Régimen jurídico de las lenguas y reconocimiento de la diversidad lingüística en el Tratado por el que se establece una Constitución para Europa

The territory of the European Union is made up of a rich and wide-ranging universe of languages, which is not circumscribed to the «State languages». The existence of multilingualism is one of Europe’s defining characteristics and it should remain so in the constantly evolving model of Europe’s political structure. Nonetheless, until now, the official use of languages has been limited to the «State languages» and has been based on a concept of state monolingualism that has led to a first level of hierarchization among the languages of Europe. This has affected the very concept of European language diversity. The draft of the treaty establishing a European Constitution contains various language-related references that can be grouped in two major categories: on the one hand, those references having to do the constitutional status of languages, and on the other, those regarding the recognition of European language diversity. Both issues are dealt with in this article. In analyzing the legal regime governing languages set forth in the draft of the constitutional treaty, we note that the draft is not based on the concept of the official status of languages. The language regulation contained in the draft of the constitutional treaty is limited in character. The constitutional language regime is based on the concept of Constitutional languages but the official status of languages is not governed by this rule. The European Constitution merely enunciates rights governing language use for European citizens vis-à-vis the languages of the Constitution and refers the regulation of the official status of languages to the Council, which is empowered to set and modify that status by unanimous decision. Because of its broad scope, this constitutes a regulatory reservation. In the final phase of the negotiation process a second level of constitutional recognition of languages would be introduced, linked to those that are official languages in the member states (Catalan, Basque, Galician, etc.). These languages, however, would be excluded from the right to petition; they would constitute a tertium genus, an intermediate category between the lan guages benefiting from the language rights recognized under the Constitution and those other languages for which no status is recognized in the European institutional context. The legal functionality of this second, intermediate category will depend on the development of standards, i.e., it will depend on the entrée provided such languages in future reforms of the institutional language regime. In a later section, the article reflects on European Union language policy with regard to regional or minority languages, concluding that the Union has not acted in accordance with defined language policy guidelines when it has been confronted, in the exercise of its powers, with regional or minority languages (or domestic legislation having to do with language demands). The Court of Justice has endeavoured to resolve on a case by case basis the conflicts raised between community freedoms and the normative measures that protect languages. Thus, using case law, the Court has set certain language boundaries for community freedoms. The article concludes by reflecting on the legal scope of the recognition of European language diversity referred to in Article II-82 of the European Constitution and the possible measures to implement the precept that might constitute the definition of a true European language policy on regional or minority languages. Such a policy has yet to be defined.

Institutional designs to face the dark side of total allowable catches

Setting total allowable catches (TACs) is an endogenous process in which different agents and institutions, often with conflicting interests and opportunistic behaviour, try to influence policy-makers. Such policy-makers, far from being the benevolent social planners many would wish them to be, may also pursue self-interest when making final decisions. Although restricted knowledge of stock abundance and population dynamics, and weakness in enforcement, have effects, these other factors may explain the reason why TAC management has failed to guarantee sustainable exploitation of fish resources. Rejecting the exogeneity of the TAC and taking advantage of fruitful debate on economic policy (i.e. the rules vs. discretion debate, and that surrounding the independence of central banks), two institutional developments are analysed as potential mechanisms to face up to misconceptions about TACs: long-term harvest control rules, and a central bank of fish.

Dialog Systems based on Markov decision processes over two real tasks

In this work the state of the art of the automatic dialogue strategy management using Markov decision processes (MDP) with reinforcement learning (RL) is described. Partially observable Markov decision processes (POMDP) are also described. To test the validity of these methods, two spoken dialogue systems have been developed. The first one is a spoken dialogue system for weather forecast providing, and the second one is a more complex system for train information. With the first system, comparisons between a rule-based system and an automatically trained system have been done, using a real corpus to train the automatic strategy. In the second system, the scalability of these methods when used in larger systems has been tested.

Multirating decision model validation: the relevance of the quality of the securitization issues

Rating enables the information asymmetry existing in the issuer-investor relationship to be reduced, particularly for issues with a high degree of complexity, as is the case of securitizations. However, there may be a serious conflict of interest between the issuer’s choice and remuneration of the agency and the credit rating awarded, resulting in lower quality and information power of the published rating. In this paper, we propose an explicative model of the number of ratings requested, by analyzing the relevance of the number of ratings to measure the reliability, where multirating is shown to be associated to the quality, size, liquidity and the degree of information asymmetry relating to the issue. Thus, we consider that the regulatory changes that foster the widespread publication of simultaneous ratings could help to alleviate the problem of rating model arbitrage and the crisis of confidence in credit ratings in general and in the securitization issues, in particular.

Group size and decision rules in legislative bargaining

We conduct experiments to investigate the effects of different majority requirements on bargaining outcomes in small and large groups. In particular, we use a Baron-Ferejohn protocol and investigate the effects of decision rules on delay (number of bargaining rounds needed to reach agreement) and measures of "fairness" (inclusiveness of coalitions, equality of the distribution within a coalition). We find that larger groups and unanimity rule are associated with significantly larger decision making costs in the sense that first round proposals more often fail, leading to more costly delay. The higher rate of failure under unanimity rule and in large groups is a combination of three facts: (1) in these conditions, a larger number of individuals must agree, (2) an important fraction of individuals reject offers below the equal share, and (3) proposers demand more (relative to the equal share) in large groups.