Royalty Licensing

Published as an article in: Economics Letters, 2010, vol. 107, issue 2, pages 284-287.

Two-part tariff licensing mechanisms

Most of the patent licensing agreements that are observed include royalties, in particular per-unit or ad valorem royalties. This paper shows that in a differ entiated duopoly that competes á la Cournot the optimal contract for an internal patentee always includes a positive royalty. Moreover, we show that the patentee would prefer to use ad valorem royalties rather than per-unit royalties when goods are complements or when they are substitutes and the degree of differentiation is suffciently low. The reason is that by including an ad valorem royalty in the licensing contract the patentee can commit strategically to be more (less) aggressive when goods are complements (substitutes) since his licensing revenues become increasing with the price of output of his rival. As a result, licensing may hurt consumers although it always increases social welfare.

An Approach to the stability of international environmental agreements: the absorbing sets solution

We study international environmental negotiations when agreements between countries can not be binding. A problem with this kind of negotiations is that countries have incentives for free-riding from such agreements. We develope a notion of equilibrium based on the assumption that countries can create and dissolve agreements in their seeking of a larger welfare. This approach leads to a larger degree of cooperation compared to models based on the internal-external stability approach.

Roaming in the Mobile Internet: when coverage sharing agreements call for regulation

Revised: 2006-06

Quota and Licensing Systems in the VIII Division European Anchovy

Paper presented at 12th Annual Conference of EAERE 2003 Bilbao (Spain)

Basque nominalizations and the role of structural Case in the licensing of null arguments

[EN] This article investigates the question of the licensing of null arguments in the so-called pro-drop languages. By focusing on the licensing of null subjects in the different types of -T(Z)E nominalizations in Basque, it aims at defining in a precise way the crucial feature that makes pro-drop possible in a clause. The central claim is that what licenses subject-drop is the assignment of structural Case. That is, it is argued that a subject can be null if and only if it is assigned structural Case. Different aspects of T(Z)E nominalizations are also explored, which show that even if these clauses are similar in the surface, they can be syntactically very different and furthermore, that infinitive clauses marked with the same nominalizing morpheme can also have diverging structures.