A monotonic core concept for convex games: The SD-prenucleolus

We prove that the SD-prenucleolus satisfies monotonicity in the class of convex games. The SD-prenucleolus is thus the only known continuous core concept that satisfies monotonicity for convex games. We also prove that for convex games the SD-prenucleolus and the SD-prekernel coincide.

Playing games with words cultural transfer in David Lynch's Blue Velvet

Eguíluz, Federico; Merino, Raquel; Olsen, Vickie; Pajares, Eterio; Santamaría, José Miguel (eds.)

Stability of Switched Feedback Time-Varying Dynamic Systems Based on the Properties of the Gap Metric for Operators

The stabilization of dynamic switched control systems is focused on and based on an operator-based formulation. It is assumed that the controlled object and the controller are described by sequences of closed operator pairs (L, C) on a Hilbert space H of the input and output spaces and it is related to the existence of the inverse of the resulting input-output operator being admissible and bounded. The technical mechanism addressed to get the results is the appropriate use of the fact that closed operators being sufficiently close to bounded operators, in terms of the gap metric, are also bounded. That philosophy is followed for the operators describing the input-output relations in switched feedback control systems so as to guarantee the closed-loop stabilization.

On Bounded Strictly Positive Operators of Closed Range and Some Applications to Asymptotic Hyperstability of Dynamic Systems

The problem discussed is the stability of two input-output feedforward and feedback relations, under an integral-type constraint defining an admissible class of feedback controllers. Sufficiency-type conditions are given for the positive, bounded and of closed range feed-forward operator to be strictly positive and then boundedly invertible, with its existing inverse being also a strictly positive operator. The general formalism is first established and the linked to properties of some typical contractive and pseudocontractive mappings while some real-world applications and links of the above formalism to asymptotic hyperstability of dynamic systems are discussed later on.

Coalitional games with veto players: Myopic and farsighted behavior

This paper studies an allocation procedure for coalitional games with veto players. The procedure is similar to the one presented by Dagan et al. (1997) for bankruptcy problems. According to it, a player, the proposer, makes a proposal that the remaining players must accept or reject, and con ict is solved bilaterally between the rejector and the proposer. We allow the proposer to make sequential proposals over several periods. If responders are myopic maximizers (i.e. consider each period in isolation), the only equilibrium outcome is the serial rule of Arin and Feltkamp (2012) regardless of the order of moves. If all players are farsighted, the serial rule still arises as the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome if the order of moves is such that stronger players respond to the proposal after weaker ones.

On the impact of independence of irrelevant alternatives: the case of two-person NTU games

On several classes of n-person NTU games that have at least one Shapley NTU value, Aumann characterized this solution by six axioms: Non-emptiness, efficiency, unanimity, scale covariance, conditional additivity, and independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA). Each of the first five axioms is logically independent of the remaining axioms, and the logical independence of IIA is an open problem. We show that for n = 2 the first five axioms already characterize the Shapley NTU value, provided that the class of games is not further restricted. Moreover, we present an example of a solution that satisfies the first five axioms and violates IIA for two-person NTU games (N, V) with uniformly p-smooth V(N).

The Relevance of Relative Position in Ultimatum Games

This paper investigates the effect of focal points and initial relative position in the outcome of a bargaining process. We conduct two on-line experiments. In the first experiment we attempt to replicate Güth, Huck and Müller's (2001) results about the relevance of equal splits. In our second experiment, we recover the choices of participants in forty mini-ultimatum games. This design allows us to test whether the equal split or any other distribution or set of distributions are salient. Our data provide no support for a focal-point explanation but we find support for an explanation based on relative position. Our results confirm that there is a norm against hyper-fair offers. Proposers are expected to behave selfishly when the unselfish distribution leads to a change in the initial relative position.

Simple Coalitional Strategy Profiles in Repeated Games

This paper is a version of the discussion paper titled "Simple coalitional strategy profiles"

A dynamic CGE modelling approach for analyzing trade-offs in climate change policy options: the case of Green Climate Fund

38 p.

Los “serious games” como herramienta docente para el fomento del emprendimiento:concurso e-mprende UPV/EHU

La sociedad está sometida a un proceso de cambio constante y las metodologías docentes deben adaptarse también a estos cambios. Hemos decidido realizar el presente Trabajo de Fin de Grado con el fin de poner en valor la utilidad de las metodologías docentes más innovadoras que consigan adaptar la docencia a la sociedad moderna. Así pues, explicamos lo que son los Serious Games y los usos que pueden tener en la docencia desde el punto de vista del emprendimiento empresarial. Como ejemplo más cercano de Serious Game, utilizamos el simulador del concurso E-mprende, un concurso diseñado para estudiantes que enfrenta a los usuarios a través de un Simulador empresarial. Se trata de un Business Game desarrollado entre otros por la Universidad del País Vasco que intenta enseñar a los jugadores lo que es dirigir una empresa de nueva creación dándoles el control virtual de la misma a través de una plataforma web donde deberán tomar una serie de rondas de decisiones. Para comenzar, realizamos un análisis bibliográfico con el fin de dar una correcta explicación de lo que son los juegos, los Serious Games y los Business Games. Básicamente, un Serious Game se diferencia de un Juego ordinario en su finalidad. Mientras que un juego ordinario se ha diseñado con el único fin de divertir, el Juego Serio también tiene el objetivo de formar, entrenar o educar. Por su parte, Un Business Game es un Serious Game diseñado para el ámbito de los negocios en el que se pretende formar al jugador en materia de empresas. Realizando ese análisis bibliográfico, obtenemos una serie de conclusiones que podremos contrastar utilizando como ejemplo el simulador del concurso emprende. Para conseguir datos totalmente verídicos, elaboramos un cuestionario a medida destinado a los participantes del concurso que se entregó al finalizar el concurso. Dado que este Trabajo de Fin de Grado se enmarca en el ámbito del emprendimiento, lo que nos interesa contrastar por encima de todo es si el hecho de participar en un Business Game como el del concurso E-mprende ayuda a fomentar el espíritu emprendedor en el alumno más allá de complementar conocimientos teóricos y prácticos, lo cual no deja de ser importante.

Properties of convergence of a class of iterative processes generated by sequences of self-mappings with applications to switched dynamic systems

This article investigates the convergence properties of iterative processes involving sequences of self-mappings of metric or Banach spaces. Such sequences are built from a set of primary self-mappings which are either expansive or non-expansive self-mappings and some of the non-expansive ones can be contractive including the case of strict contractions. The sequences are built subject to switching laws which select each active self-mapping on a certain activation interval in such a way that essential properties of boundedness and convergence of distances and iterated sequences are guaranteed. Applications to the important problem of stability of dynamic switched systems are also given.

Physiological modules for generating discrete and rhythmic movements: action identification by a dynamic recurrent neural network

In this study we employed a dynamic recurrent neural network (DRNN) in a novel fashion to reveal characteristics of control modules underlying the generation of muscle activations when drawing figures with the outstretched arm. We asked healthy human subjects to perform four different figure-eight movements in each of two workspaces (frontal plane and sagittal plane). We then trained a DRNN to predict the movement of the wrist from information in the EMG signals from seven different muscles. We trained different instances of the same network on a single movement direction, on all four movement directions in a single movement plane, or on all eight possible movement patterns and looked at the ability of the DRNN to generalize and predict movements for trials that were not included in the training set. Within a single movement plane, a DRNN trained on one movement direction was not able to predict movements of the hand for trials in the other three directions, but a DRNN trained simultaneously on all four movement directions could generalize across movement directions within the same plane. Similarly, the DRNN was able to reproduce the kinematics of the hand for both movement planes, but only if it was trained on examples performed in each one. As we will discuss, these results indicate that there are important dynamical constraints on the mapping of EMG to hand movement that depend on both the time sequence of the movement and on the anatomical constraints of the musculoskeletal system. In a second step, we injected EMG signals constructed from different synergies derived by the PCA in order to identify the mechanical significance of each of these components. From these results, one can surmise that discrete-rhythmic movements may be constructed from three different fundamental modules, one regulating the co-activation of all muscles over the time span of the movement and two others elliciting patterns of reciprocal activation operating in orthogonal directions.

Political Institutions, Technology and Growth: a dynamic panel approach

This paper investigates whether the effect of political institutions on sectoral economic performance is determined by the level of technological development of industries. Building on previous studies on the linkages among political institutions, technology and economic growth, we employ the dynamic panel Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator for a sample of 4,134 country-industries from 61 industries and 89 countries over the 1990-2010 period. Our main findings suggest that changes of political institutions towards higher levels of democracy, political rights and civil liberties enhance economic growth in technologically developed industries. On the contrary, the same institutional changes might retard economic growth of those industries that are below a technological development threshold. Overall, these results give evidence of a technologically conditioned nature of political institutions to be growth-promoting.

Contributions on agreement in dynamic distributed systems

139 p.