Social Security Programs Throughout the World: Asia and the Pacific, 2006

[Excerpt] This second issue in the current four-volume series of Social Security Programs Throughout the World reports on the countries of Asia and the Pacific. The combined findings of this series, which also includes volumes on Europe, Africa, and the Americas, are published at 6-month intervals over a 2-year period. Each volume highlights features of social security programs in the particular region. This guide serves as an overview of programs in all regions. A few political jurisdictions have been excluded because they have no social security system or have issued no information regarding their social security legislation. In the absence of recent information, national programs reported in previous volumes may also be excluded. In this volume on Asia and the Pacific, the data reported are based on laws and regulations in force in July 2006 or on the last date for which information has been received.1 Information for each country on types of social security programs, types of mandatory systems for retirement income, contribution rates, and demographic and other statistics related to social security is shown in Tables 1­4 at the end of the guide. The country summaries show each system's major features. Separate programs in the public sector and specialized funds for such groups as agricultural workers, collective farmers, or the self-employed have not been described in any detail. Benefit arrangements of private employers or individuals are not described in any detail, even though such arrangements may be mandatory in some countries or available as alternatives to statutory programs. The country summaries also do not refer to international social security agreements that may be in force between two or more countries. Those agreements may modify coverage, contributions, and benefit provisions of national laws summarized in the country write-ups. Since the summary format requires brevity, technical terms have been developed that are concise as well as comparable and are applied to all programs. The terminology may therefore differ from national concepts or usage.

The Benefits Planner: Improved Work Incentives in Social Security Disability Insurance Program - Changes Will Make Work More Attractive to SSDI Recipients

This newsletter will provide valuable information on how work for persons with disabilities effects government benefits, with an emphasis on the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) and Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) work incentives. Each newsletter will contribute to an ongoing dialogue on topics related to benefits and work.

The Eligibility Definition Used in the Social Security Administration’s Disability Programs Needs to be Changed

In its October 2003 report on the definition of disability used by the Social Security Administration’s (SSA’s) disability programs [i.e., Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) for people with disabilities], the Social Security Advisory Board raises the issue of whether this definition is at odds with the concept of disability embodied in the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and, more importantly, with the aspirations of people with disabilities to be full participants in mainstream social activities and lead fulfilling, productive lives. The Board declares that “the Nation must face up to the contradictions created by the existing definition of disability.” I wholeheartedly agree. Further, I have concluded that we have to make fundamental, conceptual changes to both how we define eligibility for economic security benefits, and how we provide those benefits, if we are ever to fulfill the promise of the ADA. To convince you of that proposition, I will begin by relating a number of facts that paint a very bleak picture – a picture of deterioration in the economic security of the population that the disability programs are intended to serve; a picture of programs that purport to provide economic security, but are themselves financially insecure and subject to cycles of expansion and cuts that undermine their purpose; a picture of programs that are facing their biggest expenditure crisis ever; and a picture of an eligibility determination process that is inefficient and inequitable -- one that rations benefits by imposing high application costs on applicants in an arbitrary fashion. I will then argue that the fundamental reason for this bleak picture is the conceptual definition of eligibility that these programs use – one rooted in a disability paradigm that social scientists, people with disabilities, and, to a substantial extent, the public have rejected as being flawed, most emphatically through the passage of the ADA. Current law requires eligibility rules to be based on the premise that disability is medically determinable. That’s wrong because, as the ADA recognizes, a person’s environment matters. I will further argue that programs relying on this eligibility definition must inevitably: reward people if they do not try to help themselves, but not if they do; push the people they serve out of society’s mainstream, fostering a culture of isolation and dependency; relegate many to a lifetime of poverty; and undermine their promise of economic security because of the periodic “reforms” that are necessary to maintain taxpayer support. I conclude by pointing out that to change the conceptual definition for program eligibility, we also must change our whole approach to providing for the economic security of people with disabilities. We need to replace our current “caretaker” approach with one that emphasizes helping people with disabilities help themselves. I will briefly describe features that such a program might require, and point out the most significant challenges we would face in making the transition.

Promising Practices: Ensuring Choice Under the Ticket to Work Program - The Indiana PABSS Approach

The Ticket to Work program offered disabled and blind social security beneficiaries the promise of greater choice when selecting a vocational rehabilitation provider. With the issuance of Transmittal #17, much of the opportunity to choose a provider was removed. The Protection and Advocacy agency in Indiana took steps to protect the rights of disabled and blind beneficiaries to choose providers in the face of this significant policy change. Learn what was done to protect the rights and ability of beneficiaries to seek and choose vocational rehabilitation providers.

The Benefits Planner: New York Implements Medicaid Buy-In Program - Program Allows Individuals With Disabilities to Work and Keep Medicaid

This newsletter will provide valuable information on how work for persons with disabilities effects government benefits, with an emphasis on the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) and Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) work incentives. Each newsletter will contribute to an ongoing dialogue on topics related to benefits and work.

Changes in Employment Security in Asia

Much attention has been focused on the decline of traditional employment structures in the advanced industrial countries. Lesser attention has focused on this issue in Asia. In this comparative essay, the authors examine the changes in employment security in China, India, Japan, and South Korea. They focus on the historical development of the employment security social contract in these countries, noting the institutional features that gave rise to it in each country. They then examine the resilience of employment security norms under recent economic pressures. They find there has been substantial erosion in employment security during the 1990s in all four countries due to both increased competition and economic liberalization, although there is some variation in both the rate of erosion as well as the prospects for revival of the social contract. They assess the possibilities of a revival in this particular social contract, and the impact of the erosion on unorganized workers.

Policy and Practice Brief: Representative Payment

This brief provides an overview of the Representative Payee program administered by Social Security. Discussed are the many provisions of the programs as well as practice tips and implications for BPA&O and PABSS personnel.

Work Study and Supplemental Security Income (SSI)

This Just the Facts Series details Work Study and Supplemental Security Income.

Strengthening Incentives for Student Effort and Learning: Michigan’s Merit Award Program?

[Excerpt] One of the primary reasons American students learn a good deal less during secondary school than students in other industrialized nations is that they devote less time and intellectual energy to the task.1 Accountability systems designed to get teachers to try harder and set higher standards will not produce more student learning if [as one high school teacher put it] “students are sitting back in their desks, arms crossed, waiting for their teachers to make them smart (Zoch, 1998, p. 70).” Learning is not a passive act; it requires the time and active involvement of the learner. In a classroom with 1 teacher and 25 students, there are 25 learning hours spent for every hour of teaching time. Learning takes work and that work is generally not going to be as much fun as hanging out with friends or watching TV. If students cannot be motivated to give up some time socializing or watching TV so that they can learn difficult material and develop high level skills, the time and talents of teachers will be wasted.