Kuviteltu aatelismies : Aateluus viholliskuvana ja itseymmärryksenä 1800-luvun Suomessa

An imagined nobleman Nobility as an enemy image and in-group identity in nineteenth-century Finland The focal point of this study is the difficult relationship between two seemingly very different 19th-century elite groups, the upwardly mobile bourgeois intelligentsia and the slowly declining traditional nobility. In the thinking of the bourgeois contender the two emerged as exact opposites, styled as conflicting ideal types: an outdated, exclusive, degenerate hereditary aristocracy versus a dynamic and progressive new force in society, recruited solely on the basis of personal merit, originating from the common people and representing the nation. The appearance of an important 19th-century novelty, print publicity, coincided with the emergence of the bourgeois intelligentsia. The institutions of the developing publishing industry were manned by the aspiring new group. The strengthening flow of progressive, democratic, nationalist ideas distributed via the printing presses carried an undercurrent of self-promotion. It transmitted to the developing readership the self-image of the new cultural bourgeoisie as the defender and benevolent educator of the nation. Having won the contest over the media, the intelligentsia was free to present its predecessor and rival as an enemy of the people. In its politics the nobility emerged as an ideal scapegoat, represented as the source for existing social evils, all if which would promptly go away after its disappearance. It also served as a black backcloth, against which the democratic, national, progressive bourgeois intelligentsia would shine more brightly. In order to shed light on the 19th-century process of (re)modelling the image of nobility as a public enemy I have used four different types of source materials. These include three genres of print publicity, ranging from popular historical and contemporary fiction to nonfictional presentations of national history and the news and political commentaries of the daily papers, complemented by another, originally oral type of publicity, the discussion protocols of the Finnish four-estate parliament. To counterpoint these I also analysed the public self-image of the nobility, particularly vis-à-vis the nationalist and democratic ethos of the modernising politics.

From Habits to Social Structures : Pragmatism and Contemporary Social Theory

Pragmatism has sometimes been taken as a catchphrase for epistemological stances in which anything goes. However, other authors argue that the real novelty and contribution of this tradition has to do with its view of action as the context in which all things human take place. Thus, it is action rather than, for example, discourses that should be our starting point in social theory. The introductory section of the book situates pragmatism (especially the ideas of G. H. Mead and John Dewey) within the field and tradition of social theory. This introductory also contextualizes the main core of the book which consists of four chapters. Two of these chapters have been published as articles in scientific journals and one in an edited book. All of them discuss the core problem of social theory: how is action related to social structures (and vice versa)? The argument is that habitual action is the explanation for the emergence of social structures from our action. Action produces structures and social reproduction takes place when action is habitualized; that is, when we develop social dispositions to act in a certain manner in familiar environments. This also means that even though the physical environment is the same for all of us, our habits structure it into different kinds of action possibilities. Each chapter highlights these general insights from different angles. Practice theory has gained momentum in recent years and it has many commonalities with pragmatism because both highlight the situated and corporeal character of human activity. One famous proponent of practice theory is Margaret Archer who has argued that the pragmatism of G. H. Mead leads to an oversocialized conception of selfhood. Mead does indeed present a socialized view of selfhood but this is a meta-sociological argument rather than a substantial sociological claim. Accordingly, one can argue that in this general sense intersubjectivity precedes subjectivity and not the other way around. Such a view does not indicate that our social relation would necessarily "colonize" individual action because there is a place for internal conversations (in Archer s terminology); it is especially in those phases of action where it meets obstacles due to the changes of the environment. The second issue discussed has the background assumption that social structures can fruitfully be conceptualized as institutions. A general classification of different institution theories is presented and it is argued that there is a need for a habitual theory of institutions due to the problems associated with these other theories. So-called habitual institutionalism accounts for institutions in terms of established and prevalent social dispositions that structure our social interactions. The germs of this institution theory can be found in the work of Thorstein Veblen. Since Veblen s times, these ideas have been discussed for example, by the economist Geoffrey M. Hodgson. His ideas on the evolution of institutions are presented but a critical stance is taken towards his tendency of defining institutions with the help of rules because rules are not always present in institutions. Accordingly, habitual action is the most basic but by no means the only aspect of institutional reproduction. The third chapter deals with theme of action and structures in the context of Pierre Bourdieu s thought. Bourdieu s term habitus refers to a system of dispositions which structure social fields. It is argued that habits come close to the concept of habitus in the sense that the latter consists of particular kinds of habits; those that are related to the reproduction of socioeconomic positions. Habits are thus constituents of a general theory of societal reproduction whereas habitus is a systematic combination of socioeconomic habits. The fourth theme relates to issues of social change and development. The capabilities approach has been associated with the name of Amartya Sen, for example, and it underscores problems inhering in economistic ways of evaluating social development. However, Sen s argument has some theoretical problems. For example, his theory cannot adequately confront the problem of relativism. In addition, Sen s discussion lacks also a theory of the role of the public. With the help of arguments derived from pragmatism, one gets an action-based, socially constituted view of freedom in which the role of the public is essential. In general, it is argued that a socially constituted view of agency does not necessarily to lead to pessimistic conclusions about the freedom of action.