Social saliency : visual psychophysics and single-neuron recordings in humans

My thesis studies how people pay attention to other people and the environment. How does the brain figure out what is important and what are the neural mechanisms underlying attention? What is special about salient social cues compared to salient non-social cues? In Chapter I, I review social cues that attract attention, with an emphasis on the neurobiology of these social cues. I also review neurological and psychiatric links: the relationship between saliency, the amygdala and autism. The first empirical chapter then begins by noting that people constantly move in the environment. In Chapter II, I study the spatial cues that attract attention during locomotion using a cued speeded discrimination task. I found that when the motion was expansive, attention was attracted towards the singular point of the optic flow (the focus of expansion, FOE) in a sustained fashion. The more ecologically valid the motion features became (e.g., temporal expansion of each object, spatial depth structure implied by distribution of the size of the objects), the stronger the attentional effects. However, compared to inanimate objects and cues, people preferentially attend to animals and faces, a process in which the amygdala is thought to play an important role. To directly compare social cues and non-social cues in the same experiment and investigate the neural structures processing social cues, in Chapter III, I employ a change detection task and test four rare patients with bilateral amygdala lesions. All four amygdala patients showed a normal pattern of reliably faster and more accurate detection of animate stimuli, suggesting that advantageous processing of social cues can be preserved even without the amygdala, a key structure of the “social brain”. People not only attend to faces, but also pay attention to others’ facial emotions and analyze faces in great detail. Humans have a dedicated system for processing faces and the amygdala has long been associated with a key role in recognizing facial emotions. In Chapter IV, I study the neural mechanisms of emotion perception and find that single neurons in the human amygdala are selective for subjective judgment of others’ emotions. Lastly, people typically pay special attention to faces and people, but people with autism spectrum disorders (ASD) might not. To further study social attention and explore possible deficits of social attention in autism, in Chapter V, I employ a visual search task and show that people with ASD have reduced attention, especially social attention, to target-congruent objects in the search array. This deficit cannot be explained by low-level visual properties of the stimuli and is independent of the amygdala, but it is dependent on task demands. Overall, through visual psychophysics with concurrent eye-tracking, my thesis found and analyzed socially salient cues and compared social vs. non-social cues and healthy vs. clinical populations. Neural mechanisms underlying social saliency were elucidated through electrophysiology and lesion studies. I finally propose further research questions based on the findings in my thesis and introduce my follow-up studies and preliminary results beyond the scope of this thesis in the very last section, Future Directions.

Efficient methods for empirical tests of behavioral economics theories in laboratory and field experiments

In the quest for a descriptive theory of decision-making, the rational actor model in economics imposes rather unrealistic expectations and abilities on human decision makers. The further we move from idealized scenarios, such as perfectly competitive markets, and ambitiously extend the reach of the theory to describe everyday decision making situations, the less sense these assumptions make. Behavioural economics has instead proposed models based on assumptions that are more psychologically realistic, with the aim of gaining more precision and descriptive power. Increased psychological realism, however, comes at the cost of a greater number of parameters and model complexity. Now there are a plethora of models, based on different assumptions, applicable in differing contextual settings, and selecting the right model to use tends to be an ad-hoc process. In this thesis, we develop optimal experimental design methods and evaluate different behavioral theories against evidence from lab and field experiments.

We look at evidence from controlled laboratory experiments. Subjects are presented with choices between monetary gambles or lotteries. Different decision-making theories evaluate the choices differently and would make distinct predictions about the subjects' choices. Theories whose predictions are inconsistent with the actual choices can be systematically eliminated. Behavioural theories can have multiple parameters requiring complex experimental designs with a very large number of possible choice tests. This imposes computational and economic constraints on using classical experimental design methods. We develop a methodology of adaptive tests: Bayesian Rapid Optimal Adaptive Designs (BROAD) that sequentially chooses the "most informative" test at each stage, and based on the response updates its posterior beliefs over the theories, which informs the next most informative test to run. BROAD utilizes the Equivalent Class Edge Cutting (EC²) criteria to select tests. We prove that the EC² criteria is adaptively submodular, which allows us to prove theoretical guarantees against the Bayes-optimal testing sequence even in the presence of noisy responses. In simulated ground-truth experiments, we find that the EC² criteria recovers the true hypotheses with significantly fewer tests than more widely used criteria such as Information Gain and Generalized Binary Search. We show, theoretically as well as experimentally, that surprisingly these popular criteria can perform poorly in the presence of noise, or subject errors. Furthermore, we use the adaptive submodular property of EC² to implement an accelerated greedy version of BROAD which leads to orders of magnitude speedup over other methods.

We use BROAD to perform two experiments. First, we compare the main classes of theories for decision-making under risk, namely: expected value, prospect theory, constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) and moments models. Subjects are given an initial endowment, and sequentially presented choices between two lotteries, with the possibility of losses. The lotteries are selected using BROAD, and 57 subjects from Caltech and UCLA are incentivized by randomly realizing one of the lotteries chosen. Aggregate posterior probabilities over the theories show limited evidence in favour of CRRA and moments' models. Classifying the subjects into types showed that most subjects are described by prospect theory, followed by expected value. Adaptive experimental design raises the possibility that subjects could engage in strategic manipulation, i.e. subjects could mask their true preferences and choose differently in order to obtain more favourable tests in later rounds thereby increasing their payoffs. We pay close attention to this problem; strategic manipulation is ruled out since it is infeasible in practice, and also since we do not find any signatures of it in our data.

In the second experiment, we compare the main theories of time preference: exponential discounting, hyperbolic discounting, "present bias" models: quasi-hyperbolic (α, β) discounting and fixed cost discounting, and generalized-hyperbolic discounting. 40 subjects from UCLA were given choices between 2 options: a smaller but more immediate payoff versus a larger but later payoff. We found very limited evidence for present bias models and hyperbolic discounting, and most subjects were classified as generalized hyperbolic discounting types, followed by exponential discounting.

In these models the passage of time is linear. We instead consider a psychological model where the perception of time is subjective. We prove that when the biological (subjective) time is positively dependent, it gives rise to hyperbolic discounting and temporal choice inconsistency.

We also test the predictions of behavioral theories in the "wild". We pay attention to prospect theory, which emerged as the dominant theory in our lab experiments of risky choice. Loss aversion and reference dependence predicts that consumers will behave in a uniquely distinct way than the standard rational model predicts. Specifically, loss aversion predicts that when an item is being offered at a discount, the demand for it will be greater than that explained by its price elasticity. Even more importantly, when the item is no longer discounted, demand for its close substitute would increase excessively. We tested this prediction using a discrete choice model with loss-averse utility function on data from a large eCommerce retailer. Not only did we identify loss aversion, but we also found that the effect decreased with consumers' experience. We outline the policy implications that consumer loss aversion entails, and strategies for competitive pricing.

In future work, BROAD can be widely applicable for testing different behavioural models, e.g. in social preference and game theory, and in different contextual settings. Additional measurements beyond choice data, including biological measurements such as skin conductance, can be used to more rapidly eliminate hypothesis and speed up model comparison. Discrete choice models also provide a framework for testing behavioural models with field data, and encourage combined lab-field experiments.

Essays in Behavioral Decision Theory

This thesis studies decision making under uncertainty and how economic agents respond to information. The classic model of subjective expected utility and Bayesian updating is often at odds with empirical and experimental results; people exhibit systematic biases in information processing and often exhibit aversion to ambiguity. The aim of this work is to develop simple models that capture observed biases and study their economic implications.

In the first chapter I present an axiomatic model of cognitive dissonance, in which an agent's response to information explicitly depends upon past actions. I introduce novel behavioral axioms and derive a representation in which beliefs are directionally updated. The agent twists the information and overweights states in which his past actions provide a higher payoff. I then characterize two special cases of the representation. In the first case, the agent distorts the likelihood ratio of two states by a function of the utility values of the previous action in those states. In the second case, the agent's posterior beliefs are a convex combination of the Bayesian belief and the one which maximizes the conditional value of the previous action. Within the second case a unique parameter captures the agent's sensitivity to dissonance, and I characterize a way to compare sensitivity to dissonance between individuals. Lastly, I develop several simple applications and show that cognitive dissonance contributes to the equity premium and price volatility, asymmetric reaction to news, and belief polarization.

The second chapter characterizes a decision maker with sticky beliefs. That is, a decision maker who does not update enough in response to information, where enough means as a Bayesian decision maker would. This chapter provides axiomatic foundations for sticky beliefs by weakening the standard axioms of dynamic consistency and consequentialism. I derive a representation in which updated beliefs are a convex combination of the prior and the Bayesian posterior. A unique parameter captures the weight on the prior and is interpreted as the agent's measure of belief stickiness or conservatism bias. This parameter is endogenously identified from preferences and is easily elicited from experimental data.

The third chapter deals with updating in the face of ambiguity, using the framework of Gilboa and Schmeidler. There is no consensus on the correct way way to update a set of priors. Current methods either do not allow a decision maker to make an inference about her priors or require an extreme level of inference. In this chapter I propose and axiomatize a general model of updating a set of priors. A decision maker who updates her beliefs in accordance with the model can be thought of as one that chooses a threshold that is used to determine whether a prior is plausible, given some observation. She retains the plausible priors and applies Bayes' rule. This model includes generalized Bayesian updating and maximum likelihood updating as special cases.

Formal methods in the foundations of science

The intent of this study is to provide formal apparatus which facilitates the investigation of problems in the methodology of science. The introduction contains several examples of such problems and motivates the subsequent formalism.

A general definition of a formal language is presented, and this definition is used to characterize an individual’s view of the world around him. A notion of empirical observation is developed which is independent of language. The interplay of formal language and observation is taken as the central theme. The process of science is conceived as the finding of that formal language that best expresses the available experimental evidence.

To characterize the manner in which a formal language imposes structure on its universe of discourse, the fundamental concepts of elements and states of a formal language are introduced. Using these, the notion of a basis for a formal language is developed as a collection of minimal states distinguishable within the language. The relation of these concepts to those of model theory is discussed.

An a priori probability defined on sets of observations is postulated as a reflection of an individual’s ontology. This probability, in conjunction with a formal language and a basis for that language, induces a subjective probability describing an individual’s conceptual view of admissible configurations of the universe. As a function of this subjective probability, and consequently of language, a measure of the informativeness of empirical observations is introduced and is shown to be intuitively plausible – particularly in the case of scientific experimentation.

The developed formalism is then systematically applied to the general problems presented in the introduction. The relationship of scientific theories to empirical observations is discussed and the need for certain tacit, unstatable knowledge is shown to be necessary to fully comprehend the meaning of realistic theories. The idea that many common concepts can be specified only by drawing on knowledge obtained from an infinite number of observations is presented, and the problems of reductionism are examined in this context.

A definition of when one formal language can be considered to be more expressive than another is presented, and the change in the informativeness of an observation as language changes is investigated. In this regard it is shown that the information inherent in an observation may decrease for a more expressive language.

The general problem of induction and its relation to the scientific method are discussed. Two hypotheses concerning an individual’s selection of an optimal language for a particular domain of discourse are presented and specific examples from the introduction are examined.

Essays in revealed preference theory and behavioral economics

Time, risk, and attention are all integral to economic decision making. The aim of this work is to understand those key components of decision making using a variety of approaches: providing axiomatic characterizations to investigate time discounting, generating measures of visual attention to infer consumers' intentions, and examining data from unique field settings.

Chapter 2, co-authored with Federico Echenique and Kota Saito, presents the first revealed-preference characterizations of exponentially-discounted utility model and its generalizations. My characterizations provide non-parametric revealed-preference tests. I apply the tests to data from a recent experiment, and find that the axiomatization delivers new insights on a dataset that had been analyzed by traditional parametric methods.

Chapter 3, co-authored with Min Jeong Kang and Colin Camerer, investigates whether "pre-choice" measures of visual attention improve in prediction of consumers' purchase intentions. We measure participants' visual attention using eyetracking or mousetracking while they make hypothetical as well as real purchase decisions. I find that different patterns of visual attention are associated with hypothetical and real decisions. I then demonstrate that including information on visual attention improves prediction of purchase decisions when attention is measured with mousetracking.

Chapter 4 investigates individuals' attitudes towards risk in a high-stakes environment using data from a TV game show, Jeopardy!. I first quantify players' subjective beliefs about answering questions correctly. Using those beliefs in estimation, I find that the representative player is risk averse. I then find that trailing players tend to wager more than "folk" strategies that are known among the community of contestants and fans, and this tendency is related to their confidence. I also find gender differences: male players take more risk than female players, and even more so when they are competing against two other male players.

Chapter 5, co-authored with Colin Camerer, investigates the dynamics of the favorite-longshot bias (FLB) using data on horse race betting from an online exchange that allows bettors to trade "in-play." I find that probabilistic forecasts implied by market prices before start of the races are well-calibrated, but the degree of FLB increases significantly as the events approach toward the end.