Una aproximación al sector eléctrico

Español:Este TFG pretende exponer de un modo sencillo el mercado eléctrico español. Se trata de un tema de elevada complejidad y gran extensión. Con el fin de alcanzar una idea clara, hemos decidido centrarnos en los puntos de mayor relevancia. En las secciones siguientes abordamos cuestiones relativas al mercado mayorista (pool) y minorista español así como la incipiente reforma eléctrica llevada a cabo por el Gobierno. Después de una breve Introducción, la sección 2 enumera una serie de términos que se utilizan con frecuencia en esta área. La sección 3 proporciona algunos antecedentes sobre el sector eléctrico. La sección 4 se refiere al mercado mayorista, en el cual se realiza la compra-venta diaria de electricidad. En él participan los productores, los distribuidores y los comercializadores de electricidad, así como los consumidores cualificados de energía eléctrica. Dentro de éste nos encontramos el mercado a plazo (o forward), el mercado diario (o spot) y el mercado a corto plazo (o de ajuste). La sección 5 trata del mercado minorista, su diseño y composición. Aquí, las empresas encargadas de comercializar energía (que compran en el mercado mayorista a las empresas generadoras) se la venden a los consumidores finales. En la sección 6 se aborda la Reforma Eléctrica, aclarando los cambios sufridos desde su implantación. Los hechos más llamativos a este respecto son: la eliminación de las subastas CESUR y el cambio de la Tarifa de Último Recurso (TUR) a un Precio Voluntario para el Pequeño Consumidor (PVPC). Por último, hay una sección final con las principales conclusiones.

Equilibrio de Cournot en el mercado eléctrico.

(EN) My project is about the Cournot equilibrium in the electric power market. The differences in this situacion depend on the number of the firms in the market.

Market Power in the Spanish Electricity Auction

Published as an article in: Journal of Regulatory Economics, 2010, vol. 37, issue 1, pages 42-69.

Income risk of EU coal-fired power plants after Kyoto

Coal-fired power plants may enjoy a significant advantage relative to gas plants in terms of cheaper fuel cost. Still, this advantage may erode or even turn into disadvantage depending on CO2 emission allowance price. This price will presumably rise in both the Kyoto Protocol commitment period (2008-2012) and the first post-Kyoto years. Thus, in a carbon-constrained environment, coal plants face financial risks arising in their profit margins, which in turn hinge on their so-called "clean dark spread". These risks are further reinforced when the price of the output electricity is determined by natural gas-fired plants' marginal costs, which differ from coal plants' costs. We aim to assess the risks in coal plants' margins. We adopt parameter values estimated from empirical data. These in turn are derived from natural gas and electricity markets alongside the EU ETS market where emission allowances are traded. Monte Carlo simulation allows to compute the expected value and risk profile of coal-based electricity generation. We focus on the clean dark spread in both time periods under different future scenarios in the allowance market. Specifically, bottom 5% and 10% percentiles are derived. According to our results, certain future paths of the allowance price may impose significant risks on the clean dark spread obtained by coal plants.

Union Formation and Bargaining Rules in the Labor Market

This paper analyzes union formation in a model of bargaining between a firm and several unions. We address two questions: first, the optimal configuration of unions (their number and size) and, second, the impact of the bargaining pattern (simultaneous or sequential). For workers, grouping into several unions works as a price discrimination device which, at the same time, decreases their market power. The analysis shows that optimal union configuration depends on the rules that regulate the bargaining process (monopoly union, Nash bargaining or right to manage).

The Economics of Gasification: A Market-Based Approach

This paper deals with the economics of gasification facilities in general and IGCC power plants in particular. Regarding the prospects of these systems, passing the technological test is one thing, passing the economic test can be quite another. In this respect, traditional valuations assume constant input and/or output prices. Since this is hardly realistic, we allow for uncertainty in prices. We naturally look at the markets where many of the products involved are regularly traded. Futures markets on commodities are particularly useful for valuing uncertain future cash flows. Thus, revenues and variable costs can be assessed by means of sound financial concepts and actual market data. On the other hand, these complex systems provide a number of flexibility options (e.g., to choose among several inputs, outputs, modes of operation, etc.). Typically, flexibility contributes significantly to the overall value of real assets. Indeed, maximization of the asset value requires the optimal exercise of any flexibility option available. Yet the economic value of flexibility is elusive, the more so under (price) uncertainty. And the right choice of input fuels and/or output products is a main concern for the facility managers. As a particular application, we deal with the valuation of input flexibility. We follow the Real Options approach. In addition to economic variables, we also address technical and environmental issues such as energy efficiency, utility performance characteristics and emissions (note that carbon constraints are looming). Lastly, a brief introduction to some stochastic processes suitable for valuation purposes is provided.