Legal dimensions of the Chinese experience in Los Angeles, 1860-1880

On October 24, 1871, a massacre of eighteen Chinese in Los Angeles brought the small southern California settlement into the national spotlight. Within a few days, news of this “night of horrors” was reported in newspapers across the country. This massacre has been cited in Asian American narratives as the first documented outbreak of ethnic violence against a Chinese community in the United States. This is ironic because Los Angeles’ small population has generally placed it on the periphery in historical studies of the California anti-Chinese movement. Because the massacre predated Los Angeles’ organized Chinese exclusion movements of the late 1870s, it has often been erroneously dismissed as an aberration in the history of the city.

The violence of 1871 was an outburst highlighting existing community tensions that would become part of public debate by decade’s close. The purpose of this study is to insert the massacre into a broader context of anti-Chinese sentiments, legal discrimination, and dehumanization in nineteenth century Los Angeles. While a second incident of widespread anti-Chinese violence never occurred, brutal attacks directed at Chinese small businessmen and others highlighted continued community conflict. Similarly, economic rivalries and concerns over Chinese prostitution that underlay the 1871 massacre were manifest in later campaigns of economic discrimination and vice suppression that sought to minimize Chinese influence within municipal limits. An analysis of the massacre in terms of anti-Chinese legal, social and economic strategies in nineteenth-century Los Angeles will elucidate these important continuities.

Extractive institutions in colonial Africa

A common explanation for African current underdevelopment is the extractive character of institutions established during the colonial period. Yet, since colonial extraction is hard to quantify and its exact mechanisms are not well understood, we still do not know precisely how colonial institutions affect economic growth today. In this project, I study this issue by focusing on the peculiar structure of trade and labor policies employed by the French colonizers.

First, I analyze how trade monopsonies and coercive labor institutions reduced African gains from trade during the colonial period. By using new data on prices to agricultural producers and labor institutions in French Africa, I show that (1) the monopsonistic character of colonial trade implied a reduction in prices to producers far below world market prices; (2) coercive labor institutions allowed the colonizers to reduce prices even further; (3) as a consequence, colonial extraction cut African gains from trade by over 60%.

Given the importance of labor institutions, I then focus on their origin by analyzing the colonial governments' incentives to choose between coerced and free labor. I argue that the choice of institutions was affected more by the properties of exported commodities, such as prices and economies of scale, than by the characteristics of colonies, such indigenous population density and ease of settlement for the colonizers.

Finally, I study the long-term effects of colonial trade monopsonies and coercive labor institutions. By combining archival data on prices in the French colonies with maps of crop suitability, I show that the extent to which prices to agricultural producers were reduced with respect to world market prices is strongly negatively correlated with current regional development, as proxied by luminosity data from satellite images. The evidence suggests that colonial extraction affected subsequent growth by reducing development in rural areas in favor of a urban elite. The differential impact in rural and urban areas can be the reason why trade monopsonies and extractive institutions persisted long after independence.