Kristallivalheita : Itsepetos filosofisen tulkinnan lähtökohtana eräissä draaman klassikoissa

The philosophical problem of self-deception focuses the relation between desire, advantage, evidence and harm. A self-deceptive person is irrational because he or she belives or wants to belive contrary to the available evidence. The study focuses on different forms of self-deception that come out in certain classical Western dramas. The first self-deception forms are: "S knows that ~p but still belives that p because he wants that ~p", "S wants that p and therefore belives that p.", "S belives that p against evidence t because he wants to belive that p.", "S belives that p if t but S would belive that p even if ~t because S wants to belive that p.", "S belives that p (even if there is t that ~p) because S is ignorant of it." and "S belives that p (even if there is t that ~p) because of ignorant of t due to an internal deception." The main sources on self-deception are the views of contemporary researchers of the subject, such as Robert Audi, Marcia Baron, Bas C. van Fraassen, Mark Johnston, Mike W. Martin, Brian MaLaughlin, Alfred Mele, Amélie Oksenberg Rorty, William Ruddick and Stephen L. White. In this study it is claimed that Shakespeare´s Othello presents self-deception as a tragic phenomenom from witch it follows deceptions and murders. Moliére´s Tartuffe deals with a phony hypocrite´s attempts at cheating. Ibsen´s Wild Duck defends the necessity of vital lies. Beckett´s Waiting for Godot deals with the self-deception witch is related to the waiting of the supernatural rescuer. Miller´s The Death of a Salesman tells about a man who, while pursuing the American myth of success, winds both himself and his family into the skeins of self-deception. They are studied with a Barthesian method that emphasizes the autonomy of literary work and its interpretation independently of the author´s personal history and social conditions. Self-deception has been regarded as an immoral way of thinking or way of action. However, vital lies show the necessity or necessity of the self-deception when it brings joy and optimism to the human being and supports his or her self-esteem and does not cause a suffering or damage, either to self or others. In the study, the processual character of self-deception is brought out.

Imagination and diversity in the philosophy of Hobbes

This dissertation is a study of some aspects of theoretical philosophy of the early modern thinker Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679). The focal point of the work is Hobbes s conception of imagination, which is discussed from both a systematic and a historical point of view, as well as in the light of contemporary scholarship. I argue that though there are significant similarities between the view of Hobbes and that of his predecessors, he gives a novel theory of imagination, which clarifies not only early modern discussions on human nature, knowledge, science, and literary criticism, but above all his own versatile philosophy. The prologue of the dissertation introduces methodological principles and gives critical remarks on the standard view of Hobbes. In Chapter II, I discuss the prominent theories of imagination before Hobbes and link them to his account. I argue that though Hobbes adopted the Aristotelian framework, his view is not reduced to it, as he borrows from various sources, for instance, from the Stoics and from Renaissance thought. Chapters III and IV form the psychological part of the work. In the Chapter III I argue that imagination, not sense, is central in the basic cognitive operations of the mind and that imagination has a decisive role in Hobbes s theory of motivation. The Chapter IV concentrates on various questions of Hobbes s philosophy of language. The chapter ends with a defence of a less naturalistic reading of Hobbes s theory of human nature. Chapters V and VI form the epistemological part of the work. I suggest, contrary to what has been recently claimed, that though Hobbes s ideas of good literary style do have a point of contact with his philosophy (e.g. the psychology of creative process), his ideas in the field are independent of his project of demonstrative political science. Instead I argue that the novelty of his major political work, Leviathan (1651), is based on a new theory of knowledge which he continued to develop in the post-Leviathan works. Chapter VII seeks to connect the more theoretical conclusions of Chapters V and VI to Hobbes's idea(l) of science as well as to his philosophical practice. On the basis of Hobbes s own writings as well as some historical examinations, I argue that method is not an apt way to conceptualise Hobbes s philosophical practice. Contemporary readings of Hobbes s theory of science are critically discussed and the chapter ends with an analysis of Hobbes s actual argumentation. In addition to the concluding remarks, the epilogue suggest three things: first, imagination is central when trying to understand Hobbes s versatile philosophy; second, that it is misleading to depict Hobbes as a simple materialist, mechanist, and empiricist; and, third, that in terms of imagination his influence on early modern thought has not been fully appreciated.

Essays in Philosophical Moral Psychology

The dissertation consists of four essays and a comprehensive introduction that discusses the topics, methods, and most prominent theories of philosophical moral psychology. I distinguish three main questions: What are the essential features of moral thinking? What are the psychological conditions of moral responsibility? And finally, what are the consequences of empirical facts about human nature to normative ethics? Each of the three last articles focuses on one of these issues. The first essay and part of the introduction are dedicated to methodological questions, in particular the relationship between empirical (social) psychology and philosophy. I reject recent attempts to understand the nature of morality on the basis of empirical research. One characteristic feature of moral thinking is its practical clout: if we regard an action as morally wrong, we either refrain from doing it even against our desires and interests, or else feel shame or guilt. Moral views seem to have a conceptual connection to motivation and emotions – roughly speaking, we can’t conceive of someone genuinely disapproving an action, but nonetheless doing it without any inner motivational conflict or regret. This conceptual thesis in moral psychology is called (judgment) internalism. It implies, among other things, that psychopaths cannot make moral judgments to the extent that they are incapable of corresponding motivation and emotion, even if they might say largely the words we would expect. Is internalism true? Recently, there has been an explosion of interest in so-called experimental philosophy, which is a methodological view according to which claims about conceptual truths that appeal to our intuitions should be tested by way of surveys presented to ordinary language users. One experimental result is that the majority of people are willing to grant that psychopaths make moral judgments, which challenges internalism. In the first article, ‘The Rise and Fall of Experimental Philosophy’, I argue that these results pose no real threat to internalism, since experimental philosophy is based on a too simple conception of the relationship between language use and concepts. Only the reactions of competent users in pragmatically neutral and otherwise conducive circumstances yield evidence about conceptual truths, and such robust intuitions remain inaccessible to surveys for reasons of principle. The epistemology of folk concepts must still be based on Socratic dialogue and critical reflection, whose character and authority I discuss at the end of the paper. The internal connection between moral judgment and motivation led many metaethicists in the past century to believe along Humean lines that judgment itself consists in a pro-attitude rather than a belief. This expressivist view, as it is called these days, has far-reaching consequences in metaethics. In the second essay I argue that perhaps the most sophisticated form of contemporary expressivism, Allan Gibbard’s norm-expressivism, according to which moral judgments are decisions or contingency plans, is implausible from the perspective of the theory of action. In certain circumstances it is possible to think that something is morally required of one without deciding to do so. Morality is not a matter of the will. Instead, I sketch on the basis of Robert Brandom’s inferentialist semantics a weak form of judgment internalism, according to which the content of moral judgment is determined by a commitment to a particular kind of practical reasoning. The last two essays in the dissertation emphasize the role of mutual recognition in the development and maintenance of responsible and autonomous moral agency. I defend a compatibilist view of autonomy, according to which agents who are unable to recognize right and wrong or act accordingly are not responsible for their actions – it is not fair to praise or blame them, since they lacked the relevant capacity to do otherwise. Conversely, autonomy demands an ability to recognize reasons and act on them. But as a long tradition in German moral philosophy whose best-known contemporary representative is Axel Honneth has it, both being aware of reasons and acting on them requires also the right sort of higher-order attitudes toward the self. Without self-respect and self-confidence we remain at the mercy of external pressures, even if we have the necessary normative competence. These attitudes toward the self, in turn, are formed through mutual recognition – we value ourselves when those who we value value us. Thus, standing in the right sort of relations of recognition is indirectly necessary for autonomy and moral responsibility. Recognition and valuing are concretely manifest in actions and institutions, whose practices make possible participation on an equal footing. Seeing this opens the way for a kind of normative social criticism that is grounded in the value of freedom and automomy, but is not limited to defending negative rights. It thus offers a new way to bridge the gap between liberalism and communitarianism.

Phytoplankton quantity as an indicator of eutrophication in Finnish coastal waters : Applications within the Water Framework Directive

The tackling of coastal eutrophication requires water protection measures based on status assessments of water quality. The main purpose of this thesis was to evaluate whether it is possible both scientifically and within the terms of the European Union Water Framework Directive (WFD) to assess the status of coastal marine waters reliably by using phytoplankton biomass (ww) and chlorophyll a (Chl) as indicators of eutrophication in Finnish coastal waters. Empirical approaches were used to study whether the criteria, established for determining an indicator, are fulfilled. The first criterion (i) was that an indicator should respond to anthropogenic stresses in a predictable manner and has low variability in its response. Summertime Chl could be predicted accurately by nutrient concentrations, but not from the external annual loads alone, because of the rapid affect of primary production and sedimentation close to the loading sources in summer. The most accurate predictions were achieved in the Archipelago Sea, where total phosphorus (TP) and total nitrogen (TN) alone accounted for 87% and 78% of the variation in Chl, respectively. In river estuaries, the TP mass-balance regression model predicted Chl most accurately when nutrients originated from point-sources, whereas land-use regression models were most accurate in cases when nutrients originated mainly from diffuse sources. The inclusion of morphometry (e.g. mean depth) into nutrient models improved accuracy of the predictions. The second criterion (ii) was associated with the WFD. It requires that an indicator should have type-specific reference conditions, which are defined as "conditions where the values of the biological quality elements are at high ecological status". In establishing reference conditions, the empirical approach could only be used in the outer coastal water types, where historical observations of Secchi depth of the early 1900s are available. The most accurate prediction was achieved in the Quark. In the inner coastal water types, reference Chl, estimated from present monitoring data, are imprecise - not only because of the less accurate estimation method but also because the intrinsic characteristics, described for instance by morphometry, vary considerably inside these extensive inner coastal types. As for phytoplankton biomass, the reference values were less accurate than in the case of Chl, because it was possible to estimate reference conditions for biomass only by using the reconstructed Chl values, not the historical Secchi observations. An paleoecological approach was also applied to estimate annual average reference conditions for Chl. In Laajalahti, an urban embayment off Helsinki, strongly loaded by municipal waste waters in the 1960s and 1970s, reference conditions prevailed in the mid- and late 1800s. The recovery of the bay from pollution has been delayed as a consequence of benthic release of nutrients. Laajalahti will probably not achieve the good quality objectives of the WFD on time.    The third criterion (iii) was associated with coastal management including the resources it has available. Analyses of Chl are cheap and fast to carry out compared to the analyses of phytoplankton biomass and species composition; the fact which has an effect on number of samples to be taken and thereby on the reliability of assessments. However, analyses on phytoplankton biomass and species composition provide more metrics for ecological classification, the metrics which reveal various aspects of eutrophication contrary to what Chl alone does.

Trust and Collectives

"Trust and Collectives" is a compilation of articles: (I) "On Rational Trust" (in Meggle, G. (ed.) Social Facts & Collective Intentionality, Dr. Hänsel-Hohenhausen AG (currently Ontos), 2002), (II) "Simulating Rational Social Normative Trust, Predictive Trust, and Predictive Reliance Between Agents" (M.Tuomela and S. Hofmann, Ethics and Information Technology 5, 2003), (III) "A Collective's Trust in a Collective's action" (Protosociology, 18-19, 2003), and (IV) "Cooperation and Trust in Group Contexts" (R. Tuomela and M.Tuomela, Mind and Society 4/1, 2005 ). The articles are tied together by an introduction that dwells deeply on the topic of trust. (I) presents a somewhat general version of (RSNTR) and some basic arguments. (II) offers an application of (RSNTR) for a computer simulation of trust.(III) applies (RSNTR) to Raimo Tuomela's "we-mode"collectives (i.e. The Philosophy of Social Practices, Cambridge University Press, 2002). (IV) analyzes cooperation and trust in the context of acting as a member of a collective. Thus, (IV) elaborates on the topic of collective agency in (III) and puts the trust account (RSNTR) to work in a framework of cooperation. The central aim of this work is to construct a well-argued conceptual and theoretical account of rational trust, viz. a person's subjectively rational trust in another person vis-à-vis his performance of an action, seen from a first-person point of view. The main method is conceptual and theoretical analysis understood along the lines of reflective equilibrium. The account of rational social normative trust (RSNTR), which is argued and defended against other views, is the result of the quest. The introduction stands on its own legs as an argued presentation of an analysis of the concept of rational trust and an analysis of trust itself (RSNTR). It is claimed that (RSNTR) is "genuine" trust and embedded in a relationship of mutual respect for the rights of the other party. This relationship is the growing site for trust, a causal and conceptual ground, but it is not taken as a reason for trusting (viz. predictive "trust"). Relevant themes such as risk, decision, rationality, control, and cooperation are discussed and the topics of the articles are briefly presented. In this work it is argued that genuine trust is to be kept apart from predictive "trust." When we trust a person vis-à-vis his future action that concerns ourselves on the basis of his personal traits and/or features of the specific situation we have a prediction-like attitude. Genuine trust develops in a relationship of mutual respect for the mutual rights of the other party. Such a relationship is formed through interaction where the parties gradually find harmony concerning "the rules of the game." The trust account stands as a contribution to philosophical research on central social notions and it could be used as a theoretical model in social psychology, economical and political science where interaction between persons and groups are in focus. The analysis could also serve as a model for a trust component in computer simulation of human action. In the context of everyday life the account clarifies the difference between predictive "trust" and genuine trust. There are no fast shortcuts to trust. Experiences of mutual respect for mutual rights cannot be had unless there is respect.

The sources of moral motivation : studies on empathy, guilt, shame and values

The goals of this study were to analyze the forms of emotional tendencies that are likely to motivate moral behaviors, and to find correlates for these tendencies. In study 1, students narratives of their own guilt or shame experiences were analyzed. The results showed that pure shame was more likely to motivate avoidance than reparation, whereas guilt and combination of guilt and shame were likely to motivate reparation. However, all types of emotion could lead to chronic rumination if the person was not clearly responsible for the situation. In study 2, the relations of empathy with two measures of guilt were examined in a sample of 13- to 16-year-olds (N=113). Empathy was measured using Davis s IRI and guilt by Tangney s TOSCA and Hoffman s semi-projective story completion method that includes two different scenarios, guilt over cheating and guilt over inaction. Empathy correlated more strongly with both measures of guilt than the two measures correlated with each other. Hoffman s guilt over inaction was more strongly associated with empathy measures in girls than in boys, whereas for guilt over cheating the pattern was the opposite. Girls and boys who describe themselves as empathetic may emphasize different aspect of morality and feel guilty in different contexts. In study 3, cultural and gender differences in guilt and shame (TOSCA) and value priorities (the Schwartz Value Survey) were studied in samples of Finnish (N=156) and Peruvian (N=159) adolescents. Gender differences were found to be larger and more stereotypical among the Finns than among the Peruvians. Finnish girls were more prone to guilt and shame than boys were, whereas among the Peruvians there was no gender difference in guilt, and boys were more shame-prone than girls. The results support the view that psychological gender differences are largest individualistic societies. In study 4, the relations of value priorities to guilt, shame and empathy were examined in two samples, one of 15 19-year-old high school students (N = 207), and the other of military conscripts (N = 503). Guilt was, in both samples, positively related to valuing universalism, benevolence, tradition, and conformity, and negatively related to valuing power, hedonism, stimulation, and self-direction. The results for empathy were similar, but the relation to the openness conservation value dimension was weaker. Shame and personal distress were weakly related to values. In sum, shame without guilt and the TOSCA shame scale are tendencies that are unlikely to motivate moral behavior in Finnish cultural context. Guilt is likely to be connected to positive social behaviors, but excessive guilt can cause psychological problems. Moral emotional tendencies are related to culture, cultural conceptions of gender and to individual value priorities.

The EU and Institutional Twinning in Morocco - An inquiry into the motives of cooperation through discourse ethics

This study examines Institutional Twinning in Morocco as a case of EU cooperation through the pragmatic, ethical and moral logics of reason in Jürgen Habermas’s discourse ethics. As a former accession tool, Twinning was introduced in 2004 for legal approximation in the context of the European Neighborhood Policy. Twinning is a unique instrument in development cooperation from a legal perspective. With its long historical and cultural ties to Europe, Morocco presents an interesting case study of this new form of cooperation. We will analyse motives behind the Twinning projects on illegal immigration, environment legislation and customs reform. As Twinning is a new policy instrument within the ENP context, there is relatively little preceding research, which, in itself, constitutes a reason to inquire into the subject. While introducing useful categories, the approaches discussing “normative power Europe” do not offer methodological tools precise enough to analyse the motives of the Twinning cooperation from a broad ethical standpoint. Helene Sjursen as well as Esther Barbé and Elisabeth Johansson-Nogués have elaborated on Jürgen Habermas’ discourse ethics in determining the extent of altruism in the ENP in general. Situating the analysis in the process-oriented framework of Critical Theory, discourse ethics provides the methodological framework for our research. The case studies reveal that the context in which they operate affects the pragmatic, ethical and moral aspirations of the actors. The utilitarian notion of profit maximization is quite pronounced both in terms of the number of Twinning projects in the economic sphere and the pragmatic logics of reason instrumental to security and trade-related issues. The historical background as well internal processes, however, contribute to defining areas of mutual interest to the actors as well as the motives Morocco and the EU sometimes described as the external projection of internal values. Through its different aspects, Twinning cooperation portrays the functioning of the pragmatic, ethical and moral logics of reason in international relations.

Kokoomus ja kommunismin uhka. Puolueen antikommunismi vuoden 1929 eduskuntavaalitaistossa.

Tämän Pro gradu -tutkielman tarkoituksena on selventää Kansallisen Kokoomuspuolueen kommunisminvastaisuutta 1920-luvulla, tarkemmin ottaen vuoden 1929 eduskuntavaalikamppailussa. Tutkimuskysymykseni liittyvät puolueen identiteetin ja kommunisminvastaisuuden yhteyteen: miten kokoomuspuolueen suhtautuminen kommunismiin kytkeytyi, yhtäältä, oman porvarillisen poliittis-kansallisen identiteetin puolustamiseen, ja toisaalta, vuonna 1929 vallitseviin poliittisiin oloihin, jolloin muun muassa parlamentaarinen järjestelmä herätti laajaa epäluottamusta, kokoomus ajautui sisäiseen kriisiin ja kommunistien kumoustavoite korostui suomalaisessa julkisuudessa? Etsimällä vastauksia näihin kysymyksiin pyrin selittämään mistä osakokonaisuuksista antikommunismi koostui, miten uhkaa muokattiin ja perusteltiin. Mielestäni tärkeää ja mielenkiintoista on miettiä, kuinka kommunisminvastaisuus ilmeni ikään kuin vastauksena muihin yhteiskunnallis-poliittisiin ongelmiin ja turhautumiin. Tutkimukseni teoreettinen viitekehys perustuu toiseuden ja viholliskuvien tutkimukseen, koska toiseuden merkitys identiteetin kehittymiselle on kiistaton. Tähän liittyvän kirjallisuuden lisäksi olen käyttänyt lähteinäni tutkimuskirjallisuutta, sanomalehtiä ja julkaisemattomia arkistolähteitä. Tutkimukseni aatehistoriallisen luonteen vuoksi ensisijainen alkuperäislähteeni on julkaistu materiaali – vaalijulkaisut ja kokoomuslehdistö – jonka avulla olen pyrkinyt analysoimaan puolueen suhtautumista kommunismiin ja sen vaikutusta puolueen identiteetille. Metodini on historiallis-kvalitatiivinen, joka tarkoittaa sitä, että pyrin samaan aikaan huomioimaan sekä puolueen julkisuuskuvan että sen toiminnan kulisseissa. Tämä edellyttää huomion kohdistamista sekä julkaistuun että julkaisemattomaan lähdeaineistoon. Julkaistuun materiaaliin kohdistuneen analyysin pohjalta on mahdollista päätellä, että kokoomus halusi luoda itsestään kuvan jyrkästi kommunisminvastaisena puolueena. Toiseus-analyysin perusteella voidaan sanoa, että kommunismi oli puolueen selvä toinen. Julkisuuskuva ei kuitenkaan välttämättä vastannut puolueen todellisia käsityksiä kommunismista ja sen pohjalle muodostetusta viholliskuvasta. Antikommunismi ja viholliskuvan vahvistaminen palvelivat myös muita päämääriä, joista merkittävimmät liittyivät katkenneen kokoomuksen yhtenäisyyden pönkittämiseen ja huomion kääntämiseen pois muista vuonna 1929 esiin työntyneistä ongelmista. Kommunismin muodostamaa uhkaa Suomen kansalliselle olemassaololle pyrittiin perustelemaan monelta eri kantilta. Kommunismin nähtiin rapauttavan kristillisen moraalin ja siveellisyyden, lisäävän yhteiskunnallisia levottomuuksia, heikentävän parlamentarismia sekä vaarantavan Suomen sotilaallisen turvallisuuden ja pyhäksi koetun etuvartiotehtävän. Antikommunismi yhdistyi läheisesti myös ideologisen venäläisvastaisuuden ääri-ilmiöön, ryssävihaan. Näihin eri ilmiöihin liittyvä "antikommunistinen diskurssi" oli siis yksi niistä perustoista, jonka päällä kokoomuksen poliittis-kansallinen identiteetti kehittyi 1920-luvun mittaan. Kevätkesän 1929 tuomien, lähes ylitsepääsemättömien vaikeuksien myötä antikommunistisen diskurssin merkitys kasvoi entisestään ja loi pohjan puolueen suhtautumiselle lapualaisvuosiin.

Governance theory as a framework for empirical research : a case study on local environmental policy-making in Helsinki, Finland

Governance has been one of the most popular buzzwords in recent political science. As with any term shared by numerous fields of research, as well as everyday language, governance is encumbered by a jungle of definitions and applications. This work elaborates on the concept of network governance. Network governance refers to complex policy-making situations, where a variety of public and private actors collaborate in order to produce and define policy. Governance is processes of autonomous, self-organizing networks of organizations exchanging information and deliberating. Network governance is a theoretical concept that corresponds to an empirical phenomenon. Often, this phenomenon is used to descirbe a historical development: governance is often used to describe changes in political processes of Western societies since the 1980s. In this work, empirical governance networks are used as an organizing framework, and the concepts of autonomy, self-organization and network structure are developed as tools for empirical analysis of any complex decision-making process. This work develops this framework and explores the governance networks in the case of environmental policy-making in the City of Helsinki, Finland. The crafting of a local ecological sustainability programme required support and knowledge from all sectors of administration, a number of entrepreneurs and companies and the inhabitants of Helsinki. The policy process relied explicitly on networking, with public and private actors collaborating to design policy instruments. Communication between individual organizations led to the development of network structures and patterns. This research analyses these patterns and their effects on policy choice, by applying the methods of social network analysis. A variety of social network analysis methods are used to uncover different features of the networked process. Links between individual network positions, network subgroup structures and macro-level network patterns are compared to the types of organizations involved and final policy instruments chosen. By using governance concepts to depict a policy process, the work aims to assess whether they contribute to models of policy-making. The conclusion is that the governance literature sheds light on events that would otherwise go unnoticed, or whose conceptualization would remain atheoretical. The framework of network governance should be in the toolkit of the policy analyst.

Worksite Fitness Policy in an Intellectual Capital Framework

In a framework of Intellectual Capital (IC), the effects and interactions of a Worksite Fitness Program (WFP) policy was studied with a multidisciplinary approach. In a preliminary study, indicators for physical activity (PAI), physical fitness (PFI), activity in WFP on a regular (WFPI) and on a events basis (WFPE) were created in line with positive findings regarding the associations between physical activity and fitness patterns and sick leave, perceived health, and self-assessed work ability. The intensity of physical activity was found to be the most important variable to predict positive associations with the above mentioned wellness parameters. In four case study follow-up settings, the effects and interactions of physical activity and fitness patterns and the company’s WFP-policy on different elements of IC were studied. Qualitative methods were applied in constructing indicators and a descriptive IC measure for each case company. In cross-sectional and follow-up settings, several findings with respect to IC were found regarding physical activity in general and activity in WFP in particular. Findings were relatively strong in health and wellness related indicators in Human Capital, where, as also in Structural Capital indicators such as the company climate and employee-superior relationship, revealed positive associations. Physical activity patterns were found to act in minor role in Relational Capital. Overall, WFP was seen to be an integrated part of Structural Capital. From the viewpoint of Worksite Fitness Program as a phenomenon, this study positioned WFP as an active element of Intellectual Capital. The literature in the field of WFP emphasizes the role of WFP as an instrument to activate employees in physical activity, and thus promote their health and wellbeing. With the wider perspective the active and long range WFP policy can support a company’s Structural and Relational Capital in line with the fundamental role it has on Human Capital.