The Importance of Stock Market Returns in Estimated Monetary Policy Rules: a Structural Approach

This paper estimates a standard version of the New Keynesian Monetary (NKM) model augmented with financial variables in order to analyze the relative importance of stock market returns and term spread in the estimated U.S. monetary policy rule. The estimation procedure implemented is a classical structural method based on the indirect inference principle. The empirical results show that the Fed seems to respond to the macroeconomic outlook and to the stock market return but does not seem to respond to the term spread. Moreover, policy inertia and persistent policy shocks are also significant features of the estimated policy rule.

Moral Hazard and the Internal Organization of Joint Research

Revised 2006-06

On the strategic equivalence of multiple-choice test scoring rules

A disadvantage of multiple-choice tests is that students have incentives to guess. To discourage guessing, it is common to use scoring rules that either penalize wrong answers or reward omissions. These scoring rules are considered equivalent in psychometrics, although experimental evidence has not always been consistent with this claim. We model students' decisions and show, first, that equivalence holds only under risk neutrality and, second, that the two rules can be modified so that they become equivalent even under risk aversion. This paper presents the results of a field experiment in which we analyze the decisions of subjects taking multiple-choice exams. The evidence suggests that differences between scoring rules are due to risk aversion as theory predicts. We also find that the number of omitted items depends on the scoring rule, knowledge, gender and other covariates.

Union Formation and Bargaining Rules in the Labor Market

This paper analyzes union formation in a model of bargaining between a firm and several unions. We address two questions: first, the optimal configuration of unions (their number and size) and, second, the impact of the bargaining pattern (simultaneous or sequential). For workers, grouping into several unions works as a price discrimination device which, at the same time, decreases their market power. The analysis shows that optimal union configuration depends on the rules that regulate the bargaining process (monopoly union, Nash bargaining or right to manage).

Consumption and portfolio rules whit stochastic hyperbolic discounting

We extend the classic Merton (1969, 1971) problem that investigates the joint consumption-savings and portfolio-selection problem under capital risk by assuming sophisticated but time-inconsistent agents. We introduce stochastic hyperbolic preferences as in Harris and Laibson (2013) and find closed-form solutions for Merton's optimal consumption and portfolio selection problem in continuous time. We find that the portfolio rule remains identical to the time-consistent solution with power utility and no borrowing constraints. However,the marginal propensity to consume out of wealth is unambiguously greater than the time-consistent, exponential case and,importantly, it is also more responsive to changes in risk. These results suggest that hyperbolic discounting with sophisticated agents offers promise for contributing to explaining important aspects of asset market data.

Preferences, actions and voting rules

In this paper we address several issues related to collective dichotomous decision-making by means of quaternary voting rules, i.e., when voters may choose between four actions: voting yes, voting no, abstaining and not turning up-which are aggregated by a voting rule into a dichotomous decision: acceptance or rejection of a proposal. In particular we study the links between the actions and preferences of the actors. We show that quaternary rules (unlike binary rules, where only two actions -yes or no- are possible) leave room for "manipulability" (i.e., strategic behaviour). Thus a preference profile does not in general determine an action profile. We also deal with the notions of success and decisiveness and their ex ante assessment for quaternary voting rules, and discuss the role of information and coordination in this context.

Group size and decision rules in legislative bargaining

We conduct experiments to investigate the effects of different majority requirements on bargaining outcomes in small and large groups. In particular, we use a Baron-Ferejohn protocol and investigate the effects of decision rules on delay (number of bargaining rounds needed to reach agreement) and measures of "fairness" (inclusiveness of coalitions, equality of the distribution within a coalition). We find that larger groups and unanimity rule are associated with significantly larger decision making costs in the sense that first round proposals more often fail, leading to more costly delay. The higher rate of failure under unanimity rule and in large groups is a combination of three facts: (1) in these conditions, a larger number of individuals must agree, (2) an important fraction of individuals reject offers below the equal share, and (3) proposers demand more (relative to the equal share) in large groups.

On the Benefits of Including Age-structure in Harvest Control Rules

This paper explores the benefits of including age-structure in the control rule (HCR) when decision makers regard their (age-structured) models as approximations. We find that introducing age structure into the HCR reduces both the volatility of the spawning biomass and the yield. Although at a fairly imprecise level the benefits are lower, there are still major advantages for actual assessment precision of the case study. Moreover, we find that when age-structure is included in the HCR the relative ranking of different policies in terms of variance in biomass and yield does not differ. These results are shown both theoretically and numerically by applying the model to the Southern Hake fishery.

Intermediate serial cost-sharing rules

In this paper we give a generalization of the serial cost-sharing rule defined by Moulin and Shenker (1992) for cost sharing problems. According to the serial cost sharing rule, agents with low demands of a good pay cost increments associated with low quantities in the production process of that good. This fact might not always be desirable for those agents, since those cost increments might be higher than others, for example with concave cost functions. In this paper we give a family of cost sharing rules which allocates cost increments in all the possible places in the production process. And we characterize axiomatically each of them by means of an axiomatic characterization related to the one given for the serial cost-sharing rule by Moulin and Shenker (1994).

A common axiom for classical division rules for claims problems

In this paper we introduce a new axiom, denoted claims separability, that is satisfied by several classical division rules defined for claims problems. We characterize axiomatically the entire family of division rules that satisfy this new axiom. In addition, employing claims separability, we characterize the minimal overlap rule, given by O'Neill (1982), Piniles rule and the rules in the TAL-family, introduced by Moreno-Ternero and Villar (2006), which includes the uniform gains rule, the uniform losses rule and the Talmud rule.

Towards a standard methodology to evaluate internal cluster validity indices

The evaluation and comparison of internal cluster validity indices is a critical problem in the clustering area. The methodology used in most of the evaluations assumes that the clustering algorithms work correctly. We propose an alternative methodology that does not make this often false assumption. We compared 7 internal cluster validity indices with both methodologies and concluded that the results obtained with the proposed methodology are more representative of the actual capabilities of the compared indices.

Impacto solvencia II en un seguro de vida

La actividad aseguradora supone la transferencia de riesgos del asegurado al asegurador. El asegurador se compromete al pago de una prestación si el riesgo se realiza. Se produce un cambio en el ciclo productivo. El asegurador vende una cobertura sin conocer el momento y el coste exacto de dicha cobertura. Esta particularidad de la actividad aseguradora explica la necesidad para una entidad aseguradora de ser solvente en cada momento y ante cualquier imprevisto. Por ello, la solvencia de las entidades aseguradoras es un aspecto que se ha ido recogiendo en las distintas normativas que han regulado la actividad aseguradora y al que se ha ido dando cada vez más importancia. Actualmente la legislación vigente en materia de solvencia de las aseguradoras esta regulada por la directiva europea Solvencia I. Esta directiva establece dos conceptos para garantizar la solvencia: las provisiones técnicas y el margen de solvencia. Las provisiones técnicas son las calculadas para garantizar la solvencia estática de la compañía, es decir aquella que hace frente, en un instante temporal determinado, a los compromisos asumidos por la entidad. El margen de solvencia se destina a cubrir la solvencia dinámica, aquella que hace referencia a eventos futuros que puedan afectar la capacidad del asegurador. Sin embargo en una corriente de gestión global del riesgo en la que el sector bancario ya se había adelantado al sector asegurador con la normativa Basilea II, se decidió iniciar un proyecto europeo de reforma de Solvencia I y en noviembre del 2009 se adoptó la directiva 2009/138/CE del parlamento europeo y del consejo, sobre el seguro de vida, el acceso a la actividad de seguro y de reaseguro y su ejercicio mas conocida como Solvencia II. Esta directiva supone un profundo cambio en las reglas actuales de solvencia para las entidades aseguradoras. Este cambio persigue el objetivo de establecer un marco regulador común a nivel europeo que sea más adaptado al perfil de riesgo de cada entidad aseguradora. Esta nueva directiva define dos niveles distintos de capital: el SCR (requerimiento estándar de capital de solvencia) y el MCR (requerimiento mínimo de capital). Para el calculo del SCR se ha establecido que el asegurador tendrá la libertad de elegir entre dos modelos. Un modelo estándar propuesto por la Autoridad Europea de Seguros y Pensiones de Jubilación (EIOPA por sus siglas en inglés), que permitirá un calculo simple, y un modelo interno desarrollado por la propia entidad que deberá ser aprobado por las autoridades competentes. También se contempla la posibilidad de utilizar un modelo mixto que combine ambos, el estándar y el interno. Para el desarrollo del modelo estándar se han realizado una serie de estudios de impacto cuantitativos (QIS). El último estudio (QIS 5) ha sido el que ha planteado de forma más precisa el cálculo del SCR. Plantea unos shocks que se deberán de aplicar al balance de la entidad con el objetivo de estresarlo, y en base a los resultados obtenidos constituir el SCR. El objetivo de este trabajo es realizar una síntesis de las especificaciones técnicas del QIS5 para los seguros de vida y realizar una aplicación práctica para un seguro de vida mixto puro. En la aplicación práctica se determinarán los flujos de caja asociados a este producto para calcular su mejor estimación (Best estimate). Posteriormente se determinará el SCR aplicando los shocks para los riesgos de mortalidad, rescates y gastos. Por último, calcularemos el margen de riesgo asociado al SCR. Terminaremos el presente TFG con unas conclusiones, la bibliografía empleada así como un anexo con las tablas empleadas.