Trade Liberalization, Heterogeneous Firms and Industrial Dynamics

This master thesis studies how trade liberalization affects the firm-level productivity and industrial evolution. To do so, I built a dynamic model that considers firm-level productivity as endogenous to investigate the influence of trade on firm’s productivity and the market structure. In the framework, heterogeneous firms in the same industry operate differently in equilibrium. Specifically, firms are ex ante identical but heterogeneity arises as an equilibrium outcome. Under the setting of monopolistic competition, this type of model yields an industry that is represented not by a steady-state outcome, but by an evolution that rely on the decisions made by individual firms. I prove that trade liberalization has a general positive impact on technological adoption rates and hence increases the firm-level productivity. Besides, this endogenous technology adoption model also captures the stylized facts: exporting firms are larger and more productive than their non-exporting counterparts in the same sector. I assume that the number of firms is endogenous, since, according to the empirical literature, the industrial evolution shows considerably different patterns across countries; some industries experience large scale of firms’ exit in the period of contracting market shares, while some industries display relative stable number of firms or gradually increase quantities. The special word “shakeout” is used to describe the dramatic decrease in the number of firms. In order to explain the causes of shakeout, I construct a model where forward-looking firms decide to enter and exit the market on the basis of their state of technology. In equilibrium, firms choose different dates to adopt innovation which generate a gradual diffusion process. It is exactly this gradual diffusion process that generates the rapid, large-scale exit phenomenon. Specifically, it demonstrates that there is a positive feedback between firm’s exit and adoption, the reduction in the number of firms increases the incentives for remaining firms to adopt innovation. Therefore, in the setting of complete information, this model not only generates a shakeout but also captures the stability of an industry. However, the solely national view of industrial evolution neglects the importance of international trade in determining the shape of market structure. In particular, I show that the higher trade barriers lead to more fragile markets, encouraging the over-entry in the initial stage of industry life cycle and raising the probability of a shakeout. Therefore, more liberalized trade generates more stable market structure from both national and international viewpoints. The main references are Ederington and McCalman(2008,2009).

Trade Blocs and the Cold War : The CMEA and the EC challenge, 1969-1976

The coherence of the Soviet bloc was seriously tested at the turn of the 1970s, as the Soviet Union and its allies engaged in intensive negotiations over their relations with the European Communities (EC). In an effort to secure their own national economic interests many East European countries began independent manoeuvres against the wishes of their bloc leader. However, much of the intra-bloc controversy was kept out of the public eye, as the battle largely took place behind the scenes, within the organisation for economic cooperation, the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). The CMEA policy-making process vis-à-vis the EC is described in this study with reference to primary archival materials. This study investigates the negotiating positions and powers of the CMEA member states in their efforts to deal with the economic challenge created by the progress of the EC, as it advanced towards the customs union. This entails an analysis of the functioning principles and performance of the CMEA machinery. The study traces the CMEA negotiations that began in 1970 over its policy toward the EC. The policy was finally adopted in 1974, and was followed by the first official meeting between the two organisations in early 1975. The story ends in 1976, when the CMEA s efforts to enter into working relations with the EC were seemingly frustrated by the latter. The first major finding of the study is that, contrary to much of the prior research, the Soviet Union was not in a hegemonic position vis-à-vis its allies. It had to use a lot of its resources to tame the independent manoeuvring of its smaller allies. Thus, the USSR was not the kind of bloc leader that the totalitarian literature has described. Because the Soviet Union had to spend so much attention on its own bloc-politics, it was not able to concentrate on formulating a policy vis-à-vis the EC. Thus, the Soviet leadership was dependent on its allies in those instances when the socialist countries needed to act as a bloc. This consequently opened up the possibility for the USSR s allies to manoeuvre. This study also argues that when the CMEA did manage to find a united position, it was a force that the EC had to reckon with in its policy-making. This was particularly the case in the implementation of the EC Common Commercial Policy. The other main finding of the study is that, although it has been largely neglected in the previous literature on the history of West European integration, the CMEA did in fact have an effect on EC decision-making. This study shows how for political and ideological reasons the CMEA members did not acknowledge the EC s supranational authority. Therefore the EC had no choice but to refrain from implementing its Common Commercial Policy in full.