Long Term Dynamics in CO2 Allowance Prices and Carbon Capture Investments

In this paper we analyse the behaviour of the EU market for CO2 emission allowances; specifically, we focus on the contracts maturing in the Kyoto Protocol's second period of application (2008 to 2012). We calibrate the underlying parameters for the allowance price in the long run and we also calibrate those from the Spanish wholesale electricity market. This information is then used to assess the option to install a carbon capture and storage (CCS) unit in a coal-fired power plant. We use a two-dimensional binomial lattice where costs and profits are valued and the optimal investment time is determined. In other words, we study the trigger allowance prices above which it is optimal to install the capture unit immediately. We further analyse the impact of several variables on the critical prices, among them allowance price volatility and a hypothetical government subsidy. We conclude that, at current permit prices, from a financial point of view, immediate installation does not seem justified. This need not be the case, though, if carbon market parameters change dramatically and/or a specific policy to promote these units is adopted.

Lessons from the northern hake long-term management plan: Could the economic assessment have accepted it?

An economic expert working group (STECF/SGBRE-07-05) was convened in 2007 for evaluating the potential economic consequences of a Long-Term Management Plan for the northern hake. Analyzing all the scenarios proposed by biological assessment, they found that keeping the F in the status quo level was the best policy in terms of net present values for both yield and profits. This result is counter intuitive because it may indicate that effort costs do no affect the economic reference points. However, it is well accepted that the inclusion of costs affects negatively the economic reference points. In this paper, applying a dynamic agestructured model to the northern hake, we show that the optimal fishing mortality that maximizes the net present value of profits is lower than Fmax.

Unions, Monetary Shocks and the Labour Market Cycle

Published as an article in: Economic Modelling, 2011, vol. 28, issue 3, pages 1140-1149.

Policy Coordination in an Oligopolistic Housing Market

This paper analyzes the consequences of the interaction between two different levels of government (regulators) in the development of housing policy when their decisions determine the level of competition in the housing market. The analysis discusses the implications derived from a lack of coordination between a local regulator who controls the supply of land for housing development and a central regulator who decides on housing subsidies. The results suggest that lack of coordination has significant effects on prices and supply of houses, housing developers’ profits, and buyers’ surplus.

Ad valorem housing subsidies may reduce house building

In this paper it is shown that an ad valorem housing subsidy set by a central regulator (or a raise in the ad valorem housing subsidy rate) may reduce the number of houses built in the market and increase the price paid by the buyers of houses. The analysis considers a situation where there is imperfect competition in the housing market and a local regulator that decides on density, or on the number of sites for housing development, and that cares about a combination of the profits of housing developers and the surplus of buyers of houses.

Social Housing under Oligopoly

In this paper it is shown that the setting up of a social housing system may decrease the total number of houses built in the market, induce a price of non-social houses greater than the price of houses without that system and increase the profits of housing developers even in situations where they have to sell social houses at a price below production cost. The analysis considers a situation with imperfect competition in the housing market and with a social housing system where housing developers must provide some social houses when they obtain a permit to build non-social houses.

The Optimality of the Common Fisheries Policy: the Northern Stock of Hake

We evaluate the management of the Northern Stock of Hake during 1986-2001. A stochastic bioeconomic model is calibrated to match the main features of this fishing ground. We show how catches, biomass stock and profits would have been if the optimal Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) consistent with the target biomass implied by the Fischler’s Recovery Plan had been implemented. The main finding are: i) an optimal CFP would have generated profits of more than 667 millions euros, ii) if side-payments are allowed (implemented by ITQ’s, for example) these profits increase 26%.

Repercusión económica de la certificación medioambiental ISO 14001

Este trabajo ha sido realizado bajo el marco de objetivos del Grupo de Investigación de Excelencia CREVALOR reconocido por la Diputación General de Aragón.

Análisis estratégico de la industria de la construcción en España

[ES] El sector de la construcción tiene, en España, una notable importancia, por su aportación al PIB (del entorno del 10%) y al empleo (en torno al 10%) y porque aglutina un amplio tejido empresarial. El deterioro de la situación económica y la saturación del mercado residencial han llevado a una fuerte contracción de la actividad constructiva, después una larga época de crecimiento.

Reference Points Based on Dynamic Optimisation: A Versatil Algorithm for Mixed Fishery Management with Bio-economic Agestructured Models

Single-species management objectives may not be consistent within mixed fisheries. They may lead species to unsafe situations, promote discarding of over-quota and/or misreporting of catches. We provide an algorithm for characterising bio-economic reference points for a mixed fishery as the steady-state solution of a dynamic optimal management problem. The optimisation problem takes into account: i) that species are fishing simultaneously in unselective fishing operations and ii)intertemporal discounting and fleet costs to relate reference points to discounted economic profits along optimal trajectories. We illustrate how the algorithm can be implemented by applying it to the European Northern Stock of Hake (Merluccius merluccius), where fleets also capture Northern megrim (Lepidorhombus whiffiagonis) and Northern anglerfish (Lophius piscatorius and Lophius budegassa). We find that optimal mixed management leads to a target reference point that is quite similar to the 2/3 of the Fmsy single-species (hake) target. Mixed management is superior to singlespecies management because it leads the fishery to higher discounted profits with higher long-term SSB for all species. We calculate that the losses due to the use of the Fmsy single-species (hake) target in this mixed fishery account for 11.4% of total discounted profits.

Are Bar Associations Anticompetitive? An Empirical Analysis of Recommended Prices for Legal Services in Spain

The European Commission Report on Competition in Professional Services found that recommended prices by professional bodies have a significant negative effect on competition since they may facilitate the coordination of prices between service providers and/or mislead consumers about reasonable price levels. Professional associations argue, first, that a fee schedule may help their members to properly calculate the cost of services avoiding excessive charges and reducing consumers’ searching costs and, second, that recommended prices are very useful for cost appraisal if a litigant is condemned to pay the legal expenses of the opposing party. Thus, recommended fee schedules could be justified to some extent if they represented the cost of providing the services. We test this hypothesis using cross‐section data on a subset of recommended prices by 52 Spanish bar associations and cost data on their territorial jurisdictions. Our empirical results indicate that prices recommended by bar associations are unrelated to the cost of legal services and therefore we conclude that recommended prices have merely an anticompetitive effect.

A note on bargaining power and managerial delegation in multimarket oligopolies

In a two-stage delegation game model with Nash bargaining between a manager and an owner, an equivalence result is found between this game and Fershtman and Judd's strategic delegation game (Fershtman and Judd, 1987). Interestingly, although both games are equivalent in terms of profits under certain conditions, managers obtain greater rewards in the bargaining game. This results in a redistribution of profits between owners and managers.

Dealing with Energy-QoE Trade-Offs in Mobile Video

Scalable video coding allows an efficient provision of video services at different quality levels with different energy demands. According to the specific type of service and network scenario, end users and/or operators may decide to choose among different energy versus quality combinations. In order to deal with the resulting trade-off, in this paper we analyze the number of video layers that are worth to be received taking into account the energy constraints. A single-objective optimization is proposed based on dynamically selecting the number of layers, which is able to minimize the energy consumption with the constraint of a minimal quality threshold to be reached. However, this approach cannot reflect the fact that the same increment of energy consumption may result in different increments of visual quality. Thus, a multiobjective optimization is proposed and a utility function is defined in order to weight the energy consumption and the visual quality criteria. Finally, since the optimization solving mechanism is computationally expensive to be implemented in mobile devices, a heuristic algorithm is proposed. This way, significant energy consumption reduction will be achieved while keeping reasonable quality levels.

Income Taxation and Growth in an OLG Economy: Does Aggregate Uncertainty Play any Role?

We analyze the effects of capital income taxation on long-run growth in a stochastic, two-period overlapping generations economy. Endogenous growth is driven by a positive externality of physical capital in the production sector that makes firms exhibit an aggregate technology in equilibrium. We distinguish between capital income and labor income, and between attitudes towards risk and intertemporal substitution of consumption. We show necessary and sufficient conditions such that i) increments in the capital income taxation lead to higher equilibrium growth rates, and ii) the effect of changes in the capital income tax rate on the equilibrium growth may be of opposite signs in stochastic and in deterministic economies. Such a sign reversal is shown to be more likely depending on i) how the intertemporal elasticity of substitution compares to one, and ii) the size of second- period labor supply. Numerical simulations show that for reasonable values of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, a sign reversal shows up only for implausibly high values of the second- period’s labor supply. The conclusion is that deterministic OLG economies are a good approximation of the effect of taxes on the equilibrium growth rate as in Smith (1996).

Role of G protein coupled inwardly rectifier K+ channels (GIRK) on the neurobiology depression

353 págs.