An economic air pollution control model-application : photochemical smog in Los Angeles County in 1975

An economic air pollution control model, which determines the least cost of reaching various air quality levels, is formulated. The model takes the form of a general, nonlinear, mathematical programming problem. Primary contaminant emission levels are the independent variables. The objective function is the cost of attaining various emission levels and is to be minimized subject to constraints that given air quality levels be attained.

The model is applied to a simplified statement of the photochemical smog problem in Los Angeles County in 1975 with emissions specified by a two-dimensional vector, total reactive hydrocarbon, (RHC), and nitrogen oxide, (NO_x), emissions. Air quality, also two-dimensional, is measured by the expected number of days per year that nitrogen dioxide, (NO₂), and mid-day ozone, (O₃), exceed standards in Central Los Angeles.

The minimum cost of reaching various emission levels is found by a linear programming model. The base or "uncontrolled" emission levels are those that will exist in 1975 with the present new car control program and with the degree of stationary source control existing in 1971. Controls, basically "add-on devices", are considered here for used cars, aircraft, and existing stationary sources. It is found that with these added controls, Los Angeles County emission levels [(1300 tons/day RHC, 1000 tons /day NO_x) in 1969] and [(670 tons/day RHC, 790 tons/day NO_x) at the base 1975 level], can be reduced to 260 tons/day RHC (minimum RHC program) and 460 tons/day NO_x (minimum NO_x program).

"Phenomenological" or statistical air quality models provide the relationship between air quality and emissions. These models estimate the relationship by using atmospheric monitoring data taken at one (yearly) emission level and by using certain simple physical assumptions, (e. g., that emissions are reduced proportionately at all points in space and time). For NO₂, (concentrations assumed proportional to NO_x emissions), it is found that standard violations in Central Los Angeles, (55 in 1969), can be reduced to 25, 5, and 0 days per year by controlling emissions to 800, 550, and 300 tons /day, respectively. A probabilistic model reveals that RHC control is much more effective than NO_x control in reducing Central Los Angeles ozone. The 150 days per year ozone violations in 1969 can be reduced to 75, 30, 10, and 0 days per year by abating RHC emissions to 700, 450, 300, and 150 tons/day, respectively, (at the 1969 NO_x emission level).

The control cost-emission level and air quality-emission level relationships are combined in a graphical solution of the complete model to find the cost of various air quality levels. Best possible air quality levels with the controls considered here are 8 O₃ and 10 NO₂ violations per year (minimum ozone program) or 25 O₃ and 3 NO₂ violations per year (minimum NO₂ program) with an annualized cost of $230,000,000 (above the estimated $150,000,000 per year for the new car control program for Los Angeles County motor vehicles in 1975).

Lattice quantum codes and exotic topological phases of matter

This thesis addresses whether it is possible to build a robust memory device for quantum information. Many schemes for fault-tolerant quantum information processing have been developed so far, one of which, called topological quantum computation, makes use of degrees of freedom that are inherently insensitive to local errors. However, this scheme is not so reliable against thermal errors. Other fault-tolerant schemes achieve better reliability through active error correction, but incur a substantial overhead cost. Thus, it is of practical importance and theoretical interest to design and assess fault-tolerant schemes that work well at finite temperature without active error correction.

In this thesis, a three-dimensional gapped lattice spin model is found which demonstrates for the first time that a reliable quantum memory at finite temperature is possible, at least to some extent. When quantum information is encoded into a highly entangled ground state of this model and subjected to thermal errors, the errors remain easily correctable for a long time without any active intervention, because a macroscopic energy barrier keeps the errors well localized. As a result, stored quantum information can be retrieved faithfully for a memory time which grows exponentially with the square of the inverse temperature. In contrast, for previously known types of topological quantum storage in three or fewer spatial dimensions the memory time scales exponentially with the inverse temperature, rather than its square.

This spin model exhibits a previously unexpected topological quantum order, in which ground states are locally indistinguishable, pointlike excitations are immobile, and the immobility is not affected by small perturbations of the Hamiltonian. The degeneracy of the ground state, though also insensitive to perturbations, is a complicated number-theoretic function of the system size, and the system bifurcates into multiple noninteracting copies of itself under real-space renormalization group transformations. The degeneracy, the excitations, and the renormalization group flow can be analyzed using a framework that exploits the spin model's symmetry and some associated free resolutions of modules over polynomial algebras.

Characterizing distribution rules for cost sharing games

In noncooperative cost sharing games, individually strategic agents choose resources based on how the welfare (cost or revenue) generated at each resource (which depends on the set of agents that choose the resource) is distributed. The focus is on finding distribution rules that lead to stable allocations, which is formalized by the concept of Nash equilibrium, e.g., Shapley value (budget-balanced) and marginal contribution (not budget-balanced) rules.

Recent work that seeks to characterize the space of all such rules shows that the only budget-balanced distribution rules that guarantee equilibrium existence in all welfare sharing games are generalized weighted Shapley values (GWSVs), by exhibiting a specific 'worst-case' welfare function which requires that GWSV rules be used. Our work provides an exact characterization of the space of distribution rules (not necessarily budget-balanced) for any specific local welfare functions remains, for a general class of scalable and separable games with well-known applications, e.g., facility location, routing, network formation, and coverage games.

We show that all games conditioned on any fixed local welfare functions possess an equilibrium if and only if the distribution rules are equivalent to GWSV rules on some 'ground' welfare functions. Therefore, it is neither the existence of some worst-case welfare function, nor the restriction of budget-balance, which limits the design to GWSVs. Also, in order to guarantee equilibrium existence, it is necessary to work within the class of potential games, since GWSVs result in (weighted) potential games.

We also provide an alternative characterization—all games conditioned on any fixed local welfare functions possess an equilibrium if and only if the distribution rules are equivalent to generalized weighted marginal contribution (GWMC) rules on some 'ground' welfare functions. This result is due to a deeper fundamental connection between Shapley values and marginal contributions that our proofs expose—they are equivalent given a transformation connecting their ground welfare functions. (This connection leads to novel closed-form expressions for the GWSV potential function.) Since GWMCs are more tractable than GWSVs, a designer can tradeoff budget-balance with computational tractability in deciding which rule to implement.

The principles involved in a factory cost system

Successful management has been defined as the art of spending money wisely and well. Profits may not be the end and all of business but they are certainly the test of practicality. Everything worth while should pay for itself. One proposal is no better than another, except as in the working-out it yields better results.

Essays on Correlated Equilibrium and Voter Turnout

This thesis consists of three essays in the areas of political economy and game theory, unified by their focus on the effects of pre-play communication on equilibrium outcomes.

Communication is fundamental to elections. Chapter 2 extends canonical voter turnout models, where citizens, divided into two competing parties, choose between costly voting and abstaining, to include any form of communication, and characterizes the resulting set of Aumann's correlated equilibria. In contrast to previous research, high-turnout equilibria exist in large electorates and uncertain environments. This difference arises because communication can coordinate behavior in such a way that citizens find it incentive compatible to follow their correlated signals to vote more. The equilibria have expected turnout of at least twice the size of the minority for a wide range of positive voting costs.

In Chapter 3 I introduce a new equilibrium concept, called subcorrelated equilibrium, which fills the gap between Nash and correlated equilibrium, extending the latter to multiple mediators. Subcommunication equilibrium similarly extends communication equilibrium for incomplete information games. I explore the properties of these solutions and establish an equivalence between a subset of subcommunication equilibria and Myerson's quasi-principals' equilibria. I characterize an upper bound on expected turnout supported by subcorrelated equilibrium in the turnout game.

Chapter 4, co-authored with Thomas Palfrey, reports a new study of the effect of communication on voter turnout using a laboratory experiment. Before voting occurs, subjects may engage in various kinds of pre-play communication through computers. We study three communication treatments: No Communication, a control; Public Communication, where voters exchange public messages with all other voters, and Party Communication, where messages are exchanged only within one's own party. Our results point to a strong interaction effect between the form of communication and the voting cost. With a low voting cost, party communication increases turnout, while public communication decreases turnout. The data are consistent with correlated equilibrium play. With a high voting cost, public communication increases turnout. With communication, we find essentially no support for the standard Nash equilibrium turnout predictions.