20 resultados para Afghan War, 2001-
Resumo:
In this thesis I examine the U.S. foreign policy discussion that followed the war between Russia and Georgia in August 2008. In the politically charged setting that preceded the presidential elections, the subject of the debate was not only Washington's response to the crisis in the Caucasus but, more generally, the direction of U.S. foreign policy after the presidency of George W. Bush. As of November 2010, the reasons for and consequences of the Russia-Georgia war continue to be contested. My thesis demonstrates that there were already a number of different stories about the conflict immediately after the outbreak of hostilities. I want to argue that among these stories one can discern a “neoconservative narrative” that described the war as a confrontation between the East and the West and considered it as a test for Washington’s global leadership. I draw on the theory of securitization, particularly on a framework introduced by Holger Stritzel. Accordingly, I consider statements about the conflict as “threat texts” and analyze these based on the existing discursive context, the performative force of the threat texts and the positional power of the actors presenting them. My thesis suggests that a notion of narrativity can complement Stritzel’s securitization framework and take it further. Threat texts are established as narratives by attaching causal connections, meaning and actorship to the discourse. By focusing on this process I want to shed light on the relationship between the text and the context, capture the time dimension of a speech act articulation and help to explain how some interpretations of the conflict are privileged and others marginalized. I develop the theoretical discussion through an empirical analysis of the neoconservative narrative. Drawing on Stritzel’s framework, I argue that the internal logic of the narrative which was presented as self-evident can be analyzed in its historicity. Asking what was perceived to be at stake in the conflict, how the narrative was formed and what purposes it served also reveals the possibility for alternative explanations. My main source material consists of transcripts of think tank seminars organized in Washington, D.C. in August 2008. In addition, I resort to the foreign policy discussion in the mainstream media.
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XVIII IUFRO World Congress, Ljubljana 1986.
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The dissertation examines aspects of asymmetrical warfare in the war-making of the German military entrepreneur Ernst von Mansfeld during his involvement in the Thirty Years War. Due to the nature of the inquiry, which combines history with military-political theory, the methodological approach of the dissertation is interdisciplinary. The theoretical framework used is that of asymmetrical warfare. The primary sources used in the dissertation are mostly political pamphlets and newsletters. Other sources include letters, documents, and contemporaneous chronicles. The secondary sources are divided into two categories, literature on the history of the Thirty Years War and textbooks covering the theory of asymmetrical warfare. The first category includes biographical works on Ernst von Mansfeld, as well as general histories of the Thirty Years War and seventeenth-century warfare. The second category combines military theory and political science. The structure of the dissertation consists of eight lead chapters, including an introduction and conclusion. The introduction covers the theoretical approach and aims of the dissertation, and provides a brief overlook of the sources and previous research on Ernst von Mansfeld and asymmetrical warfare in the Thirty Years War. The second chapter covers aspects of Mansfeld s asymmetrical warfare from the perspective of operational art. The third chapter investigates the illegal and immoral aspects of Mansfeld s war-making. The fourth chapter compares the differing methods by which Mansfeld and his enemies raised and financed their armies. The fifth chapter investigates Mansfeld s involvement in indirect warfare. The sixth chapter presents Mansfeld as an object and an agent of image and information war. The seventh chapter looks into the counter-reactions, which Mansfeld s asymmetrical warfare provoked from his enemies. The eighth chapter offers a conclusion of the findings. The dissertation argues that asymmetrical warfare presented itself in all the aforementioned areas of Mansfeld s conduct during the Thirty Years War. The operational asymmetry arose from the freedom of movement that Mansfeld enjoyed, while his enemies were constrained by the limits of positional warfare. As a non-state operator Mansfeld was also free to flout the rules of seventeenth-century warfare, which his enemies could not do with equal ease. The raising and financing of military forces was another source of asymmetry, because the nature of early seventeenth-century warfare favoured private military entrepreneurs rather than embryonic fiscal-military states. The dissertation also argues that other powers fought their own asymmetrical and indirect wars against the Habsburgs through Mansfeld s agency. Image and information were asymmetrical weapons, which were both aimed against Mansfeld and utilized by him. Finally, Mansfeld s asymmetrical threat forced the Habsburgs to adapt to his methods, which ultimately lead to the formation of a subcontracted Imperial Army under the management and leadership of Albrecht von Wallenstein. Therefore Mansfeld s asymmetrical warfare ultimately paved way for the kind of state-monopolized, organised, and symmetrical warfare that has prevailed from 1648 onwards. The conclusion is that Mansfeld s conduct in the Thirty Years War matched the criteria for asymmetrical warfare. While traditional historiography treated Mansfeld as an anomaly in the age of European state formation, his asymmetrical warfare has begun to bear resemblance to the contemporary conflicts, where nation states no longer hold the monopoly of violence.
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Tässä tutkielmassa tarkastellaan Bolivialaisten naisvankien (alkuperäisväestön) ja globaalin huumesodan ("War on Drugs") välistä yhteyttä. Keskustelu sijoitetaan laajemmin kokan viljelyn politiikkaan ja alkuperäisväestön kulttuuriin. Kokaa viljeleviä köyhiä maalaisia, joista huomattava osa on naisia, on vangittu Boliviassa kiihtyvää tahtia viime vuosikymmeninä. Moni naisista on kokan tuotannossa ja kaupassa mukana, sillä se on monesti ainoa keino taloudelliseen selviämiseen. Yleisesti ottaen naisvangit ja naisrikolliset ovat marginaalinen ilmiö. Kansainvälisesti tarkasteltuna naisvankien suhteellinen osuus koko vankilaväestöstä on noin 5,2 % (keskiarvo). Boliviassa osuus on vaihdellut 6,1 %:n ja 17,1 %:n välillä vuosina 2000-2008. Naisvankien määrä yleisesti ottaen on ollut rajussa kasvussa, suurin syy naisten vangitsemiseen on huumausaineisiin liittyvät rikokset. Näyttää myös siltä että vähemmistöt ja etnisen taustan omaavat henkilöt ovat yliedustettuina vankilaväestössä. Bolivia seuraa tätä kansainvälistä trendiä. Tämä tutkielma on rajattu kysymyksiin Bolivian intiaaniperäisten naisten osuudesta maan huumerikollisuudessa, sekä heidän suhteellisen korkeaa vangitsemisastetta selittäviin yhteiskunnallisiin tekijöihin. Kysymykset sukupuolesta, etnisyydestä ja kokan viljelyn politiikasta ovat keskiössä. Yleisiä kriminologisia teorioita peilataan kriittisesti suhteessa aineistoon ja Bolivian kontekstiin. Huumesodan ja Bolivian ankaran huumelainsäädännön seurauksista keskustellaan kriittisesti, sekä pohditaan köyhän alkuperäisväestön massavangitsemisen tarpeellisuutta. Tutkimuskysymykseni ovat: mitkä tekijät selittävät kohtuullisen korkean intiaaniperäisten naisvankien määrän Boliviassa, ja mikä on heidän asemansa globaalissa huumesodassa? Tutkielmassa on analysoitu kvantitatiivista ja kvalitatiivista aineistoa. Päälähteenä on ollut Bolivian tilastokeskuksen tuottamat rikostilastot. Tutkielman tärkeimpänä löydöksenä voidaan pitää havaintoa, että vastoin tiettyjä olettamuksia, intiaaniperäiset naiset ovat hyvinkin aktiivisia perinteisesti miehisiksi käsitetyillä aloilla kuten rikollisuudessa ja politiikassa. Tutkielmassa osoitetaan myös, että pidätysten määrät ovat moninkertaistuneet muutamassa vuosikymmenessä. Koska kokan viljelyssä on kyse pääasiallisesti taloudellisesta toimeentulosta, tämä tutkielma kysyy, onko hengissä pysyminen rikos?
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The coherence of the Soviet bloc was seriously tested at the turn of the 1970s, as the Soviet Union and its allies engaged in intensive negotiations over their relations with the European Communities (EC). In an effort to secure their own national economic interests many East European countries began independent manoeuvres against the wishes of their bloc leader. However, much of the intra-bloc controversy was kept out of the public eye, as the battle largely took place behind the scenes, within the organisation for economic cooperation, the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). The CMEA policy-making process vis-à-vis the EC is described in this study with reference to primary archival materials. This study investigates the negotiating positions and powers of the CMEA member states in their efforts to deal with the economic challenge created by the progress of the EC, as it advanced towards the customs union. This entails an analysis of the functioning principles and performance of the CMEA machinery. The study traces the CMEA negotiations that began in 1970 over its policy toward the EC. The policy was finally adopted in 1974, and was followed by the first official meeting between the two organisations in early 1975. The story ends in 1976, when the CMEA s efforts to enter into working relations with the EC were seemingly frustrated by the latter. The first major finding of the study is that, contrary to much of the prior research, the Soviet Union was not in a hegemonic position vis-à-vis its allies. It had to use a lot of its resources to tame the independent manoeuvring of its smaller allies. Thus, the USSR was not the kind of bloc leader that the totalitarian literature has described. Because the Soviet Union had to spend so much attention on its own bloc-politics, it was not able to concentrate on formulating a policy vis-à-vis the EC. Thus, the Soviet leadership was dependent on its allies in those instances when the socialist countries needed to act as a bloc. This consequently opened up the possibility for the USSR s allies to manoeuvre. This study also argues that when the CMEA did manage to find a united position, it was a force that the EC had to reckon with in its policy-making. This was particularly the case in the implementation of the EC Common Commercial Policy. The other main finding of the study is that, although it has been largely neglected in the previous literature on the history of West European integration, the CMEA did in fact have an effect on EC decision-making. This study shows how for political and ideological reasons the CMEA members did not acknowledge the EC s supranational authority. Therefore the EC had no choice but to refrain from implementing its Common Commercial Policy in full.