Evolution of Cooperation in the Snowdrift Game with Incomplete Information and Heterogeneous Population

Differently from previous studies of tag-based cooperation, we assume that individuals fail to recognize their own tag. Due to such incomplete information, the action taken against the opponent cannot be based on similarity, although it is still motivated by the tag displayed by the opponent. We present stability conditions for the case when individuals play unconditional cooperation, unconditional defection or conditional cooperation. We then consider the removal of one or two strategies. Results show that conditional cooperators are the most resilient agents against extinction and that the removal of unconditional cooperators may lead to the extinction of unconditional defectors.

ADAPTECC: A Role-Play Game about Adapting to Climate Change

The ADAPTECC Climate Change Adaptation Game is a role-play game designed to enable players to experience the difficulties that arise at local and regional levels when authorities have to implement adaptation measures. Adaptation means anticipating the advert effects of climate change (CC) and taking measures to prevent and minimise the damage caused by its impacts. Each player takes the role of the mayor or a councillor of a town affected by CC who must decide what adaptation strategies and measures to take, or of a member of the Regional Environment Department which must distribute funding for adaptation among the various towns. At the end of the game, players should have a greater understanding of the challenges posed by adaptation to CC

Implementing with veto players: a simple non cooperative game

The paper adapts a non cooperative game presented by Dagan, Serrano and Volij (1997) for bankruptcy problems to the context of TU veto balanced games. We investigate the relationship between the Nash outcomes of a noncooperative game and solution concepts of cooperative games such as the nucleolus, kernel and the egalitarian core.

The Supercore for Normal Form Games

We study the supercore of a system derived from a normal form game. For the case of a finite game with pure strategies, we define a sequence of games and show that the supercore of that system coincides with the set of Nash equilibrium strategy profiles of the last game in the sequence. This result is illustrated with the characterization of the supercore for the n-person prisoners’ dilemma. With regard to the mixed extension of a normal form game, we show that the set of Nash equilibrium profiles coincides with the supercore for games with a finite number of Nash equilibria. For games with an infinite number of Nash equilibria this need not be no longer the case. Yet, it is not difficult to find a binary relation which guarantees the coincidence of these two sets.

Replicator Dynamics and Evolutionary Stable Strategies in Heterogeneous Games

We generalise and extend the work of Iñarra and Laruelle (2011) by studying two person symmetric evolutionary games with two strategies, a heterogenous population with two possible types of individuals and incomplete information. Comparing such games with their classic homogeneous version vith complete information found in the literature, we show that for the class of anti-coordination games the only evolutionarily stable strategy vanishes. Instead, we find infinite neutrally stable strategies. We also model the evolutionary process using two different replicator dynamics setups, each with a different inheritance rule, and we show that both lead to the same results with respect to stability.

Cell Reprogramming, IPS Limitations, and Overcoming Strategies in Dental Bioengineering

8 p.

Learning from human teaching strategies

Recent works in the area of adaptive education systems point out the importance of aumenting the student model to improve the personalization and adaptation to the learner by means of several aspects such as emotions, user locations or interactions. Until now the study of interactions has been mainly focused on the student-learning system flow, despite the fact that the most successful and used way of teaching are the traditional face-to-face interactions. In this project, we explore the use of interactions among teachers and students, as they occur in traditional education, to enrich the current student models, with the aim of providing them with useful information about new characteristics for improving the learning process. At a first step, in this paper we present the formal process carried out to obtain information about teachers’ expertise and necessities regarding the direct interactions with students.

Approximate knowledge of rationality and correlated equilibria

We extend Aumann's [3] theorem deriving correlated equilibria as a consequence of common priors and common knowledge of rationality by explicitly allowing for non-rational behavior. We replace the assumption of common knowledge of rationality with a substantially weaker notion, joint p-belief of rationality, where agents believe the other agents are rational with probabilities p = (pi)i2I or more. We show that behavior in this case constitutes a constrained correlated equilibrium of a doubled game satisfying certain p-belief constraints and characterize the topological structure of the resulting set of p-rational outcomes. We establish continuity in the parameters p and show that, for p su ciently close to one, the p-rational outcomes are close to the correlated equilibria and, with high probability, supported on strategies that survive the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies. Finally, we extend Aumann and Dreze's [4] theorem on rational expectations of interim types to the broader p-rational belief systems, and also discuss the case of non-common priors.

Competitive Pressure and Job Interview Lying: A Game Theoretical Analysis

We consider a job contest in which candidates go through interviews (cheap talk) and are subject to reference checks. We show how competitive pressure - increasing the ratio of "good" to "bad" type candi- dates - can lead to a vast increase in lying and in some cases make bad hires more likely. As the number of candidates increases, it becomes harder to in- duce truth-telling. The interview stage becomes redundant if the candidates, a priori, know each others' type or the result of their own reference check. Finally, we show that the employer can bene t from committing not to reject all the applicants.

New methods for generating populations in Markov network based EDAs: Decimation strategies and model-based template recombination

Methods for generating a new population are a fundamental component of estimation of distribution algorithms (EDAs). They serve to transfer the information contained in the probabilistic model to the new generated population. In EDAs based on Markov networks, methods for generating new populations usually discard information contained in the model to gain in efficiency. Other methods like Gibbs sampling use information about all interactions in the model but are computationally very costly. In this paper we propose new methods for generating new solutions in EDAs based on Markov networks. We introduce approaches based on inference methods for computing the most probable configurations and model-based template recombination. We show that the application of different variants of inference methods can increase the EDAs’ convergence rate and reduce the number of function evaluations needed to find the optimum of binary and non-binary discrete functions.

The coincidence of the kernel and nucleolus of a convex game: an alternative proof

In 1972, Maschler, Peleg and Shapley proved that in the class of convex the nucleolus and the kernel coincide. The only aim of this note is to provide a shorter, alternative proof of this result.

Majoritarian Contests with Asymmetric Battlefields: An Experiment

We investigate a version of the classic Colonel Blotto game in which individual battles may have different values. Two players allocate a fixed budget across battlefields and each battlefield is won by the player who allocates the most to that battlefield. The winner of the game is the player who wins the battlefields with highest total value. We focus on the case where there is one large and several small battlefields, such that a player wins if he wins the large and any one small battlefield, or all the small battlefields. We compute the mixed strategy equilibrium for these games and compare this with choices from a laboratory experiment. The equilibrium predicts that the large battlefield receives more than a proportional share of the resources of the players, and that most of the time resources should be spread over more battlefields than are needed to win the game. We find support for the main qualitative features of the equilibrium. In particular, strategies that spread resources widely are played frequently, and the large battlefield receives more than a proportional share in the treatment where the asymmetry between battlefields is stronger.

Processing Facilitation Strategies in OV and VO Languages: A Corpus Study

The present corpus study aimed to examine whether Basque (OV) resorts more often than Spanish (VO) to certain grammatical operations, in order to minimi ze the number of arguments to be processed before the verb. Ueno & Polinsky (2009) argue that VO/OV languages use certain grammatical resources with different frequencies in order to facilitate real-time processing. They observe that both OV and VO languages in their sample (Japanese, Turkish and Spanish) have a similar frequency of use of subject pro-drop; however, they find that OV languages (Japanese, Turkish) use more intransitive sentences than VO languages (English, Spanish), and conclude this is an OV-specific strategy to facilitate processing. We conducted a comparative corpus study of Spanish (VO) and Basque (OV). Results show (a) that the fre- quency of use of subject pro-drop is higher in Basque than in Spanish; and (b) Basque does not use more intransitive sentences than Spanish; both languages have a similar frequency of intransitive sentences. Based on these findings, we conclude that the frequency of use of grammatical resources to facilitate the processing does not depend on a single typological trait (VO/OV) but it is modulated by the concurrence of other grammatical feature.

Simple Coalitional Strategy Profiles in Repeated Games

This paper is a version of the discussion paper titled "Simple coalitional strategy profiles"

Design of tailored strategies for preservation and re-use of information about heritage

[EN] This paper is an outcome of the following dissertation: