9 resultados para Constitutional conventions.
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The scope of the paper is the literature that employs coordination games to study social norms and conventions from the viewpoint of game theory and cognitive psychology. We claim that those two alternative approaches are complementary, as they provide different insights to explain how people converge to a unique system of self-fulfilling expectations in presence of multiple, equally viable, conventions. While game theory explains the emergence of conventions relying on efficiency and risk considerations, the psychological view is more concerned with frame and labeling effects. The interaction between these alternative (and, sometimes, competing) effects leads to the result that coordination failures may well occur and, even when coordination takes place, there is no guarantee that the convention eventually established will be the most efficient.
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In this paper we study a simple mathematical model of a bilingual community in which all agents are f luent in the majority language but only a fraction of the population has some degree of pro ficiency in the minority language. We investigate how different distributions of pro ficiency, combined with the speaker´attitudes towards or against the minority language, may infl uence its use in pair conversations.
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Prepared for the Handbook of the Economics of Cultural Heritage. Forthcoming in Edgard Elgar Publisher. Anna Mignosa and Ilde Rizzo (editors)
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The territory of the European Union is made up of a rich and wide-ranging universe of languages, which is not circumscribed to the «State languages». The existence of multilingualism is one of Europe’s defining characteristics and it should remain so in the constantly evolving model of Europe’s political structure. Nonetheless, until now, the official use of languages has been limited to the «State languages» and has been based on a concept of state monolingualism that has led to a first level of hierarchization among the languages of Europe. This has affected the very concept of European language diversity. The draft of the treaty establishing a European Constitution contains various language-related references that can be grouped in two major categories: on the one hand, those references having to do the constitutional status of languages, and on the other, those regarding the recognition of European language diversity. Both issues are dealt with in this article. In analyzing the legal regime governing languages set forth in the draft of the constitutional treaty, we note that the draft is not based on the concept of the official status of languages. The language regulation contained in the draft of the constitutional treaty is limited in character. The constitutional language regime is based on the concept of Constitutional languages but the official status of languages is not governed by this rule. The European Constitution merely enunciates rights governing language use for European citizens vis-à-vis the languages of the Constitution and refers the regulation of the official status of languages to the Council, which is empowered to set and modify that status by unanimous decision. Because of its broad scope, this constitutes a regulatory reservation. In the final phase of the negotiation process a second level of constitutional recognition of languages would be introduced, linked to those that are official languages in the member states (Catalan, Basque, Galician, etc.). These languages, however, would be excluded from the right to petition; they would constitute a tertium genus, an intermediate category between the lan guages benefiting from the language rights recognized under the Constitution and those other languages for which no status is recognized in the European institutional context. The legal functionality of this second, intermediate category will depend on the development of standards, i.e., it will depend on the entrée provided such languages in future reforms of the institutional language regime. In a later section, the article reflects on European Union language policy with regard to regional or minority languages, concluding that the Union has not acted in accordance with defined language policy guidelines when it has been confronted, in the exercise of its powers, with regional or minority languages (or domestic legislation having to do with language demands). The Court of Justice has endeavoured to resolve on a case by case basis the conflicts raised between community freedoms and the normative measures that protect languages. Thus, using case law, the Court has set certain language boundaries for community freedoms. The article concludes by reflecting on the legal scope of the recognition of European language diversity referred to in Article II-82 of the European Constitution and the possible measures to implement the precept that might constitute the definition of a true European language policy on regional or minority languages. Such a policy has yet to be defined.
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The evidence collected concerning the biocentric judgment that young children express when evaluating human actions on the environment leads some scholars to suggest that an essential understanding of the notion of living beings should appear earlier than previously believed. This research project aims to study that assumption. To this end, young children’s choice when they are put in situation of having to compare and choose the most negative option between environmentally harmful actions and the breaking of social conventions are examined. Afterwards, the results are categorized in relation to those obtained from the study of children’s grasp of the distinction between living beings and inanimate entities. The data is analysed according to the individuals’ age and overall, it suggests a lack of relationship between environmental judgment and the understanding of the concept of living beings. The final results are discussed in keeping with recent research in the field of moral development that underscores the role that unconscious emotional processing plays in the individual’s normative judgment.
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We study the language choice behavior of bilingual speakers in modern societies, such as the Basque Country, Ireland andWales. These countries have two o cial languages:A, spoken by all, and B, spoken by a minority. We think of the bilinguals in those societies as a population playing repeatedly a Bayesian game in which, they must choose strategically the language, A or B, that might be used in the interaction. The choice has to be made under imperfect information about the linguistic type of the interlocutors. We take the Nash equilibrium of the language use game as a model for real life language choice behavior. It is shown that the predictions made with this model t very well the data about the actual use, contained in the censuses, of Basque, Irish and Welsh languages. Then the question posed by Fishman (2001),which appears in the title, is answered as follows: it is hard, mainly, because bilingual speakers have reached an equilibrium which is evolutionary stable. This means that to solve fast and in a re ex manner their frequent language coordination problem, bilinguals have developed linguistic conventions based chie y on the strategy 'Use the same language as your interlocutor', which weakens the actual use of B.1
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28 p.
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This chapter studies multilingual democratic societies with highly developed economies. These societies are assumed to have two languages with official status: language A, spoken by every individual, and language B, spoken by the bilingual minority. We emphasize that language rights are important, but the survival of the minority language B depends mainly on the actual use bilinguals make of B. The purpose of the present chapter is to study some of the factors affecting the bilingual speakers language choice behaviour. Our view is that languages with their speech communities compete for speakers just as fi rms compete for market share. Thus, the con ict among the minority languages in these societies does not take the rough expressions such as those studied in Desmet et al. (2012). Here the con flict is more subtle. We model highly plausible language choice situations by means of choice procedures and non-cooperative games, each with different types of information. We then study the determinants of the bilinguals ' strategic behaviour with regard to language. We observe that the bilinguals' use of B is shaped, essentially, by linguistic conventions and social norms that are developed in situations of language contact.
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Master in Literature and Literary Science