Deductions from gross income and taxes calculated according to tax schedules. - The central government income tax schedule (progressive income taxation). - The rates for the local taxes and for social security payments (proportional taxation). In the study we investigate how much a certain group of taxpayers would have paid in taxes according to the actual tax regulations prevailing indifferent years if the income were kept constant in real terms. Other factors affecting tax liability are kept strictly unchanged (as constants). The resulting taxes, expressed in fixed prices, are then compared to the taxes levied in the base year (hypothetical taxation). The question we are addressing is thus how much taxes a certain group of taxpayers with the same socioeconomic characteristics would have paid on the same real income according to the actual tax regulations prevailing in different years. This has been suggested as the main way to measure real changes in taxation, although there are several alternative measures with essentially the same aim. Next an aggregate indicator of changes in income tax rates is constructed. It is designed to show how much the taxation of income has increased or reduced from one year to next year on average. The main question remains: How aggregation over all income levels should be performed? In order to determine the average real changes in the tax scales the difference functions (difference between actual and hypothetical taxation functions) were aggregated using taxable income as weights. Besides the difference functions, the relative changes in real taxes can be used as indicators of change. In this case the ratio between the taxes computed according to the new and the old situation indicates whether the taxation has become heavier or easier. The relative changes in tax scales can be described in a way similar to that used in describing the cost of living, or by means of price indices. For example, we can use Laspeyres´ price index formula for computing the ratio between taxes determined by the new tax scales and the old tax scales. The formula answers the question: How much more or less will be paid in taxes according to the new tax scales than according to the old ones when the real income situation corresponds to the old situation. In real terms the central government tax burden experienced a steady decline from its high post-war level up until the mid-1950s. The real tax burden then drifted upwards until the mid-1970s. The real level of taxation in 1975 was twice that of 1961. In the 1980s there was a steady phase due to the inflation corrections of tax schedules. In 1989 the tax schedule fell drastically and from the mid-1990s tax schedules have decreased the real tax burden significantly. Local tax rates have risen continuously from 10 percent in 1948 to nearly 19 percent in 2008. Deductions have lowered the real tax burden especially in recent years. Aggregate figures indicate how the tax ratio for the same real income has changed over the years according to the prevailing tax regulations. We call the tax ratio calculated in this manner the real income tax ratio. A change in the real income tax ratio depicts an increase or decrease in the real tax burden. The real income tax ratio declined after the war for some years. In the beginning of the 1960s it nearly doubled to mid-1970. From mid-1990s the real income tax ratio has fallen about 35 %.

Lippu, uhri, kansakunta : Ryhmäkokemukset ja -rajat Suomessa 1917 1945

This dissertation deals with the notions of sacrifice and violence in connection with the Fin¬nish flag struggles between 1917 and 1945. The study begins with the basic idea that sacrificial thinking is a key element in nationalism and the social cohesion of large groups. The method used in the study combines anthropological notions of totemism with psychoanalytical object relation theory. The aim is to explore the social and psychological elements of the Finnish national flag and the workers flags during the times of crisis and nation building. The phenomena and concepts addressed include self-sacrifice, scapegoating, remembrance of war, inclusion, and exclusion. The research is located at the intersection of nationalism studies and the cultural history of war. The analysis is based primarily on the press debates, public speeches and archival sources of the civic organizations that promoted the Finnish flag. The study is empirically divided into three sections: 1) the years of the Revolution and the Civil War (1917 1918), 2) the interwar period (1919 1938), and 3) the Second World War (1939 1945). The research demonstrates that the modern national flags and workers flags in Finland maintain certain characteristics of primitive totems. When referred to as a totem the flag means an emotionally charged symbol, a reservoir of the collective ideals of a large group. Thus the flag issue offers a path to explore the perceptions and memory of sacrifice and violence in the making of the First Republic . Any given large group, for example a nation, must conceptually pursue a consensus on its past sacrifices. Without productive interpretation sacrifice represents only meaningless violence. By looking at the passions associated with the flag the study also illuminates various group identities, boundaries and crossings of borders within the Finnish society at the same time. The study shows further that the divisive violence of the Civil War was first overcome in the late 1930s when the social democrats adopted a new perception of the Red victims of 1918 they were seen as part of the birth pains of the nation, and not only the martyrs of class struggle. At the same time the radical Right became marginalized. The study also illuminates how this development made the Spirit of the Winter War possible, a genuine albeit brief experience of horizontal brother and sisterhood, and how this spirit was reflected in the popular adoption of the Finnish flag. The experience was not based only on the external and unifying threat posed by the Soviet Union: it was grounded in a sense of unifying sacrifice which reflected a novel way of understanding the nation and its past sacrifices. Paradoxically, the newly forged consensus over the necessity and the rewards of the common sacrifices of the Winter War (1939 1940) made new sacrifices possible during the Continuation War (1941 1944). In spite of political discord and war weariness, the concept of a unified nation under the national flag survived even the absurdity of the stationary war phase. It can be said that the conflict between the idea of a national community and parliamentary party politics dissolved as a result of the collective experience of the Second World War.

Kuviteltu aatelismies : Aateluus viholliskuvana ja itseymmärryksenä 1800-luvun Suomessa

An imagined nobleman Nobility as an enemy image and in-group identity in nineteenth-century Finland The focal point of this study is the difficult relationship between two seemingly very different 19th-century elite groups, the upwardly mobile bourgeois intelligentsia and the slowly declining traditional nobility. In the thinking of the bourgeois contender the two emerged as exact opposites, styled as conflicting ideal types: an outdated, exclusive, degenerate hereditary aristocracy versus a dynamic and progressive new force in society, recruited solely on the basis of personal merit, originating from the common people and representing the nation. The appearance of an important 19th-century novelty, print publicity, coincided with the emergence of the bourgeois intelligentsia. The institutions of the developing publishing industry were manned by the aspiring new group. The strengthening flow of progressive, democratic, nationalist ideas distributed via the printing presses carried an undercurrent of self-promotion. It transmitted to the developing readership the self-image of the new cultural bourgeoisie as the defender and benevolent educator of the nation. Having won the contest over the media, the intelligentsia was free to present its predecessor and rival as an enemy of the people. In its politics the nobility emerged as an ideal scapegoat, represented as the source for existing social evils, all if which would promptly go away after its disappearance. It also served as a black backcloth, against which the democratic, national, progressive bourgeois intelligentsia would shine more brightly. In order to shed light on the 19th-century process of (re)modelling the image of nobility as a public enemy I have used four different types of source materials. These include three genres of print publicity, ranging from popular historical and contemporary fiction to nonfictional presentations of national history and the news and political commentaries of the daily papers, complemented by another, originally oral type of publicity, the discussion protocols of the Finnish four-estate parliament. To counterpoint these I also analysed the public self-image of the nobility, particularly vis-à-vis the nationalist and democratic ethos of the modernising politics.

European Union and the developing nations' external debt : EU-15's debt policy, 1960–2008

This Master's Thesis defines the debt policy of the current European Union Member States towards the developing nations. Since no official policy for debt exists in the EU, it is defined to include debt practices (loans and debt relief in development cooperation) and debt within the EU development policy framework. This study (1) describes how the issue of external debt appears in the development policy framework, (2) compares EU Member States' given loans and debt relief to grants for the developing nations (1960s to the 2000s), and (3) measures the current orientation in ODA of each EU Member State between grant aid and loan aid using the Grant-Loan Index (GLI). Theoretical aspects include reasons for selecting between loans (Bouchet 1987) and grants (Odedokun 2004, O'Brien and Williams 2007), policy context of the EU (Van Reisen 2007) and the meaning of external debt in the set-up between the North and the South. In terms of history, the events and impact of the colonial period (where loans have originated) are overviewed and compared in light of today's policies. Development assistance statistics are derived from the OECD DAC statistics portal and EU development policy framework documents from the EU portal. Methodologically, the structure of this study is from policy analysis (Barrien 1999, Hill 2008, Berndtson 2008), but it has been modified to fit the needs of studying a non-official policy. EU Member States are divided into three groups by Carbone (2007a), the Big-3, Northern and Southern donors, based on common development assistance characteristics. The Grant-Loan Index is used to compare Carbone's model, which measures quality of aid, to the GLI measuring the structure of aid. Results indicate that EU- 15 countries (active in debt practices) differ in terms of timing, stability and equality of debt practices in the long-term (1960s to the 2000s). In terms of current practices, (2000-2008), it is noted that there lies a disparity between the actual practices and the way in which external debt is represented in the development policy framework, although debt practices form a relevant portion of total ODA practices for many EU-15 Member States, the issue itself plays a minor role in development policy documents. Carbone’s group division applies well to the Grant – Loan Index’s results, indicating that countries with similar development policy behaviour have similarities in debt policy behaviour, with one exception: Greece. On the basis of this study, it is concluded that EU development policy framework content in terms of external debt and debt practices are not congruent. The understanding of this disparity between the policy outline and differences in long-term practices is relevant in both, reaching the UN’s Millennium Development Goals, and in the actual process of developing development aid.

Oligarchs, political regime changes, and firm valuation

This paper examines the impact of a regime shift on the valuation of politically powerful oligarch firms. Focusing on the Yeltsin-Putin regime shift in Russia, we find that the valuations of outside shareholders claims are significantly higher under the Putin regime than under the Yeltsin regime after controlling for industry and time effects. The findings suggest that the increasing cost of extracting private benefits outweigh the reduction in the value of political connections following the political regime change. The results are also consistent with changes in the risk of state expropriation. Our results show that effects driven by the political regime change complement the traditional view stating that increased ownership concentration improved the performance of Russian oligarch firms.

Becoming an international man: Top manager masculinities in the making of a multinational corporation

Purpose We address gender and management in contemporary globalization by focusing on the ways in which male top managers in a multinational corporation (MNC) construct their identities in interviews with researchers. Design/methodology/approach Our qualitative analysis is based on interviews with virtually all top managers in the Nordic financial services company Nordea (53 men and two women). Findings We specify how becoming international induces a particular masculine identity for the top managers. In becoming international, however, their national identification persists. The unstability of the MNC as a political constellation leaves room for questioning the transnational identity offered. Originality/value Our findings suggest that in the global world of business, national identity can also be interpreted as something positive and productive, contrary to how it has been previously treated in feminist and men’s studies literature.

Struggling over subjectivity: A discursive analysis of strategic development in a group

We have seen growing interest in discursive perspectives on strategy. This perspective holds great promise for development of an understanding on how strategy discourse and subjectivity are intertwined. We wish to add to this existing research by outlining a discursive struggle approach to subjectivity. To understand the complex subjectification and empowering/disempowering effects of organizational strategy discourse, this approach focuses on organization-specific discourse mobilizations an various ways of resistance. Drawing on an analysis of the discourses and practices of ‘strategic development’ in an engineering and consulting group we provide an empirical illustration of such struggles over subjectivity. In particular, we report three examples of competing ways of making sense of and giving sense to strategic development, with specific subjectification tendencies. First, we show how corporate management can mobilize and appropriate a specific kind of discourse to attempt to gain control of the organization, which tends to reproduce managerial hegemony, but also trigger discursive and other forms of resistance. Second, we will illustrate how middle managers resist this hegemony by initiating a strategy discourse of their own to create room for manoeuvre in controversial situations. Third, we show how project engineers can distance themselves from managerial-initiated strategy discourses to maintain a viable identity despite all kinds of pressures. Although our examples are case-specific, we believe that similar discursive dynamics also characterize strategizing in other organizations.

Political Risk in Credit Evaluation: Empirical Studies and Survey Results

Financing trade between economic agents located in different countries is affected by many types of risks, resulting from incomplete information about the debtor, the problems of enforcing international contracts, or the prevalence of political and financial crises. Trade is important for economic development and the availability of trade finance is essential, especially for developing countries. Relatively few studies treat the topic of political risk, particularly in the context of international lending. This thesis explores new ground to identify links between political risk and international debt defaults. The core hypothesis of the study is that the default probability of debt increases with increasing political risk in the country of the borrower. The thesis consists of three essays that support the hypothesis from different angles of the credit evaluation process. The first essay takes the point of view of an international lender assessing the credit risk of a public borrower. The second investigates creditworthiness assessment of companies. The obtained results are substantiated in the third essay that deals with an extensive political risk survey among finance professionals in developing countries. The financial instruments of core interest are export credit guaranteed debt initiated between the Export Credit Agency of Finland and buyers in 145 countries between 1975 and 2006. Default events of the foreign credit counterparts are conditioned on country-specific macroeconomic variables, corporate-specific accounting information as well as political risk indicators from various international sources. Essay 1 examines debt issued to government controlled institutions and conditions public default events on traditional macroeconomic fundamentals, in addition to selected political and institutional risk factors. Confirming previous research, the study finds country indebtedness and the GDP growth rate to be significant indicators of public default. Further, it is shown that public defaults respond to various political risk factors. However, the impact of the risk varies between countries at different stages of economic development. Essay 2 proceeds by investigating political risk factors as conveivable drivers of corporate default and uses traditional accounting variables together with new political risk indicators in the credit evaluation of private debtors. The study finds links between corporate default and leverage, as well as between corporate default and the general investment climate and measeures of conflict in the debtor country. Essay 3 concludes the thesis by offering survey evidence on the impact of political risk on debt default, as perceived and experienced by 103 finance professionals in 38 developing countries. Taken together, the results of the thesis suggest that various forms of political risk are associated with international debt defaults and continue to pose great concerns for both international creditors and borrowers in developing countries. The study provides new insights on the importance of variable selection in country risk analysis, and shows how political risk is actually perceived and experienced in the riskier, often lower income countries of the global economy.