An Approach to the stability of international environmental agreements: the absorbing sets solution

We study international environmental negotiations when agreements between countries can not be binding. A problem with this kind of negotiations is that countries have incentives for free-riding from such agreements. We develope a notion of equilibrium based on the assumption that countries can create and dissolve agreements in their seeking of a larger welfare. This approach leads to a larger degree of cooperation compared to models based on the internal-external stability approach.

Modos de intervención criminal punible en crímenes de atrocidad: un análisis jurídico-penal a partir de los aportes de la criminología

790 p.

Las Mujeres en Colombia por la paz

Tesina de Master para el Magíster en Género y Desarrollo, Instituto Complutense de Estudios Internacionales, Universidad Complutense de Madrid. 94 p.