10 resultados para cognition
Resumo:
Background: Cognitive impairments are seen in first psychotic episode (FEP) patients. The neurobiological underpinnings that might underlie these changes remain unknown. The aim of this study is to investigate whether Brain Derived Neurotrophic Factor (BDNF) levels are associated with cognitive impairment in FEP patients compared with healthy controls. Methods: 45 FEP patients and 45 healthy controls matched by age, gender and educational level were selected from the Basque Country area of Spain. Plasma BDNF levels were assessed in healthy controls and in patients. A battery of cognitive tests was applied to both groups, with the patients being assessed at 6 months after the acute episode and only in those with a clinical response to treatment. Results: Plasma BDNF levels were altered in patients compared with the control group. In FEP patients, we observed a positive association between BDNF levels at six months and five cognitive domains (learning ability,immediate and delayed memory, abstract thinking and processing speed) which persisted after controlling for medications prescribed, drug use, intelligence quotient (IQ) and negative symptoms. In the healthy control group, BDNF levels were not associated with cognitive test scores. Conclusion: Our results suggest that BDNF is associated with the cognitive impairment seen after a FEP. Further investigations of the role of this neurotrophin in the symptoms associated with psychosis onset are warranted.
Resumo:
Enactive approaches foreground the role of interpersonal interaction in explanations of social understanding. This motivates, in combination with a recent interest in neuroscientific studies involving actual interactions, the question of how interactive processes relate to neural mechanisms involved in social understanding. We introduce the Interactive Brain Hypothesis (IBH) in order to help map the spectrum of possible relations between social interaction and neural processes. The hypothesis states that interactive experience and skills play enabling roles in both the development and current function of social brain mechanisms, even in cases where social understanding happens in the absence of immediate interaction. We examine the plausibility of this hypothesis against developmental and neurobiological evidence and contrast it with the widespread assumption that mindreading is crucial to all social cognition. We describe the elements of social interaction that bear most directly on this hypothesis and discuss the empirical possibilities open to social neuroscience. We propose that the link between coordination dynamics and social understanding can be best grasped by studying transitions between states of coordination. These transitions form part of the self-organization of interaction processes that characterize the dynamics of social engagement. The patterns and synergies of this self-organization help explain how individuals understand each other. Various possibilities for role-taking emerge during interaction, determining a spectrum of participation. This view contrasts sharply with the observational stance that has guided research in social neuroscience until recently. We also introduce the concept of readiness to interact to describe the practices and dispositions that are summoned in situations of social significance (even if not interactive). This latter idea links interactive factors to more classical observational scenarios.
Resumo:
[EN] In this study, we explore native and non-native syntactic processing, paying special attention to the language distance factor. To this end, we compared how native speakers of Basque and highly proficient non-native speakers of Basque who are native speakers of Spanish process certain core aspects of Basque syntax. Our results suggest that differences in native versus non-native language processing strongly correlate with language distance: native/non-native processing differences obtain if a syntactic parameter of the non-native grammar diverges from the native grammar. Otherwise, non-native processing will approximate native processing as levels of proficiency increase. We focus on three syntactic parameters: (i) the head parameter, (ii) argument alignment (ergative/accusative), and (iii) verb agreement. The first two diverge in Basque and Spanish, but the third is the same in both languages. Our results reveal that native and non-native processing differs for the diverging syntactic parameters, but not for the convergent one. These findings indicate that language distance has a significant impact in non-native language processing.
Resumo:
This paper takes a new look at an old question: what is the human self? It offers a proposal for theorizing the self from an enactive perspective as an autonomous system that is constituted through interpersonal relations. It addresses a prevalent issue in the philosophy of cognitive science: the body-social problem. Embodied and social approaches to cognitive identity are in mutual tension. On the one hand, embodied cognitive science risks a new form of methodological individualism, implying a dichotomy not between the outside world of objects and the brain-bound individual but rather between body-bound individuals and the outside social world. On the other hand, approaches that emphasize the constitutive relevance of social interaction processes for cognitive identity run the risk of losing the individual in the interaction dynamics and of downplaying the role of embodiment. This paper adopts a middle way and outlines an enactive approach to individuation that is neither individualistic nor disembodied but integrates both approaches. Elaborating on Jonas' notion of needful freedom it outlines an enactive proposal to understanding the self as co-generated in interactions and relations with others. I argue that the human self is a social existence that is organized in terms of a back and forth between social distinction and participation processes. On this view, the body, rather than being identical with the social self, becomes its mediator
Resumo:
The past years have seen an increasing debate on cooperation and its unique human character. Philosophers and psychologists have proposed that cooperative activities are characterized by shared goals to which participants are committed through the ability to understand each other’s intentions. Despite its popularity, some serious issues arise with this approach to cooperation. First, one may challenge the assumption that high-level mental processes are necessary for engaging in acting cooperatively. If they are, then how do agents that do not possess such ability (preverbal children, or children with autism who are often claimed to be mind-blind) engage in cooperative exchanges, as the evidence suggests? Secondly, to define cooperation as the result of two de-contextualized minds reading each other’s intentions may fail to fully acknowledge the complexity of situated, interactional dynamics and the interplay of variables such as the participants’ relational and personal history and experience. In this paper we challenge such accounts of cooperation, calling for an embodied approach that sees cooperation not only as an individual attitude toward the other, but also as a property of interaction processes. Taking an enactive perspective, we argue that cooperation is an intrinsic part of any interaction, and that there can be cooperative interaction before complex communicative abilities are achieved. The issue then is not whether one is able or not to read the other’s intentions, but what it takes to participate in joint action. From this basic account, it should be possible to build up more complex forms of cooperation as needed. Addressing the study of cooperation in these terms may enhance our understanding of human social development, and foster our knowledge of different ways of engaging with others, as in the case of autism.
Resumo:
During the last two decades, analysis of 1/f noise in cognitive science has led to a considerable progress in the way we understand the organization of our mental life. However, there is still a lack of specific models providing explanations of how 1/f noise is generated in coupled brain-body-environment systems, since existing models and experiments typically target either externally observable behaviour or isolated neuronal systems but do not address the interplay between neuronal mechanisms and sensorimotor dynamics. We present a conceptual model of a minimal neurorobotic agent solving a behavioural task that makes it possible to relate mechanistic (neurodynamic) and behavioural levels of description. The model consists of a simulated robot controlled by a network of Kuramoto oscillators with homeostatic plasticity and the ability to develop behavioural preferences mediated by sensorimotor patterns. With only three oscillators, this simple model displays self-organized criticality in the form of robust 1/f noise and a wide multifractal spectrum. We show that the emergence of self-organized criticality and 1/f noise in our model is the result of three simultaneous conditions: a) non-linear interaction dynamics capable of generating stable collective patterns, b) internal plastic mechanisms modulating the sensorimotor flows, and c) strong sensorimotor coupling with the environment that induces transient metastable neurodynamic regimes. We carry out a number of experiments to show that both synaptic plasticity and strong sensorimotor coupling play a necessary role, as constituents of self-organized criticality, in the generation of 1/f noise. The experiments also shown to be useful to test the robustness of 1/f scaling comparing the results of different techniques. We finally discuss the role of conceptual models as mediators between nomothetic and mechanistic models and how they can inform future experimental research where self-organized critically includes sensorimotor coupling among the essential interaction-dominant process giving rise to 1/f noise.
Resumo:
Bipolar disorder (BD) and alcohol use disorders (AUDs) are usually comorbid, and both have been associated with significant neurocognitive impairment. Patients with the BD-AUD comorbidity (dual diagnosis) may have more severe neurocognitive deficits than those with a single diagnosis, but there is paucity of research in this area. To explore this hypothesis more thoroughly, we carried out a systematic literature review through January 2015. Eight studies have examined the effect of AUDs on the neurocognitive functioning of BD patients. Most studies found that BD patients with current or past history of comorbid AUDs show more severe impairments, especially in verbal memory and executive cognition, than their non-dual counterparts. Greater neurocognitive dysfunction is another facet of this severe comorbid presentation. Implications for clinical practice and research are discussed. Specifically, the application of holistic approaches, such as clinical staging and systems biology, may open new avenues of discoveries related to the BD-AUD comorbidity.
Resumo:
Learning to perceive is faced with a classical paradox: if understanding is required for perception, how can we learn to perceive something new, something we do not yet understand? According to the sensorimotor approach, perception involves mastery of regular sensorimotor co-variations that depend on the agent and the environment, also known as the "laws" of sensorimotor contingencies (SMCs). In this sense, perception involves enacting relevant sensorimotor skills in each situation. It is important for this proposal that such skills can be learned and refined with experience and yet up to this date, the sensorimotor approach has had no explicit theory of perceptual learning. The situation is made more complex if we acknowledge the open-ended nature of human learning. In this paper we propose Piaget's theory of equilibration as a potential candidate to fulfill this role. This theory highlights the importance of intrinsic sensorimotor norms, in terms of the closure of sensorimotor schemes. It also explains how the equilibration of a sensorimotor organization faced with novelty or breakdowns proceeds by re-shaping pre-existing structures in coupling with dynamical regularities of the world. This way learning to perceive is guided by the equilibration of emerging forms of skillful coping with the world. We demonstrate the compatibility between Piaget's theory and the sensorimotor approach by providing a dynamical formalization of equilibration to give an explicit micro-genetic account of sensorimotor learning and, by extension, of how we learn to perceive. This allows us to draw important lessons in the form of general principles for open-ended sensorimotor learning, including the need for an intrinsic normative evaluation by the agent itself. We also explore implications of our micro-genetic account at the personal level.
Resumo:
The neurotransmitter serotonin (5-HT) has a multifaceted function in the modulation of information processing through the activation of multiple receptor families, including G-protein-coupled receptor subtypes (5-HT1, 5-HT2, 5-HT4-7) and ligand-gated ion channels (5-HT3). The largest population of serotonergic neurons is located in the midbrain, specifically in the raphe nuclei. Although the medial and dorsal raphe nucleus (DRN) share common projecting areas, in the basal ganglia (BG) nuclei serotonergic innervations come mainly from the DRN. The BG are a highly organized network of subcortical nuclei composed of the striatum (caudate and putamen), subthalamic nucleus (STN), internal and external globus pallidus (or entopeduncular nucleus in rodents, GPi/EP and GPe) and substantia nigra (pars compacta, SNc, and pars reticulata, SNr). The BG are part of the cortico-BG-thalamic circuits, which play a role in many functions like motor control, emotion, and cognition and are critically involved in diseases such as Parkinson's disease (PD). This review provides an overview of serotonergic modulation of the BG at the functional level and a discussion of how this interaction may be relevant to treating PD and the motor complications induced by chronic treatment with L-DOPA.
Resumo:
We distinguish two general approaches to inner speech (IS) the "format" and the "activity" views and defend the activity view. The format view grounds the utility of IS on features of the representational format of language, and is related to the thesis that the proper function of IS is to make conscious thinking possible. IS appears typically as a product constituted by representations of phonological features. The view also has implications for the idea that passivity phenomena in cognition may be misat-tributed IS. The activity view sees IS as a speaking activity that does not have a proper function in cognition. It simply inherits the array of functions of outer speech. We argue that it is methodologically advisable to start from this variety of uses, which suggests commonalities between internal and external activities. The format view has several problems; it has to deny "unsymbolized thinking"; it cannot easily explain how IS makes thoughts available to consciousness, and it cannot explain those uses of IS where its format features apparently play no role. The activity view not only lacks these problems but also has explanatory advantages: construing IS as an activity allows it to be integrally constituted by its content; the view is able to construe unsymbolized thinking as part of a continuum of phenomena that exploit the same mechanisms, and it offers a simple explanation for the variety of uses of IS