19 resultados para Adorno, Theodor W, 1903-1969.


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We present a search for standard model Higgs boson production in association with a W boson in proton-antiproton collisions at a center of mass energy of 1.96 TeV. The search employs data collected with the CDF II detector that correspond to an integrated luminosity of approximately 1.9 inverse fb. We select events consistent with a signature of a single charged lepton, missing transverse energy, and two jets. Jets corresponding to bottom quarks are identified with a secondary vertex tagging method, a jet probability tagging method, and a neural network filter. We use kinematic information in an artificial neural network to improve discrimination between signal and background compared to previous analyses. The observed number of events and the neural network output distributions are consistent with the standard model background expectations, and we set 95% confidence level upper limits on the production cross section times branching fraction ranging from 1.2 to 1.1 pb or 7.5 to 102 times the standard model expectation for Higgs boson masses from 110 to $150 GeV/c^2, respectively.

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Julkaistu Silva Fennica Vol. 4(1) -numeron liitteenä.

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The coherence of the Soviet bloc was seriously tested at the turn of the 1970s, as the Soviet Union and its allies engaged in intensive negotiations over their relations with the European Communities (EC). In an effort to secure their own national economic interests many East European countries began independent manoeuvres against the wishes of their bloc leader. However, much of the intra-bloc controversy was kept out of the public eye, as the battle largely took place behind the scenes, within the organisation for economic cooperation, the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). The CMEA policy-making process vis-à-vis the EC is described in this study with reference to primary archival materials. This study investigates the negotiating positions and powers of the CMEA member states in their efforts to deal with the economic challenge created by the progress of the EC, as it advanced towards the customs union. This entails an analysis of the functioning principles and performance of the CMEA machinery. The study traces the CMEA negotiations that began in 1970 over its policy toward the EC. The policy was finally adopted in 1974, and was followed by the first official meeting between the two organisations in early 1975. The story ends in 1976, when the CMEA s efforts to enter into working relations with the EC were seemingly frustrated by the latter. The first major finding of the study is that, contrary to much of the prior research, the Soviet Union was not in a hegemonic position vis-à-vis its allies. It had to use a lot of its resources to tame the independent manoeuvring of its smaller allies. Thus, the USSR was not the kind of bloc leader that the totalitarian literature has described. Because the Soviet Union had to spend so much attention on its own bloc-politics, it was not able to concentrate on formulating a policy vis-à-vis the EC. Thus, the Soviet leadership was dependent on its allies in those instances when the socialist countries needed to act as a bloc. This consequently opened up the possibility for the USSR s allies to manoeuvre. This study also argues that when the CMEA did manage to find a united position, it was a force that the EC had to reckon with in its policy-making. This was particularly the case in the implementation of the EC Common Commercial Policy. The other main finding of the study is that, although it has been largely neglected in the previous literature on the history of West European integration, the CMEA did in fact have an effect on EC decision-making. This study shows how for political and ideological reasons the CMEA members did not acknowledge the EC s supranational authority. Therefore the EC had no choice but to refrain from implementing its Common Commercial Policy in full.