Constructions and situations : a constructivist reading of Hegel's System

The object of this work is Hegel's Logic, which comprises the first third of his philosophical System that also includes the Philosophy of Nature and the Philosophy of Spirit. The work is divided into two parts, where the first part investigates Hegel s Logic in itself or without an explicit reference to rest of Hegel's System. It is argued in the first part that Hegel's Logic contains a methodology for constructing examples of basic ontological categories. The starting point on which this construction is based is a structure Hegel calls Nothing, which I argue to be identical with an empty situation, that is, a situation with no objects in it. Examples of further categories are constructed, firstly, by making previous structures objects of new situations. This rule makes it possible for Hegel to introduce examples of ontological structures that contain objects as constituents. Secondly, Hegel takes also the very constructions he uses as constituents of further structures: thus, he is able to exemplify ontological categories involving causal relations. The final result of Hegel's Logic should then be a model of Hegel s Logic itself, or at least of its basic methods. The second part of the work focuses on the relation of Hegel's Logic to the other parts of Hegel's System. My interpretation tries to avoid, firstly, the extreme of taking Hegel's System as a grand metaphysical attempt to deduce what exists through abstract thinking, and secondly, the extreme of seeing Hegel's System as mere diluted Kantianism or a second-order investigation of theories concerning objects instead of actual objects. I suggest a third manner of reading Hegel's System, based on extending the constructivism of Hegel's Logic to the whole of his philosophical System. According to this interpretation, transitions between parts of Hegel's System should not be understood as proofs of any sort, but as constructions of one structure or its model from another structure. Hence, these transitions involve at least, and especially within the Philosophy of Nature, modelling of one type of object or phenomenon through characteristics of an object or phenomenon of another type, and in the best case, and especially within the Philosophy of Spirit, transformations of an object or phenomenon of one type into an object or phenomenon of another type. Thus, the transitions and descriptions within Hegel's System concern actual objects and not mere theories, but they still involve no fallacious deductions.

An Analysis of the Concept of Citizenship: Legal, Political and Social Dimensions

The thesis aims at analyzing concept of citizenship in political philosophy. The concept of citizenship is a complex one: it does not have a definitive explication, but it nevertheless is a very important category in contemporary world. Citizenship is a powerful ideal, and often the way a person is treated depends on whether he or she has the status of a citizen. Citizenship includes protection of a person’s rights both at home and abroad. It entails legal, political and social dimension: the legal status as a full member of society, the recognition of that status by fellow citizens and acting as a member of society. The thesis discusses these three dimensions. Its objective is to show how all of them, despite being insufficient in some aspects, reach something important about the concept. The main sources of the thesis are Civic Republicanism by Iseult Honohan (Routledge 2002), Republicanism by Philip Pettit (Clarendon Press 1997), and Taking Rights Seriously by Ronald Dworkin (1997). In addition, the historical part of the thesis relies mainly on the works of Aristotle, Immanuel Kant, Adam Smith, Quentin Skinner, James Pocock and James Tully. The writings of Will Kymlicka, John Rawls, Chantal Mouffe, and Shane Phelan are referred to in the presentation and critique of the liberal tradition of thought. Hannah Arendt and Seyla Benhabib’s analysis of Arendt’s philosophy both address the problematic relations between human rights and nation-states as the main guarantors of rights. The chapter on group rights relies on Peter Jones’ account of corporate and collective rights, after which I continue to Seumas Miller’s essay on the (liberal) account of group rights and their relation to the concept of citizenship. Republicanism and Political Theory (2002) edited by Cécile Laborde and John Maynor is also references. David Miller and Maurizio Viroli represent the more “rooted” version of republicanism. The thesis argues that the full concept of citizenship should be seen as containing legal, political and social dimensions. The concept can be viewed from all of these three angles. The first means that citizenship is connected with certain rights, like the right to vote or stand for election, the right to property and so on. In most societies, the law guarantees these rights to every citizen. Then there is also the social dimension, which can be said to be as important as the legal one: the recognition of equality and identities of others. Finally, there is the political dimension, meaning the importance of citizens’ participation in the society, which is discussed in connection with the contemporary account of republicanism. All these issues are discussed from the point of view of groups demanding for group-specific rights and equal recognition. The challenge with these three aspects of citizenship is, however, that they are difficult to discuss under one heading. Different theories or discourses of citizenship each approach the subject from different starting points, which make reconciling them sometimes hard. The fundamental questions theories try to answer may differ radically depending on the theory. Nevertheless, in order to get the whole image of what the citizenship discourses are about all the aspects deserve to be taken into account.