The price of pain and the value of suffering.

Estimating the financial value of pain informs issues as diverse as the market price of analgesics, the cost-effectiveness of clinical treatments, compensation for injury, and the response to public hazards. Such valuations are assumed to reflect a stable trade-off between relief of discomfort and money. Here, using an auction-based health-market experiment, we show that the price people pay for relief of pain is strongly determined by the local context of the market, that is, by recent intensities of pain or immediately disposable income (but not overall wealth). The absence of a stable valuation metric suggests that the dynamic behavior of health markets is not predictable from the static behavior of individuals. We conclude that the results follow the dynamics of habit-formation models of economic theory, and thus, this study provides the first scientific basis for this type of preference modeling.

Oscillations in a decentralized economic network

The study of exchange markets dates back to LeonWalras's general equilibrium theory. Since then the economic market has been studied for its' equilibrium properties, fairness of allocations of private and public goods, and even the psychological incentives of participants. This paper studies the dynamics of an exchange economy built on a network of markets where consumers trade with suppliers to optimize utility. Viewing the market in as a decentralized network we study the system from the usual control theory point of view, evaluating the system's dynamic performance, stability and robustness. It is shown that certain consumer demand dynamics can lead to oscillations while others can converge to optimal allocations. © 2011 IFAC.