The Impact of Regulation on Pricing Behavior in the Spanish Electricity Market

In this paper we measure the impact of regulatory measures which affected the Spanish electricity wholesale market in the period 2002-2005. Our approach is based on the fact that regulation changes firms' incentives and therefore their market behavior. In the absence of any regulation firms would choose profit- maximizing prices on their residual demands so that the observed gap between optimal and actual prices provides a measure of the effect of regulation. Our results indicate that regulation has decreased wholesale prices considerably, but became less effective at the end of the sample period which explains the change of regulatory regime introduced in 2006.

An empirical comparison of the performance of alternative option pricing models

Published as an article in: Investigaciones Economicas, 2005, vol. 29, issue 3, pages 483-523.

Asset pricing and systematic liquidity risk: an empirical investigation of the Spanish stock market

Systematic liquidity shocks should affect the optimal behavior of agents in financial markets. Indeed, fluctuations in various measures of liquidity are significantly correlated across common stocks. Accordingly, this paper empirically analyzes whether Spanish average returns vary cross-sectionally with betas estimated relative to two competing liquidity risk factors. The first one, proposed by Pastor and Stambaugh (2002), is associated with the strength of volume-related return reversals. Our marketwide liquidity factor is defined as the difference between returns highly sensitive to changes in the relative bid-ask spread and returns with low sensitivities to those changes. Our empirical results show that neither of these proxies for systematic liquidity risk seems to be priced in the Spanish stock market. Further international evidence is deserved.

Consumer Expertise or Credit Risk? An empirical analysis of mortgage pricing

Loan mortgage interest rates are usually the result of a bank-customer negotiation process. Credit risk, consumer cross-buying potential, bundling, financial market competition and other features affecting the bargaining power of the parties could affect price. We argue that, since mortgage loan is a complex product, consumer expertise could be a relevant factor for mortgage pricing. Using data on mortgage loan prices for a sample of 1055 households for the year 2005 (Bank of Spain Survey of Household Finances, EFF-2005), and including credit risk, costs, potential capacity of the consumer to generate future business and bank competition variables, the regression results indicate that consumer expertise-related metrics are highly significant as predictors of mortgage loan prices. Other factors such as credit risk and consumer cross-buying potential do not have such a significant impact on mortgage prices. Our empirical results are affected by the credit conditions prior to the financial crisis and could shed some light on this issue.

On the impact of independence of irrelevant alternatives: the case of two-person NTU games

On several classes of n-person NTU games that have at least one Shapley NTU value, Aumann characterized this solution by six axioms: Non-emptiness, efficiency, unanimity, scale covariance, conditional additivity, and independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA). Each of the first five axioms is logically independent of the remaining axioms, and the logical independence of IIA is an open problem. We show that for n = 2 the first five axioms already characterize the Shapley NTU value, provided that the class of games is not further restricted. Moreover, we present an example of a solution that satisfies the first five axioms and violates IIA for two-person NTU games (N, V) with uniformly p-smooth V(N).

Environmental Concerns in Water Pricing Policy: an Application of Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA)

25 p.

Price Premium for High-Efficiency Refrigerators and Calculation of Price-Elasticities for Close-Substitutes: Combining Hedonic Pricing and Demand Systems

21 p.

Algoritmo de Gale-Shapley. Variaciones y alternativas

En esta memoria se trata el problema de encontrar un algoritmo que construya un emparejamiento entre dos grupos, entendiendo por emparejamiento la asignacion a cada individuo, de cada grupo, otro individuo. La situaci on inicial de la que parte el problema es la siguiente: Dos grupos, los proponentes y los propuestos, que est an formados por n individuos cada uno, siendo n la dimensi on del problema. El grupo de los proponentes es el encargado de hacer las propuestas a la hora de construir el emparejamiento. El grupo de los propuestos es el encargado de recibir y gestionar las propuestas a la hora de construir el emparejamiento. Cada individuo de cada grupo ordena en una lista, de manera decreciente, a individuos del otro grupo atendiendo a su preferencia a la hora de ser emparejado, a esta lista la llamaremos lista de preferencia del individuo, considerando el quedarse solo la opci on menos preferida de entre las aceptables. El objetivo del problema es crear un emparejamiento en el que cada pareja sea satisfactoria para los individuos que la crean en base a las preferencias de cada uno.

Egalitarian distributions in coalitional models: The Lorenz criterion

The paper presents a framework where the most important single-valued solutions in the literature of TU games are jointly analyzed. The paper also suggests that similar frameworks may be useful for other coalitional models.

The Relationship between Risk and Expected Return in Europe

Revised: 2006-07

Going Multinational under Exchange Rate Uncertainty

Published as an article in: Journal of International Money and Finance, 2010, vol. 29, issue 6, pages 1171-1191.

Smiling under stochastic volatility

This paper studies the behavior of the implied volatility function (smile) when the true distribution of the underlying asset is consistent with the stochastic volatility model proposed by Heston (1993). The main result of the paper is to extend previous results applicable to the smile as a whole to alternative degrees of moneyness. The conditions under which the implied volatility function changes whenever there is a change in the parameters associated with Hestons stochastic volatility model for a given degree of moneyness are given.

Los Modelos Implícitos de Valoración de Opciones

[ES] Los modelos implícitos constituyen uno de los enfoques de valoración de opciones alternativos al modelo de Black-Scholes que ha conocido un mayor desarrollo en los últimos años. Dentro de este planteamiento existen diferentes alternativas: los árboles implícitos, los modelos con función de volatilidad determinista y los modelos con función de volatilidad implícita. Todos ellos se construyen a partir de una estimación de la distribución de probabilidades riesgo-neutral del precio futuro del activo subyacente, congruente con los precios de mercado de las opciones negociadas. En consecuencia, los modelos implícitos proporcionan buenos resultados en la valoración de opciones dentro de la muestra. Sin embargo, su comportamiento como instrumento de predicción para opciones fuera de muestra no resulta satisfactorio. En este artículo se analiza la medida en la que este enfoque contribuye a la mejora de la valoración de opciones, tanto desde un punto de vista teórico como práctico.

Approximate knowledge of rationality and correlated equilibria

We extend Aumann's [3] theorem deriving correlated equilibria as a consequence of common priors and common knowledge of rationality by explicitly allowing for non-rational behavior. We replace the assumption of common knowledge of rationality with a substantially weaker notion, joint p-belief of rationality, where agents believe the other agents are rational with probabilities p = (pi)i2I or more. We show that behavior in this case constitutes a constrained correlated equilibrium of a doubled game satisfying certain p-belief constraints and characterize the topological structure of the resulting set of p-rational outcomes. We establish continuity in the parameters p and show that, for p su ciently close to one, the p-rational outcomes are close to the correlated equilibria and, with high probability, supported on strategies that survive the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies. Finally, we extend Aumann and Dreze's [4] theorem on rational expectations of interim types to the broader p-rational belief systems, and also discuss the case of non-common priors.

The coincidence of the kernel and nucleolus of a convex game: an alternative proof

In 1972, Maschler, Peleg and Shapley proved that in the class of convex the nucleolus and the kernel coincide. The only aim of this note is to provide a shorter, alternative proof of this result.