Unraveling Public Good Games: The Role of Priors

This paper provides experimental evidence on how players predict end game effects in a linear public good game. Our regression analysis yields a measure of the relative importance of priors and signals on subjects\' beliefs on contributions and allow us to conclude that, firstly, the weight of the signal is relatively unimportant, while priors have a large weight and, secondly, priors are the same for all periods. Hence, subjects do not expect end game effects and there is very little updating of beliefs.

On monotonic core allocations for coalitional games whith veto players

We characterize a monotonic core concept defined on the class of veto balanced games. We also discuss what restricted versions of monotonicity are possible when selecting core allocations. We introduce a family of monotonic core concepts for veto balanced games and we show that, in general, the nucleolus per capita is not monotonic.

The Supercore for Normal Form Games

We study the supercore of a system derived from a normal form game. For the case of a finite game with pure strategies, we define a sequence of games and show that the supercore of that system coincides with the set of Nash equilibrium strategy profiles of the last game in the sequence. This result is illustrated with the characterization of the supercore for the n-person prisoners’ dilemma. With regard to the mixed extension of a normal form game, we show that the set of Nash equilibrium profiles coincides with the supercore for games with a finite number of Nash equilibria. For games with an infinite number of Nash equilibria this need not be no longer the case. Yet, it is not difficult to find a binary relation which guarantees the coincidence of these two sets.

Replicator Dynamics and Evolutionary Stable Strategies in Heterogeneous Games

We generalise and extend the work of Iñarra and Laruelle (2011) by studying two person symmetric evolutionary games with two strategies, a heterogenous population with two possible types of individuals and incomplete information. Comparing such games with their classic homogeneous version vith complete information found in the literature, we show that for the class of anti-coordination games the only evolutionarily stable strategy vanishes. Instead, we find infinite neutrally stable strategies. We also model the evolutionary process using two different replicator dynamics setups, each with a different inheritance rule, and we show that both lead to the same results with respect to stability.

Time transcendence, metadata and future utilization in 3D models of point clouds for heritage elements

Contributed to: Virtual Retrospect 2007 (Pessac, France, Nov 14-16, 2007)

Representación 3D interactiva de relaciones de derivación e hiponimia en paradigmas léxicos del inglés antiguo

Participantes en el proyecto Nerthus: Javier Martín Arista (Universidad de La Rioja, Investigador principal), Laboratorio de Documentación Geométrica del Patrimonio (Universidad del País Vasco UPV/EHU).-- Sitio web del proyecto: http://www.nerthusproject.com/

3D line drawing from point clouds using chromatic stereo and shading

1 PDF document (8 pp., English).-- Contributed to: VSMM'08: 14th International Conference on Virtual Systems and Multimedia (Limassol, Cyprus, Oct 20-25, 2008)

Moral cleansing and moral licenses: experimental evidence

Research on moral cleansing and moral self-licensing has introduced dynamic considerations in the theory of moral behavior. Past bad actions trigger negative feelings that make people more likely to engage in future moral behavior to offset them. Symmetrically, past good deeds favor a positive self-perception that creates licensing effects, leading people to engage in behavior that is less likely to be moral. In short, a deviation from a “normal state of being” is balanced with a subsequent action that compensates the prior behavior. We model the decision of an individual trying to reach the optimal level of moral self-worth over time and show that under certain conditions the optimal sequence of actions follows a regular pattern which combines good and bad actions. We conduct an economic experiment where subjects play a sequence of giving decisions (dictator games) to explore this phenomenon. We find that donation in the previous period affects present decisions and the sign is negative: participants’ behavior in every round is negatively correlated to what they did in the past. Hence donations over time seem to be the result of a regular pattern of self-regulation: moral licensing (being selfish after altruist) and cleansing (altruistic after selfish).

Games with perceptions

We assume that 2 x 2 matrix games are publicly known and that players perceive a dichotomous characteristic on their opponents which defines two types for each player. In turn, each type has beliefs concerning her opponent's types, and payoffs are assumed to be type-independent. We analyze whether the mere possibility of different types playing different strategies generates discriminatory equilibria. Given a specific information structure we find that in equilibrium a player discriminates between her types if and only if her opponent does so. We also find that for dominant solvable 2x2 games no discriminatory equilibrium exists, while under different conditions of concordance between players' beliefs discrimination appears for coordination and for competitive games. A complete characterization of the set of Bayesian equilibria is provided.

3D geolokalizazioa androidetan

Karrera amaierako proiektu honetan telefono mugikor aurreratuentzako aplikazio grafiko bat garatu da. Aplikazioak mendizaleei lainoa dagoenean orientatzen lagundu nahi die, ikuspen ezagatik galdu ez daitezen. Hori lortzeko, erabiltzailearen inguruan dagoen paisaia hiru dimentsiotan pantailaratuko da. Non kokatuta dagoen jakiteko GPS sistema atzitzen da. Erabiltzaileak aurrera egiten duen heinean marraztutako ingurunea eguneratzen da. Orientatzen laguntzeko, begiratzen ari den norantzan dagoen lurrazala bakarrik marraztuko zaio mendizaleari.

The von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets for 2x2 games

We analyze the von Neumann and Morgenstern stable sets for the mixed extension of 2 2 games when only single profitable deviations are allowed. We show that the games without a strict Nash equilibrium have a unique vN&M stable set and otherwise they have infinite sets.

Learning in Network Games

We report the findings of an experiment designed to study how people learn and make decisions in network games. Network games offer new opportunities to identify learning rules, since on networks (compared to e.g. random matching) more rules differ in terms of their information requirements. Our experimental design enables us to observe both which actions participants choose and which information they consult before making their choices. We use this information to estimate learning types using maximum likelihood methods. There is substantial heterogeneity in learning types. However, the vast majority of our participants' decisions are best characterized by reinforcement learning or (myopic) best-response learning. The distribution of learning types seems fairly stable across contexts. Neither network topology nor the position of a player in the network seem to substantially affect the estimated distribution of learning types.

A monotonic core concept for convex games: The SD-prenucleolus

We prove that the SD-prenucleolus satisfies monotonicity in the class of convex games. The SD-prenucleolus is thus the only known continuous core concept that satisfies monotonicity for convex games. We also prove that for convex games the SD-prenucleolus and the SD-prekernel coincide.

Propuesta para acceder a los recursos sobre Patrimonio depositados en el repositorio institucional ADDI de la Universidad del País Vasco (UPV/EHU) mediante un grafo 3D interactivo

[ES] Los repositorios institucionales albergan gran cantidad de información científica generada por las universidades y centros de investigación que está disponible para su descarga y uso de forma libre. Uno de los factores que puede limitar el uso proviene de la dificultad de navegación dentro de las interfaces que proporcionan estos programas de cara a los usuarios; por este motivo, es interesante desarrollar métodos alternativos de búsqueda y navegación por los contenidos que complementen a los existentes, permitiendo así una mayor difusión.

Playing games with words cultural transfer in David Lynch's Blue Velvet

Eguíluz, Federico; Merino, Raquel; Olsen, Vickie; Pajares, Eterio; Santamaría, José Miguel (eds.)