Reestructuración financiera del sistema bancario español

A finales del año 2007 se produjeron una serie de acontecimientos que más tarde, y por efecto del contagio internacional, desembocaron en una de las crisis económico-financieras más determinantes que se recuerdan en España. El presente proyecto tiene como objetivo entender todo el proceso de reestructuración llevado a cabo en los últimos años. Para ello, recoge inicialmente el origen de la crisis económico-financiera, para más tarde hacer referencia a las principales medidas que se han tenido que llevar a cabo para modificar el sistema financiero. Además, explica la última reforma de las Cajas de Ahorro y fundaciones bancarias junto con los cambios que la misma ha generado en el Sistema Financiero y en la Obra Social. Por último, después de analizar lo sucedido años atrás, llega a una serie de conclusiones acerca de la situación actual y futura del nuevo mapa financiero Español.

¿Bancos con Problemas? Un Sistema de Alerta Temprana para la Prevención de Crisis Bancarias

[ES] Las autoridades reguladoras y supervisoras de los sistemas financieros han probado diversos métodos para intentar encontrar un procedimiento eficaz en la elaboración de un sistema de alerta temprana de las crisis bancarias. Los Modelos de Regresión Logística han sido usados aunque han mostrado algunas debilidades, por lo que se necesitan nuevos y mejores métodos. La crisis bancaria ocurrida en la República Dominicana entre los años 2002 y 2004 se ha usado para comparar la eficacia de la Regresión Logística frente al uso del método Support Vector Machines (SVM) para la detección de crisis bancarias.

The Spanish corporate structure through interlocking directorates

[EN] The aim of this paper is to determine to what extent globalization pressures are changing interlocking directorate networks modeled on continental capitalism into Anglo-Saxon models. For this purpose we analyse the Spanish network of interlocks, comparing the present structure (2012) with that of 1993 and 2006. We show how, although Spanish corporative structure continues to display characteristics of the continental economies, some major banks are significantly reducing industrial activity. Nevertheless, the financial organizations continue to maintain a close relationship with sectors such as construction and services. The analysis of the network of directorates shows a retreat in activity of industrial banking in Spain. Two large Spanish financial institutions, BSCH and La Caixa, continue to undertake activities of industrial banking in 2006, but this activity is significantly reduced in 2012. According to the theories on the role of the interlocking directorates, the companies in these sectors assure their access to banking credit by incorporating advisors from financial organizations to their board of directors. We cannot conclude that the structure of the Spanish corporate network has become a new case of Anglo-Saxon structure, but we got indications that are becoming less hierarchic as banks seem to slowly abandon centrality positions. This is especially salient if we compare the networks of 2006 and 2012, which show a continuing decrease of the role of banks and insurance companies in the network.

The Black Box of Mutual Fund Fees

This paper re-examines the determinants of mutual fund fees paid by mutual fund shareholders for management costs and other expenses. There are two novelties with respect to previous studies. First, each type of fee is explained separately. Second, the paper employs a new dataset consisting of Spanish mutual funds, making it the second paper to study mutual fund fees outside the US market. Furthermore, the Spanish market has three interesting characteristics: (i) both distribution and management are highly dominated by banks and savings banks, which points towards potential conflicts of interest; (ii) Spanish mutual fund law imposes caps on all types of fees; and (iii) Spain ranks first in terms of average mutual fund fees among similar countries. We find significant differences in mutual fund fees not explained by the fund’s investment objective. For instance, management companies owned by banks and savings banks charge higher management fees and redemption fees to nonguaranteed funds. Also, investors in older non-guaranteed funds and non-guaranteed funds with a lower average investment are more likely to end up paying higher management fees. Moreover, there is clear evidence that some mutual funds enjoy better conditions from custodial institutions than others. In contrast to evidence from the US market, larger funds are not associated with lower fees, but with higher custody fees for guaranteed funds and higher redemption fees for both types of funds. Finally, fee-setting by mutual funds is not related to fund before-fee performance.