Fiscal Policy and Economic Stability: Does PIGS stand for Procyclicality In Government Spending?

The Financial Crisis has hit particularly hard countries like Ireland or Spain. Procyclical fiscal policy has contributed to a boom-bust cycle that undermined fiscal positions and deepened current account deficits during the boom. We set up an RBC model of a small open economy, following Mendoza (1991), and introduce the effect of fiscal policy decisions that change over the cycle. We calibrate the model on data for Ireland, and simulate the effect of different spending policies in response to supply shocks. Procyclical fiscal policy distorts intertemporal allocation decisions. Temporary spending boosts in booms spur investment, and hence the need for external finance, and so generates very volatile cycles in investment and the current account. This economic instability is also harmful for the steady state level of output. Our model is able to replicate the relation between the degree of cyclicality of fiscal policy, and the volatility of consumption, investment and the current account observed in OECD countries.

Policy Coordination in an Oligopolistic Housing Market

This paper analyzes the consequences of the interaction between two different levels of government (regulators) in the development of housing policy when their decisions determine the level of competition in the housing market. The analysis discusses the implications derived from a lack of coordination between a local regulator who controls the supply of land for housing development and a central regulator who decides on housing subsidies. The results suggest that lack of coordination has significant effects on prices and supply of houses, housing developers’ profits, and buyers’ surplus.

Ad valorem housing subsidies may reduce house building

In this paper it is shown that an ad valorem housing subsidy set by a central regulator (or a raise in the ad valorem housing subsidy rate) may reduce the number of houses built in the market and increase the price paid by the buyers of houses. The analysis considers a situation where there is imperfect competition in the housing market and a local regulator that decides on density, or on the number of sites for housing development, and that cares about a combination of the profits of housing developers and the surplus of buyers of houses.

Which policy option can be more cost-effective in promoting the use of energy efficient appliances in Europe? A comparison of energy taxes, subsidies, tax credits and bans.

4 p.

Understanding Public Support for Externality-Correcting Taxes and Subsidies: A Lab Experiment

31 p.

Economic Efficiency, Environmental Effectiveness and Political Feasibility of Energy Efficiency Rebates: The Case of the Spanish Energy Efficiency 'Renove' Plan

29 p.