Exploring Game Performance in the National Basketball Association Using Player Tracking Data

Recent player tracking technology provides new information about basketball game performance. The aim of this study was to (i) compare the game performances of all-star and non all-star basketball players from the National Basketball Association (NBA), and (ii) describe the different basketball game performance profiles based on the different game roles. Archival data were obtained from all 2013-2014 regular season games (n = 1230). The variables analyzed included the points per game, minutes played and the game actions recorded by the player tracking system. To accomplish the first aim, the performance per minute of play was analyzed using a descriptive discriminant analysis to identify which variables best predict the all-star and non all-star playing categories. The all-star players showed slower velocities in defense and performed better in elbow touches, defensive rebounds, close touches, close points and pull-up points, possibly due to optimized attention processes that are key for perceiving the required appropriate environmental information. The second aim was addressed using a k-means cluster analysis, with the aim of creating maximal different performance profile groupings. Afterwards, a descriptive discriminant analysis identified which variables best predict the different playing clusters. The results identified different playing profile of performers, particularly related to the game roles of scoring, passing, defensive and all-round game behavior. Coaching staffs may apply this information to different players, while accounting for individual differences and functional variability, to optimize practice planning and, consequently, the game performances of individuals and teams.

Doubts and Equilibria

In real life strategic interactions, decision-makers are likely to entertain doubts about the degree of optimality of their play. To capture this feature of real choice-making, we present here a model based on the doubts felt by an agent about how well is playing a game. The doubts are coupled with (and mutually reinforced by) imperfect discrimination capacity, which we model here by means of similarity relations. We assume that each agent builds procedural preferences de ned on the space of expected payoffs-strategy frequencies attached to his current strategy. These preferences, together with an adaptive learning process lead to doubt-based selection dynamic systems. We introduce the concepts of Mixed Strategy Doubt Equilibria, Mixed Strategy Doubt-Full Equilibria and Mixed Strategy Doubtless Equilibria and show the theoretical and the empirical relevance of these concepts.

A Behavioral Foundation for Models of Evolutionary Drift

Binmore and Samuelson (1999) have shown that perturbations (drift) are crucial to study the stability properties of Nash equilibria. We contribute to this literature by providing a behavioural foundation for models of evolutionary drift. In particular, this article introduces a microeconomic model of drift based on the similarity theory developed by Tversky (1977), Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and Rubinstein (1988),(1998). An innovation with respect to those works is that we deal with similarity relations that are derived from the perception that each agent has about how well he is playing the game. In addition, the similarity relations are adapted to a dynamic setting. We obtain different models of drift depending on how we model the agent´s assessment of his behaviour in the game. The examples of the ultimatum game and the chain-store game are used to show the conditions for each model to stabilize elements in the component of Nash equilibria that are not subgame- perfect. It is also shown how some models approximate the laboratory data about those games while others match the data.

Implementing with veto players: a simple non cooperative game

The paper adapts a non cooperative game presented by Dagan, Serrano and Volij (1997) for bankruptcy problems to the context of TU veto balanced games. We investigate the relationship between the Nash outcomes of a noncooperative game and solution concepts of cooperative games such as the nucleolus, kernel and the egalitarian core.

A Model of Evolutionay Drift

Drift appears to be crucial to study the stability properties of Nash equilibria in a component specifying different out-of-equilibrium behaviour. We propose a new microeconomic model of drift to be added to the learning process by which agents find their way to equilibrium. A key feature of the model is the sensitivity of the noisy agent to the proportion of agents in his player population playing the same strategy as his current one. We show that, 1. Perturbed Payoff-Positive and PayoffMonotone selection dynamics are capable of stabilizing pure non strict Nash equilibria in either singleton or nonsingleton component of equilibria; 2. The model is relevant to understand the role of drift in the behaviour observed in the laboratory for the Ultimatum Game and for predicting outcomes that can be experimentally tested. Hence, the selection dynamics model perturbed with the proposed drift may be seen as well as a new learning tool to understand observed behaviour.

Competitive Pressure and Job Interview Lying: A Game Theoretical Analysis

We consider a job contest in which candidates go through interviews (cheap talk) and are subject to reference checks. We show how competitive pressure - increasing the ratio of "good" to "bad" type candi- dates - can lead to a vast increase in lying and in some cases make bad hires more likely. As the number of candidates increases, it becomes harder to in- duce truth-telling. The interview stage becomes redundant if the candidates, a priori, know each others' type or the result of their own reference check. Finally, we show that the employer can bene t from committing not to reject all the applicants.

Evolution of Cooperation in the Snowdrift Game with Incomplete Information and Heterogeneous Population

Differently from previous studies of tag-based cooperation, we assume that individuals fail to recognize their own tag. Due to such incomplete information, the action taken against the opponent cannot be based on similarity, although it is still motivated by the tag displayed by the opponent. We present stability conditions for the case when individuals play unconditional cooperation, unconditional defection or conditional cooperation. We then consider the removal of one or two strategies. Results show that conditional cooperators are the most resilient agents against extinction and that the removal of unconditional cooperators may lead to the extinction of unconditional defectors.

The coincidence of the kernel and nucleolus of a convex game: an alternative proof

In 1972, Maschler, Peleg and Shapley proved that in the class of convex the nucleolus and the kernel coincide. The only aim of this note is to provide a shorter, alternative proof of this result.

Playing games with words cultural transfer in David Lynch's Blue Velvet

Eguíluz, Federico; Merino, Raquel; Olsen, Vickie; Pajares, Eterio; Santamaría, José Miguel (eds.)

The Economics of "Why is it so hard to save a threatened Language?"

We study the language choice behavior of bilingual speakers in modern societies, such as the Basque Country, Ireland andWales. These countries have two o cial languages:A, spoken by all, and B, spoken by a minority. We think of the bilinguals in those societies as a population playing repeatedly a Bayesian game in which, they must choose strategically the language, A or B, that might be used in the interaction. The choice has to be made under imperfect information about the linguistic type of the interlocutors. We take the Nash equilibrium of the language use game as a model for real life language choice behavior. It is shown that the predictions made with this model t very well the data about the actual use, contained in the censuses, of Basque, Irish and Welsh languages. Then the question posed by Fishman (2001),which appears in the title, is answered as follows: it is hard, mainly, because bilingual speakers have reached an equilibrium which is evolutionary stable. This means that to solve fast and in a re ex manner their frequent language coordination problem, bilinguals have developed linguistic conventions based chie y on the strategy 'Use the same language as your interlocutor', which weakens the actual use of B.1

A Game-Theoreteic Analysis of Minority Language Use in Multilingual Societies

This chapter studies multilingual democratic societies with highly developed economies. These societies are assumed to have two languages with official status: language A, spoken by every individual, and language B, spoken by the bilingual minority. We emphasize that language rights are important, but the survival of the minority language B depends mainly on the actual use bilinguals make of B. The purpose of the present chapter is to study some of the factors affecting the bilingual speakers language choice behaviour. Our view is that languages with their speech communities compete for speakers just as fi rms compete for market share. Thus, the con ict among the minority languages in these societies does not take the rough expressions such as those studied in Desmet et al. (2012). Here the con flict is more subtle. We model highly plausible language choice situations by means of choice procedures and non-cooperative games, each with different types of information. We then study the determinants of the bilinguals ' strategic behaviour with regard to language. We observe that the bilinguals' use of B is shaped, essentially, by linguistic conventions and social norms that are developed in situations of language contact.

Moles' game

El trabajo consiste en el desarrollo del juego de los topos en HTML5. El objetivo del juego es golpear los topos antes de que se escondan para ir consiguiendo la mayor cantidad de puntos sin que se agoten las vidas.

The use of role-play games in teaching: The International Climate Negotiation Game

This paper presents a role-play game designed by the authors, which focuses on international climate negotiations. The game has been used at a university with students all drawn from the same course and at summer schools with students from different levels (undergraduate, master’s and doctoral students and post-doctoral researchers) and different knowledge areas (economics, law, engineering, architecture, biology and others). We discuss how the game fits into the process of competence-based learning, and what benefits games, and role-play games in particular, have for teaching. In the game, students take on the role of representatives of national institutions and experience at first hand a detailed process of international negotiation concerned with climate change.

ADAPTECC: A Role-Play Game about Adapting to Climate Change

The ADAPTECC Climate Change Adaptation Game is a role-play game designed to enable players to experience the difficulties that arise at local and regional levels when authorities have to implement adaptation measures. Adaptation means anticipating the advert effects of climate change (CC) and taking measures to prevent and minimise the damage caused by its impacts. Each player takes the role of the mayor or a councillor of a town affected by CC who must decide what adaptation strategies and measures to take, or of a member of the Regional Environment Department which must distribute funding for adaptation among the various towns. At the end of the game, players should have a greater understanding of the challenges posed by adaptation to CC