Long Run Trends in the Price of Energy and Energy Services

4 p.

Divergences in the Long Run Trends in the Price of Energy and of Energy Services

32 p.

Ad valorem housing subsidies may reduce house building

In this paper it is shown that an ad valorem housing subsidy set by a central regulator (or a raise in the ad valorem housing subsidy rate) may reduce the number of houses built in the market and increase the price paid by the buyers of houses. The analysis considers a situation where there is imperfect competition in the housing market and a local regulator that decides on density, or on the number of sites for housing development, and that cares about a combination of the profits of housing developers and the surplus of buyers of houses.

Social Housing under Oligopoly

In this paper it is shown that the setting up of a social housing system may decrease the total number of houses built in the market, induce a price of non-social houses greater than the price of houses without that system and increase the profits of housing developers even in situations where they have to sell social houses at a price below production cost. The analysis considers a situation with imperfect competition in the housing market and with a social housing system where housing developers must provide some social houses when they obtain a permit to build non-social houses.

Income risk of EU coal-fired power plants after Kyoto

Coal-fired power plants may enjoy a significant advantage relative to gas plants in terms of cheaper fuel cost. Still, this advantage may erode or even turn into disadvantage depending on CO2 emission allowance price. This price will presumably rise in both the Kyoto Protocol commitment period (2008-2012) and the first post-Kyoto years. Thus, in a carbon-constrained environment, coal plants face financial risks arising in their profit margins, which in turn hinge on their so-called "clean dark spread". These risks are further reinforced when the price of the output electricity is determined by natural gas-fired plants' marginal costs, which differ from coal plants' costs. We aim to assess the risks in coal plants' margins. We adopt parameter values estimated from empirical data. These in turn are derived from natural gas and electricity markets alongside the EU ETS market where emission allowances are traded. Monte Carlo simulation allows to compute the expected value and risk profile of coal-based electricity generation. We focus on the clean dark spread in both time periods under different future scenarios in the allowance market. Specifically, bottom 5% and 10% percentiles are derived. According to our results, certain future paths of the allowance price may impose significant risks on the clean dark spread obtained by coal plants.

Optimal Abandonment of Coal-Fired Stations in the EU

36 p.

The Long Run Demand for Lighting: Elasticities and Rebound Effects in Different Phases of Economic Development

25 p.

Evaluation of Two Alternative Carbon Capture and Storage Technologies: A Stochastic Model

30 p.

Prices and the Real Exchange Rate in Hong Kong: 1985-2006

This paper has been presented at the XIII Encuentros de Economía Aplicada, Sevilla, Spain, 2010.

Royalty Licensing

Published as an article in: Economics Letters, 2010, vol. 107, issue 2, pages 284-287.

Policy Coordination in an Oligopolistic Housing Market

This paper analyzes the consequences of the interaction between two different levels of government (regulators) in the development of housing policy when their decisions determine the level of competition in the housing market. The analysis discusses the implications derived from a lack of coordination between a local regulator who controls the supply of land for housing development and a central regulator who decides on housing subsidies. The results suggest that lack of coordination has significant effects on prices and supply of houses, housing developers’ profits, and buyers’ surplus.

Two-part tariff licensing mechanisms

Most of the patent licensing agreements that are observed include royalties, in particular per-unit or ad valorem royalties. This paper shows that in a differ entiated duopoly that competes á la Cournot the optimal contract for an internal patentee always includes a positive royalty. Moreover, we show that the patentee would prefer to use ad valorem royalties rather than per-unit royalties when goods are complements or when they are substitutes and the degree of differentiation is suffciently low. The reason is that by including an ad valorem royalty in the licensing contract the patentee can commit strategically to be more (less) aggressive when goods are complements (substitutes) since his licensing revenues become increasing with the price of output of his rival. As a result, licensing may hurt consumers although it always increases social welfare.

[R_Arnedo_SanMiguel] Documentación geométrica de las excavaciones arqueológicas del Cerro de San Miguel (Arnedo, La Rioja)

[ES] El cerro de San Miguel de Arnedo alberga un importante asentamiento plenamente adscrito a la cultura celtibérica. Los restos documentados corresponden a dos conjuntos de viviendas y una estructura defensiva compuesta por un foso y restos de muralla.

[R_Arnedo_SanMiguel] Documentación geométrica de las excavaciones arqueológicas del Cerro de San Miguel (Arnedo, La Rioja). Campaña 2007

[ES] El cerro de San Miguel de Arnedo alberga un importante asentamiento plenamente adscrito a la cultura celtibérica. Los restos documentados corresponden a dos conjuntos de viviendas y una estructura defensiva compuesta por un foso y restos de muralla.

Warsaw Conference: “Small steps forward while awaiting major decisions at the 2015 Paris Conference”

6 p.