5 resultados para INCENTIVOS TRIBUTARIOS

em Archivo Digital para la Docencia y la Investigación - Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad del País Vasco


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Para cualquier alumno de la Licenciatura en Economía o de la Licenciatura en Administración y Dirección de Empresase que esté interesado en analizar los problemas de coordinar y motivar a los miembros de una organización. Contenido: Conceptos de Equilibrio: Equilibrio de Nash, Equilibrio Perfecto en Subjuegos, Solución Negociadora de Nash. Modelos de Oligopolio. Regulación de los mercados por el gobierno. Incentivos a los gestores: motivos de eficiencia y estratégicos. Incentivos a los trabajadores: negociación del salario. Incentivos de los gobiernos a privatizar las empresas públicas. Incentivos para proteger el medio ambiente. La Economía de los Costes de Transacción

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Este artículo es una adaptación de la conferencia titulada “Génesis de la crisis financiera”, que fue impartida en el Curso de Verano “Diez años del euro: 1999-2009”, celebrado los días 25 y 26 de junio de 2009 en el marco de los XXVIII Cursos de Verano de la UPV/EHU

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[EN] Debt issue credit ratings can lead to conflicts of interest as the issuer itself is entrusted with contracting and compensating the rating agency. Into the bargain, the credit rating agency may be involved in designing the issues that the same agency subsequently rates. Credit rating agencies thus could have incentives to rate issues advantageously. Given the economic importance of this issue, in this paper we have proposed to analyze this phenomenon, known as rating shopping in academic literature, for Spanish market securitization issues for the period of time comprehensive from January 1993 to December 2011. In sum 3,665 published ratings are been analysed, for an issued nominal amount of 791,090 million Euros. The results show an association between the credit rating agency contracted and the mean rating awarded. Significant differences are observed in the ratings associated to the contracting manager (or special purpose vehicle SPV- manager firm), to the number of ratings or to the type of collateral. Furthermore, a pattern compatible with rating shopping was observed for some types of collateral: abnormally high market shares associated with certain agencies awarding unusually generous ratings. However, this phenomenon is not seen to be widespread on the rating market associated to Spanish securitization issues.