Endogenous Timing in Pollution Control: Stackelberg versus Cournot-Nash Equilibria

27 p.

A Behavioral Foundation for Models of Evolutionary Drift

Binmore and Samuelson (1999) have shown that perturbations (drift) are crucial to study the stability properties of Nash equilibria. We contribute to this literature by providing a behavioural foundation for models of evolutionary drift. In particular, this article introduces a microeconomic model of drift based on the similarity theory developed by Tversky (1977), Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and Rubinstein (1988),(1998). An innovation with respect to those works is that we deal with similarity relations that are derived from the perception that each agent has about how well he is playing the game. In addition, the similarity relations are adapted to a dynamic setting. We obtain different models of drift depending on how we model the agent´s assessment of his behaviour in the game. The examples of the ultimatum game and the chain-store game are used to show the conditions for each model to stabilize elements in the component of Nash equilibria that are not subgame- perfect. It is also shown how some models approximate the laboratory data about those games while others match the data.

Implementing with veto players: a simple non cooperative game

The paper adapts a non cooperative game presented by Dagan, Serrano and Volij (1997) for bankruptcy problems to the context of TU veto balanced games. We investigate the relationship between the Nash outcomes of a noncooperative game and solution concepts of cooperative games such as the nucleolus, kernel and the egalitarian core.

The Supercore for Normal Form Games

We study the supercore of a system derived from a normal form game. For the case of a finite game with pure strategies, we define a sequence of games and show that the supercore of that system coincides with the set of Nash equilibrium strategy profiles of the last game in the sequence. This result is illustrated with the characterization of the supercore for the n-person prisoners’ dilemma. With regard to the mixed extension of a normal form game, we show that the set of Nash equilibrium profiles coincides with the supercore for games with a finite number of Nash equilibria. For games with an infinite number of Nash equilibria this need not be no longer the case. Yet, it is not difficult to find a binary relation which guarantees the coincidence of these two sets.

A Model of Evolutionay Drift

Drift appears to be crucial to study the stability properties of Nash equilibria in a component specifying different out-of-equilibrium behaviour. We propose a new microeconomic model of drift to be added to the learning process by which agents find their way to equilibrium. A key feature of the model is the sensitivity of the noisy agent to the proportion of agents in his player population playing the same strategy as his current one. We show that, 1. Perturbed Payoff-Positive and PayoffMonotone selection dynamics are capable of stabilizing pure non strict Nash equilibria in either singleton or nonsingleton component of equilibria; 2. The model is relevant to understand the role of drift in the behaviour observed in the laboratory for the Ultimatum Game and for predicting outcomes that can be experimentally tested. Hence, the selection dynamics model perturbed with the proposed drift may be seen as well as a new learning tool to understand observed behaviour.

Union Formation and Bargaining Rules in the Labor Market

This paper analyzes union formation in a model of bargaining between a firm and several unions. We address two questions: first, the optimal configuration of unions (their number and size) and, second, the impact of the bargaining pattern (simultaneous or sequential). For workers, grouping into several unions works as a price discrimination device which, at the same time, decreases their market power. The analysis shows that optimal union configuration depends on the rules that regulate the bargaining process (monopoly union, Nash bargaining or right to manage).

The von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets for 2x2 games

We analyze the von Neumann and Morgenstern stable sets for the mixed extension of 2 2 games when only single profitable deviations are allowed. We show that the games without a strict Nash equilibrium have a unique vN&M stable set and otherwise they have infinite sets.

A note on bargaining power and managerial delegation in multimarket oligopolies

In a two-stage delegation game model with Nash bargaining between a manager and an owner, an equivalence result is found between this game and Fershtman and Judd's strategic delegation game (Fershtman and Judd, 1987). Interestingly, although both games are equivalent in terms of profits under certain conditions, managers obtain greater rewards in the bargaining game. This results in a redistribution of profits between owners and managers.

New Oncogenic Drivers in Hepatocellular Carcinoma: Role of the RNA Binding Protein Hu antigen R

156 p. : graf.

The Economics of "Why is it so hard to save a threatened Language?"

We study the language choice behavior of bilingual speakers in modern societies, such as the Basque Country, Ireland andWales. These countries have two o cial languages:A, spoken by all, and B, spoken by a minority. We think of the bilinguals in those societies as a population playing repeatedly a Bayesian game in which, they must choose strategically the language, A or B, that might be used in the interaction. The choice has to be made under imperfect information about the linguistic type of the interlocutors. We take the Nash equilibrium of the language use game as a model for real life language choice behavior. It is shown that the predictions made with this model t very well the data about the actual use, contained in the censuses, of Basque, Irish and Welsh languages. Then the question posed by Fishman (2001),which appears in the title, is answered as follows: it is hard, mainly, because bilingual speakers have reached an equilibrium which is evolutionary stable. This means that to solve fast and in a re ex manner their frequent language coordination problem, bilinguals have developed linguistic conventions based chie y on the strategy 'Use the same language as your interlocutor', which weakens the actual use of B.1

Aproximación a las ciencias sociales desde la teoría de los juegos

Para cualquier alumno de Ciencias Sociales que esté interesado en saber analizar juegos en los que existe interacción estratégica entre los jugadores. Contenido: Introducción, Conceptos Básicos, Juegos simultáneos, Ejercicios de autoevaluación, el equilibrio de Nash, problemas del equilibrio de Nash, algunos resultados de interés, algunas aplicaciones del equilibrio de Nash, Ejercicios de autoevaluación, Las estrategias Maximin, las estrategias mixtas, Ejercicios de autoevaluación, el dilema del prisionero, Ejercicios de autoevaluación, Juegos sucesivos o secuenciales, Ejercicios de autoevaluación, paso de la forma extensiva a la normal, Ejercicios de autoevaluación, los juegos repetidos, Ejercicios de autoevaluación, Ejercicio de repaso, solución a los Ejercicios de autoevaluación, respuesta al ejercicio de repaso, Ejercicios, Apéndice: Aplicaciones Económicas, Bibliografía.

Tópicos de incentivos y contratos

Para cualquier alumno de la Licenciatura en Economía o de la Licenciatura en Administración y Dirección de Empresase que esté interesado en analizar los problemas de coordinar y motivar a los miembros de una organización. Contenido: Conceptos de Equilibrio: Equilibrio de Nash, Equilibrio Perfecto en Subjuegos, Solución Negociadora de Nash. Modelos de Oligopolio. Regulación de los mercados por el gobierno. Incentivos a los gestores: motivos de eficiencia y estratégicos. Incentivos a los trabajadores: negociación del salario. Incentivos de los gobiernos a privatizar las empresas públicas. Incentivos para proteger el medio ambiente. La Economía de los Costes de Transacción

Unilateral vs. Bilateral link-formation: Bridging the gap

We provide a model that bridges the gap between two benchmark models of strategic network formation: Jackson and Wolinsky' s model based on bilateral formation of links, and Bala and Goyal's two-way fl ow model, where links can be unilaterally formed. In the model introduced and studied here a link can be created unilaterally. When it is only supported by one of the two players the fl ow through the link suffers a certain decay, but when it is supported by both the fl ow runs without friction. When the decay in links supported by only one player is maximal (i.e. there is no flow) we have Jackson and Wolinsky 's connections model without decay, while when flow in such links is perfect we have Bala and Goyal' s two-way flow model. We study Nash, strict Nash and pairwise stability for the intermediate models. Efficiency and dynamics are also examined.

From bilateral two-way to unilateral one-way flow link-formation

Documento de trabajo

Novel equation to determine the hepatic triglyceride concentration in humans by MRI: diagnosis and monitoring of NAFLD in obese patients before and after bariatric surgery

Background: Non-alcoholic fatty liver disease (NAFLD) is caused by abnormal accumulation of lipids within liver cells. Its prevalence is increasing in developed countries in association with obesity, and it represents a risk factor for non-alcoholic steatohepatitis (NASH), cirrhosis and hepatocellular carcinoma. Since NAFLD is usually asymptomatic at diagnosis, new non-invasive approaches are needed to determine the hepatic lipid content in terms of diagnosis, treatment and control of disease progression. Here, we investigated the potential of magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) to quantitate and monitor the hepatic triglyceride concentration in humans. Methods: A prospective study of diagnostic accuracy was conducted among 129 consecutive adult patients (97 obesity and 32 non-obese) to compare multi-echo MRI fat fraction, grade of steatosis estimated by histopathology, and biochemical measurement of hepatic triglyceride concentration (that is, Folch value). Results: MRI fat fraction positively correlates with the grade of steatosis estimated on a 0 to 3 scale by histopathology. However, this correlation value was stronger when MRI fat fraction was linked to the Folch value, resulting in a novel equation to predict the hepatic triglyceride concentration (mg of triglycerides/g of liver tissue = 5.082 + (432.104 * multi-echo MRI fat fraction)). Validation of this formula in 31 additional patients (24 obese and 7 controls) resulted in robust correlation between the measured and estimated Folch values. Multivariate analysis showed that none of the variables investigated improves the Folch prediction capacity of the equation. Obese patients show increased steatosis compared to controls using MRI fat fraction and Folch value. Bariatric surgery improved MRI fat fraction values and the Folch value estimated in obese patients one year after surgery. Conclusions: Multi-echo MRI is an accurate approach to determine the hepatic lipid concentration by using our novel equation, representing an economic non-invasive method to diagnose and monitor steatosis in humans.