Religion Explained? : A Philosophical Appraisal of the Cognitive Science of Religion

This study examines philosophically the main theories and methodological assumptions of the field known as the cognitive science of religion (CSR). The study makes a philosophically informed reconstruction of the methodological principles of the CSR, indicates problems with them, and examines possible solutions to these problems. The study focuses on several different CSR writers, namely, Scott Atran, Justin Barrett, Pascal Boyer and Dan Sperber. CSR theorising is done in the intersection between cognitive sciences, anthropology and evolutionary psychology. This multidisciplinary nature makes CSR a fertile ground for philosophical considerations coming from philosophy of psychology, philosophy of mind and philosophy of science. The study begins by spelling out the methodological assumptions and auxiliary theories of CSR writers by situating these theories and assumptions in the nexus of existing approaches to religion. The distinctive feature of CSR is its emphasis on information processing: CSR writers claim that contemporary cognitive sciences can inform anthropological theorising about the human mind and offer tools for producing causal explanations. Further, they claim to explain the prevalence and persistence of religion by cognitive systems that undergird religious thinking. I also examine the core theoretical contributions of the field focusing mainly on the (1) “minimally counter-intuitiveness hypothesis” and (2) the different ways in which supernatural agent representations activate our cognitive systems. Generally speaking, CSR writers argue for the naturalness of religion: religious ideas and practices are widespread and pervasive because human cognition operates in such a way that religious ideas are easy to acquire and transmit. The study raises two philosophical problems, namely, the “problem of scope” and the “problem of religious relevance”. The problem of scope is created by the insistence of several critics of the CSR that CSR explanations are mostly irrelevant for explaining religion. Most CSR writers themselves hold that cognitive explanations can answer most of our questions about religion. I argue that the problem of scope is created by differences in explanation-begging questions: the former group is interested in explaining different things than the latter group. I propose that we should not stick too rigidly to one set of methodological assumptions, but rather acknowledge that different assumptions might help us to answer different questions about religion. Instead of adhering to some robust metaphysics as some strongly naturalistic writers argue, we should adopt a pragmatic and explanatory pluralist approach which would allow different kinds of methodological presuppositions in the study of religion provided that they attempt to answer different kinds of why-questions, since religion appears to be a multi-faceted phenomenon that spans over a variety of fields of special sciences. The problem of religious relevance is created by the insistence of some writers that CSR theories show religious beliefs to be false or irrational, whereas others invoke CSR theories to defend certain religious ideas. The problem is interesting because it reveals the more general philosophical assumptions of those who make such interpretations. CSR theories can (and have been) interpreted in terms of three different philosophical frameworks: strict naturalism, broad naturalism and theism. I argue that CSR theories can be interpreted inside all three frameworks without doing violence to the theories and that these frameworks give different kinds of results regarding the religious relevance of CSR theories.

The Catholic Internet discussion on cloning : A study in cognitive rhetoric

This work combines the cognitive theory of folk-theoretical thought with the classical Aristotelian theory of artistic proof in rhetoric. The first half of the work discusses the common ground shared by the elements of artistic proof (logos, pathos, ethos) and the elements of folk-theoretical thought (naïve physics, folk biology, folk psychology, naïve sociology). Combining rhetoric with the cognitive theory of folk-theoretical thought creates a new point of view for argumentation analysis. The logos of an argument can be understood as the inferential relations established between the different parts of an argument. Consequently, within this study the analysis of logos is to be viewed as the analysis of the inferential folk-theoretical elements that make the suggested factual states-of-things appear plausible within given argumentative structures. The pathos of an argumentative structure can be understood as determining the quality of the argumentation in question in the sense that emotive elements play a great part in what can be called a distinction between good and deceptive rhetoric. In the context of this study the analysis of pathos is to be viewed as the analysis of the emotive content of argumentative structures and of whether they aim at facilitating surface- or deep cognitive elaboration of the suggested matters. The ethos of an argumentative structure means both the speaker-presentation and audience-construct that can be discerned within a body of argumentation. In the context of this study, the analysis of ethos is to be understood as the analysis of mutually manifest cognitive environments in the context of argumentation. The theory is used to analyse Catholic Internet discussion concerning cloning. The discussion is divided into six themes: Human Dignity, Sacred Family, Exploitation / Dehumanisation, Playing God, Monsters and Horror Scenarios and Ensoulment. Each theme is analysed for both the rhetorical and the cognitive elements that can be seen creating persuasive force within the argumentative structures presented. It is apparent that the Catholic voices on the Internet extensively oppose cloning. The voices utilise rhetoric that is aggressive and pejorative more often than not. Furthermore, deceptive rhetoric (in the sense presented above) plays a great part in argumentative structures of the Catholic voices. The theory of folk-theoretical thought can be seen as a useful tool for analysing the possible reasons why the Catholic speakers think about cloning and choose to present cloning in their argumentation as they do. The logos utilized in the argumentative structures presented can usually be viewed as based on folk-theoretical inference concerning biology and psychology. The structures of pathos utilized generally appear to aim at generating fear appeal in the assumed audiences, often incorporating counter-intuitive elements. The ethos utilised in the arguments generally revolves around Christian mythology and issues of social responsibility. These structures can also be viewed from the point of view of folk psychology and naïve sociological assumptions.

Dietary habits and obesity: the role of emotional and cognitive factors

In post-industrialised societies, food is more plentiful, accessible and palatable than ever before and technological development has reduced the need for physical activity. Consequently, the prevalence of obesity is increasing, which is problematic as obesity is related to a number of diseases. Various psychological and social factors have an important influence on dietary habits and the development of obesity in the current food-rich and sedentary environments. The present study concentrates on the associations of emotional and cognitive factors with dietary intake and obesity as well as on the role these factors play in socioeconomic disparities in diet. Many people cognitively restrict their food intake to prevent weight gain or to lose weight, but research on whether restrained eating is a useful weight control strategy has produced conflicting findings. With respect to emotional factors, the evidence is accumulating that depressive symptoms are related to less healthy dietary intake and obesity, but the mechanisms explaining these associations remain unclear. Furthermore, it is not fully understood why socioeconomically disadvantaged individuals tend to have unhealthier dietary habits and the motives underlying food choices (e.g., price and health) could be relevant in this respect. The specific aims of the study were to examine 1) whether obesity status and dieting history moderate the associations of restrained eating with overeating tendencies, self-control and obesity indicators; 2) whether the associations of depressive symptoms with unhealthier dietary intake and obesity are attributable to a tendency for emotional eating and a low level of physical activity self-efficacy; and 3) whether the absolute or relative importance of food choice motives (health, pleasure, convenience, price, familiarity and ethicality) contribute to the socioeconomic disparities in dietary habits. The study was based on a large population-based sample of Finnish adults: the participants were men (N=2325) and women (N=2699) aged 25-74 who took part in the DILGOM (Dietary, Lifestyle and Genetic Determinants of Obesity and Metabolic Syndrome) sub-study of the National FINRISK Study 2007. The participants weight, height, waist circumference and body fat percentage were measured in a health examination. Psychological eating styles (the Three-Factor Eating Questionnaire-R18), food choice motives (a shortened version of the Food Choice Questionnaire), depressive symptoms (the Center for Epidemiological Studies Depression Scale) and self-control (the Brief Self-Control Scale) were measured with pre-existing questionnaires. A validated food frequency questionnaire was used to assess the average consumption of sweet and non-sweet energy-dense foods and vegetables/fruit. Self-reported total years of education and gross household income were used as indicators of socioeconomic position. The results indicated that 1) restrained eating was related to a lower body mass index, waist circumference, emotional eating and uncontrolled eating, and to a higher self-control in obese participants and current/past dieters. In contrast, the associations were the opposite in normal weight individuals and those who had never dieted. Thus, restrained eating may be related to better weight control among obese individuals and those with dieting experiences, while among others it may function as an indicator of problems with eating and an attempt to solve them. 2) Emotional eating and depressive symptoms were both related to less healthy dietary intake, and the greater consumption of energy-dense sweet foods among participants with elevated depressive symptoms was attributable to the susceptibility for emotional eating. In addition, emotional eating and physical activity self-efficacy were both important in explaining the positive association between depressive symptoms and obesity. 3) The lower vegetable/fruit intake and higher energy-dense food intake among individuals with a low socioeconomic position were partly explained by the higher priority they placed on price and familiarity and the lower priority they gave to health motives in their daily food choices. In conclusion, although policy interventions to change the obesogenic nature of the current environment are definitely needed, knowledge of the factors that hinder or facilitate people s ability to cope with the food-rich environment is also necessary. This study implies that more emphasis should be placed on various psychological and social factors in weight control programmes and interventions.