Coalitional games with veto players: Myopic and farsighted behavior

This paper studies an allocation procedure for coalitional games with veto players. The procedure is similar to the one presented by Dagan et al. (1997) for bankruptcy problems. According to it, a player, the proposer, makes a proposal that the remaining players must accept or reject, and con ict is solved bilaterally between the rejector and the proposer. We allow the proposer to make sequential proposals over several periods. If responders are myopic maximizers (i.e. consider each period in isolation), the only equilibrium outcome is the serial rule of Arin and Feltkamp (2012) regardless of the order of moves. If all players are farsighted, the serial rule still arises as the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome if the order of moves is such that stronger players respond to the proposal after weaker ones.

Majoritarian Contests with Asymmetric Battlefields: An Experiment

We investigate a version of the classic Colonel Blotto game in which individual battles may have different values. Two players allocate a fixed budget across battlefields and each battlefield is won by the player who allocates the most to that battlefield. The winner of the game is the player who wins the battlefields with highest total value. We focus on the case where there is one large and several small battlefields, such that a player wins if he wins the large and any one small battlefield, or all the small battlefields. We compute the mixed strategy equilibrium for these games and compare this with choices from a laboratory experiment. The equilibrium predicts that the large battlefield receives more than a proportional share of the resources of the players, and that most of the time resources should be spread over more battlefields than are needed to win the game. We find support for the main qualitative features of the equilibrium. In particular, strategies that spread resources widely are played frequently, and the large battlefield receives more than a proportional share in the treatment where the asymmetry between battlefields is stronger.

Diagrama de secuencias de reducción (dsr): aproximación metodológica para el análisis de núcleos líticos y remontajes

Homenaje a Georges Laplace, realizado en Vitoria-Gasteiz el 13,14 y 15 de noviembre de 2012. Edición a cargo de Aitor Calvo, Aitor Sánchez, Maite García-Rojas y Mónica Alonso-Eguíluz.

Participación ciudadana, patrimonio cultural y museos: entre la teoría y la praxis

Cap. 1. La Nueva Museología, el patrimonio cultural y la participación ciudadana a debate. Iñaki Arrieta Urtizberea Cap. 2. Museos: del público al ciudadano. Rafael Azuar Ruiz Cap. 3. Los públicos y lo público. De mutismos, sorderas, y de diálogos sociales en museos y espacios patrimoniales. Luz Maceira Ochoa Cap. 4. La restitution du patrimoine: un rôle pour le musée? Études de cas dans les communautés innues du Québec et du Labrador (Canada). Élise Dubuc Cap. 5. El museo de territorio y sociedad, ¿una utopía? el caso del Museo Industrial del Ter. Carles García Hermosilla Cap. 6. El ecomuseo del río Caicena (Almedinilla-Córdoba): un proyecto de desarrollo rural desde el patrimonio histórico-natural, ¿y la participación ciudadana? Ignacio Muñiz Jaén Cap. 7. Mé-tisser les mémoires. Musées indiens du nordeste brésilien. Martin Soares Cap. 8. El patrimonio como proceso social. Intervención, desarrollo y consumo del patrimonio minero en Andalucía. Macarena Hernández Ramírez y Esteban Ruiz Ballesteros Cap. 9. Legislación patrimonial, intervención pública y participación ciudadana en la declaración de un conjunto histórico. Iñaki Arrieta Urtizberea Cap. 10. El castillo de Montsoriu. La participación de la sociedad civil. Joaquim Mateu Gasquet Cap. 11. El patrimonio cultural; espacio de encuentro. Daniel Arnesio Lara Montero