The Impact of Regulation on Pricing Behavior in the Spanish Electricity Market

In this paper we measure the impact of regulatory measures which affected the Spanish electricity wholesale market in the period 2002-2005. Our approach is based on the fact that regulation changes firms' incentives and therefore their market behavior. In the absence of any regulation firms would choose profit- maximizing prices on their residual demands so that the observed gap between optimal and actual prices provides a measure of the effect of regulation. Our results indicate that regulation has decreased wholesale prices considerably, but became less effective at the end of the sample period which explains the change of regulatory regime introduced in 2006.

Strategic Behavior and Collusion: An Application to the Spanish Electricity Market

The paper has two major contributions to the theory of repeated games. First, we build a supergame oligopoly model where firms compete in supply functions, we show how collusion sustainability is affected by the presence of a convex cost function, the magnitude of both the slope of demand market, and the number of rivals. Then, we compare the results with those of the traditional Cournot reversion under the same structural characteristics. We find how depending on the number of firms and the slope of the linear demand, collusion sustainability is easier under supply function than under Cournot competition. The conclusions of the models are simulated with data from the Spanish wholesale electricity market to predict lower bounds of the discount factors.

Estudio de "gar" como marcador del discurso: "Pro corona" de Demóstenes

[ES] En este trabajo se estudia gár como marcador del discurso en un corpus del griego ático, el discurso Pro corona de Demóstenes. Gár introduce secciones informativas tanto en el nivel local como en el global. En el primero añade información complementaria, mientras que en el segundo indica la introducción de un nuevo tema como desarrollo de una información preliminar. La función común de gár en los dos casos es marcar la información que introduce como suplementaria.

Coalitional games with veto players: Myopic and farsighted behavior

This paper studies an allocation procedure for coalitional games with veto players. The procedure is similar to the one presented by Dagan et al. (1997) for bankruptcy problems. According to it, a player, the proposer, makes a proposal that the remaining players must accept or reject, and con ict is solved bilaterally between the rejector and the proposer. We allow the proposer to make sequential proposals over several periods. If responders are myopic maximizers (i.e. consider each period in isolation), the only equilibrium outcome is the serial rule of Arin and Feltkamp (2012) regardless of the order of moves. If all players are farsighted, the serial rule still arises as the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome if the order of moves is such that stronger players respond to the proposal after weaker ones.

Cartas enviadas por José Urbano Aguirre y Diego Joaquín Ibarbia (Comité Pro-Inmigración Vasca) a Justo Garate en 1940

3 cartas (mecanografiadas) ; entre 220x340mm y 220x310mm. Ubicación: Caja 1 - Carpeta 11

Suspensión trasera regulable para un a moto de competición: alternativa Pro-Link

El objetivo general que se pretende alcanzar con la realización de este proyecto, consiste en el diseño del sistema de suspensión trasera regulable y el prediseño de un basculante para una motocicleta de competición de 250cc y 4 tiempos, englobado dentro de la competición MotoStudent promovida por la Fundación Moto Engineering Foundation. Más concretamente se pretende diseñar un sistema de suspensión con un buen comportamiento dinámico que facilite el manejo de la moto, regulable para que se pueda adaptar a las características de los diferentes circuitos y a la forma de conducción de los pilotos, y el prediseño de un basculante con una buena relación rigidez - peso.