Altruism in the (Social) Network

This paper explores the role of social integration on altruistic behavior. To this aim, we develop a two-stage experimental protocol based on the classic Dictator Game. In the first stage, we ask a group of 77 undergraduate students in Economics to elicit their social network; in the second stage, each of them has to unilaterally decide over the division of a fixed amount of money to be shared with another anonymous member in the group. Our experimental design allows to control for other variables known to be relevant for altruistic behavior: framing and friendship/acquaintance relations. Consistently with previous research, we find that subjects favor their friends and that framing enhances altruistic behavior. Once we control for these effects, social integration (measured by betweenness, a standard centrality measure in network theory) has a positive effect on giving: the larger social isolation within the group, the more likely it is the emergence of selfish behavior. These results suggest that information on the network structure in which subjects are embedded is crucial to account for their behavior.

Accuracy in Copy Number Calling by qPCR and PRT : A Matter of DNA

7 p.

Prosocial norms and degree heterogeneity in social networks

We provide empirical evidence to support the claims that social diversity promotes prosocial behavior. We elicit a real-life social network and its members’ adherence to a social norm, namely inequity aversion. The data reveal a positive relationship between subjects’ prosociality and several measures of centrality. This result is in line with the theoretical literature that relates the evolution of social norms to the structure of social interactions and argues that central individuals are crucial for the emergence of prosocial behavior.

El clasicismo en el País Vasco: Ramón de Basterra

[ES] Este trabajo analiza la obra del poeta y ensayista Ramón de Basterra (1888-1928), tratando de establecer las peculiaridades de su dimensión clasicista, en comparación con las líneas generales del clasicismo de la época. El clasicismo es visto como un componente fundamental de las ideologías conservadoras y del fascismo en el siglo XX. Se destacan las relaciones del autor con la intelectualidad vasca, especialmente bilbaína , y española. El conjunto de su obra, en particular La obra de Trajano (1921) y Las ubres luminosas (1923), representan una singular aportación a la historia del clasicismo, poco estudiado todavía en nuestro país. Para Basterra. La romanidad, la latinidad y la cristiandad como ejes de la misión civilizatoria de Occidente y su concepción esencialista y ahistórica de la raza y la nacionalidad españolas son elementos centrales de la obra basterriana. En la perspectiva de un análisis del fascismo que destaca el papel nuclear del culto a la romanidad, este autor podría ser definido como "protofascista".

Detection of Atomic Scale Changes in the Free Volume Void Size of Three-Dimensional Colorectal Cancer Cell Culture Using Positron Annihilation Lifetime Spectroscopy

5 p.

Cartas enviadas por Ramón María de Aldasoro a Justo Garate en 1940

8 cartas (mecanografiadas) ; 225x285 mmm. Ubicación: Caja 1 - Carpeta 20

Cartas enviadas por Ramón Ansoain Garraza a Justo Garate entre 1982 y 1983

1 tarjeta, 1 felicitación de Navidad, 1 carta, 1 tarjeta de vistita (manuscritas y mecanografiadas) ; entre 231x165mm y 10x60mm. Ubicación: Caja 1 - Carpeta 30

Síntesis de carbonato de glicerol a partir de glicerol, CO2 y sus derivados

209 p. : il., gráf.

Certificado de fallecimiento en actos de campaña de los hermanos Koldobika e Iñaki de Larrañaga y Barrutieta firmado por Ramón de Azkue como responsable del Euzko Gudarostea del PNV

Fecha: 18 de agosto de 1937 / Unidad de ínstalación: Carpeta Rectorado - C-2 / Nº de pág.: 1, mecanografiado. Con membrete y sellos del Euzko Gudarostea del PNV. Firma manuscrita de Ramón de Azkue

Doubts and Equilibria

In real life strategic interactions, decision-makers are likely to entertain doubts about the degree of optimality of their play. To capture this feature of real choice-making, we present here a model based on the doubts felt by an agent about how well is playing a game. The doubts are coupled with (and mutually reinforced by) imperfect discrimination capacity, which we model here by means of similarity relations. We assume that each agent builds procedural preferences de ned on the space of expected payoffs-strategy frequencies attached to his current strategy. These preferences, together with an adaptive learning process lead to doubt-based selection dynamic systems. We introduce the concepts of Mixed Strategy Doubt Equilibria, Mixed Strategy Doubt-Full Equilibria and Mixed Strategy Doubtless Equilibria and show the theoretical and the empirical relevance of these concepts.

A Behavioral Foundation for Models of Evolutionary Drift

Binmore and Samuelson (1999) have shown that perturbations (drift) are crucial to study the stability properties of Nash equilibria. We contribute to this literature by providing a behavioural foundation for models of evolutionary drift. In particular, this article introduces a microeconomic model of drift based on the similarity theory developed by Tversky (1977), Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and Rubinstein (1988),(1998). An innovation with respect to those works is that we deal with similarity relations that are derived from the perception that each agent has about how well he is playing the game. In addition, the similarity relations are adapted to a dynamic setting. We obtain different models of drift depending on how we model the agent´s assessment of his behaviour in the game. The examples of the ultimatum game and the chain-store game are used to show the conditions for each model to stabilize elements in the component of Nash equilibria that are not subgame- perfect. It is also shown how some models approximate the laboratory data about those games while others match the data.

A Model of Evolutionay Drift

Drift appears to be crucial to study the stability properties of Nash equilibria in a component specifying different out-of-equilibrium behaviour. We propose a new microeconomic model of drift to be added to the learning process by which agents find their way to equilibrium. A key feature of the model is the sensitivity of the noisy agent to the proportion of agents in his player population playing the same strategy as his current one. We show that, 1. Perturbed Payoff-Positive and PayoffMonotone selection dynamics are capable of stabilizing pure non strict Nash equilibria in either singleton or nonsingleton component of equilibria; 2. The model is relevant to understand the role of drift in the behaviour observed in the laboratory for the Ultimatum Game and for predicting outcomes that can be experimentally tested. Hence, the selection dynamics model perturbed with the proposed drift may be seen as well as a new learning tool to understand observed behaviour.

Factors Facilitating Successful Educational Innovation with ICT in Schools

[EN]This paper proposes an approach to the concept of ICT-based innovation in schools, from the perspective of the factors that facilitate the innovative use of ICT. To this end, a scale has been developed and validated to identify these factors through the participation of 195 teachers from 16 schools considered by the Basque educational authorities as innovators in ICT. The results obtained attest to the validity and reliability of both the scale and the 5 key factors that influence innovation in technology-based teaching. This factor-based structure enables a holistic view of ICT innovation in schools across 3 key areas: school context, teachers and the education authorities.

On the Informational Role of Term Structure in the U.S. Monetary Policy Rule

This paper uses a structural approach based on the indirect inference principle to estimate a standard version of the new Keynesian monetary (NKM) model augmented with term structure using both revised and real-time data. The estimation results show that the term spread and policy inertia are both important determinants of the U.S. estimated monetary policy rule whereas the persistence of shocks plays a small but significant role when revised and real-time data of output and inflation are both considered. More importantly, the relative importance of term spread and persistent shocks in the policy rule and the shock transmission mechanism drastically change when it is taken into account that real-time data are not well behaved.

The New Keynesian Monetary Model: Does it Show the Comovement Between Output and Inflation in the U.S.?

Published as article in: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control (2008), 32(May), pp. 1466-1488.