A Fundamental Contradiction in Standard Rent Theory: A Case Study on Varian's "Intermediate Microeconomics"

In this paper, I examine Varian’s treatment of rent in his textbook on Microeconomics. I argue that he holds contradictory conceptions: sometimes rent is defined as surplus over cost whereas sometimes it is defined as cost, as the opportunity cost of fixed factors. I start by arguing that the distinction between fixed and variable factors is not the key for the definition of rent; ultimately, it is monopoly. Varian’s conception of rent is, essentially, Ricardo’s: rent is extraordinary profit turned rent. On the basis of a selfinconsistent notion of opportunity cost, Varian introduces the idea that rent is the opportunity cost of land, when what he actually defines is the opportunity cost of not renting the land. I also critically examine the related notion of “producer’s surplus”, and show that Varian’s treatment repeats the same contradiction as in rent.

Mergers in Durable Goods Industries

Revised 2008-11.-- Published as an article in: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2008, 68, pp. 691-701.

Identifying social determinants of urban low carbon transitions: the case of energy transition in Bilbao, Basque Country

33 p.

Countervailing incentives in adverse selection models. A synthesis

In this paper we propose a simple method of characterizing countervailing incentives in adverse selection problems. The key element in our characterization consists of analyzing properties of the full information problem. This allows solving the principal problem without using optimal control theory. Our methodology can also be applied to different economic settings: health economics, monopoly regulation, labour contracts, limited liabilities and environmental regulation.

The Impact of Regulation on Pricing Behavior in the Spanish Electricity Market

In this paper we measure the impact of regulatory measures which affected the Spanish electricity wholesale market in the period 2002-2005. Our approach is based on the fact that regulation changes firms' incentives and therefore their market behavior. In the absence of any regulation firms would choose profit- maximizing prices on their residual demands so that the observed gap between optimal and actual prices provides a measure of the effect of regulation. Our results indicate that regulation has decreased wholesale prices considerably, but became less effective at the end of the sample period which explains the change of regulatory regime introduced in 2006.

Choice of Flexible Production Technologies Under Strategic Delegation

This work analyzes a managerial delegation model in which firms can choose between a flexible production technology which allows them to produce two different products and a dedicated production technology which limits production to only one product. We analyze whether the incentives to adopt the flexible technology are smaller or greater in a managerial delegation model than under strict profit maximization. We obtain that the asymmetric equilibrium in which only one firm adopts the flexible technology can be sustained under strategic delegation but not under strict profit maximization when products are substitutes. We extend the analysis to consider welfare implications.

An Approach to the stability of international environmental agreements: the absorbing sets solution

We study international environmental negotiations when agreements between countries can not be binding. A problem with this kind of negotiations is that countries have incentives for free-riding from such agreements. We develope a notion of equilibrium based on the assumption that countries can create and dissolve agreements in their seeking of a larger welfare. This approach leads to a larger degree of cooperation compared to models based on the internal-external stability approach.

Social Security, Education, Retirement and Growth

In this paper we analyze the effects of social security policies in an unfunded, earnings-related social security system on the incentives to education investment and voluntary retirement, on growth and on income inequality. Growth is endogenously driven by human capital investment, individuals differ in their innate (learning) ability at birth, and the pension scheme includes a minimum pension. More skilled individuals spend more on education, minimum pensions reduce low skill individuals' incentives to invest in human capital, there is no monotonic relationship between per capita growth and income inequality.

Roaming in the Mobile Internet: when coverage sharing agreements call for regulation

Revised: 2006-06

On the strategic equivalence of multiple-choice test scoring rules

A disadvantage of multiple-choice tests is that students have incentives to guess. To discourage guessing, it is common to use scoring rules that either penalize wrong answers or reward omissions. These scoring rules are considered equivalent in psychometrics, although experimental evidence has not always been consistent with this claim. We model students' decisions and show, first, that equivalence holds only under risk neutrality and, second, that the two rules can be modified so that they become equivalent even under risk aversion. This paper presents the results of a field experiment in which we analyze the decisions of subjects taking multiple-choice exams. The evidence suggests that differences between scoring rules are due to risk aversion as theory predicts. We also find that the number of omitted items depends on the scoring rule, knowledge, gender and other covariates.

Strategic Votes and Sincere Counterfactuals

The Random Utility Model (RUM) of voting behavior can account for strategic voting by making use of proxy indicators that measure voter incentives to vote strategically. The contribution of this paper is to propose a new method to estimate the RUM in the presence of strategic voters, without having to construct proxy measures of strategic voting incentives. Our method can be used to infer the counterfactual sincere vote of those who vote strategically and provides an estimate of the size of strategic voting. We illustrate the procedure using post-electoral survey data from Spain. Our calculations indicate that strategic voting in Spain is about 2.19 per cent

What happened during the climate change negotiations in Copenhagen 2009?

4 p.

Which policy option can be more cost-effective in promoting the use of energy efficient appliances in Europe? A comparison of energy taxes, subsidies, tax credits and bans.

4 p.

Linking Reduced Deforestation and a Global Carbon Market: Impacts on Costs, Financial Flows, and Technological Innovation

25 p.

International Support of Climate Change Policies in Developing Countries: Strategic, Moral and Fairness Aspects

33 p.