Essays on economics networks

This thesis belongs to the growing field of economic networks. In particular, we develop three essays in which we study the problem of bargaining, discrete choice representation, and pricing in the context of networked markets. Despite analyzing very different problems, the three essays share the common feature of making use of a network representation to describe the market of interest.

In Chapter 1 we present an analysis of bargaining in networked markets. We make two contributions. First, we characterize market equilibria in a bargaining model, and find that players' equilibrium payoffs coincide with their degree of centrality in the network, as measured by Bonacich's centrality measure. This characterization allows us to map, in a simple way, network structures into market equilibrium outcomes, so that payoffs dispersion in networked markets is driven by players' network positions. Second, we show that the market equilibrium for our model converges to the so called eigenvector centrality measure. We show that the economic condition for reaching convergence is that the players' discount factor goes to one. In particular, we show how the discount factor, the matching technology, and the network structure interact in a very particular way in order to see the eigenvector centrality as the limiting case of our market equilibrium.

We point out that the eigenvector approach is a way of finding the most central or relevant players in terms of the “global” structure of the network, and to pay less attention to patterns that are more “local”. Mathematically, the eigenvector centrality captures the relevance of players in the bargaining process, using the eigenvector associated to the largest eigenvalue of the adjacency matrix of a given network. Thus our result may be viewed as an economic justification of the eigenvector approach in the context of bargaining in networked markets.

As an application, we analyze the special case of seller-buyer networks, showing how our framework may be useful for analyzing price dispersion as a function of sellers and buyers' network positions.

Finally, in Chapter 3 we study the problem of price competition and free entry in networked markets subject to congestion effects. In many environments, such as communication networks in which network flows are allocated, or transportation networks in which traffic is directed through the underlying road architecture, congestion plays an important role. In particular, we consider a network with multiple origins and a common destination node, where each link is owned by a firm that sets prices in order to maximize profits, whereas users want to minimize the total cost they face, which is given by the congestion cost plus the prices set by firms. In this environment, we introduce the notion of Markovian traffic equilibrium to establish the existence and uniqueness of a pure strategy price equilibrium, without assuming that the demand functions are concave nor imposing particular functional forms for the latency functions. We derive explicit conditions to guarantee existence and uniqueness of equilibria. Given this existence and uniqueness result, we apply our framework to study entry decisions and welfare, and establish that in congested markets with free entry, the number of firms exceeds the social optimum.

Chemical studies of viral entry mechanisms: I. Hydrophobic protein-lipid interactions during sendai virus membrane fusion. II. Kinetics of bacteriophage λ DNA injection.

Viruses possess very specific methods of targeting and entering cells. These methods would be extremely useful if they could also be applied to drug delivery, but little is known about the molecular mechanisms of the viral entry process. In order to gain further insight into mechanisms of viral entry, chemical and spectroscopic studies in two systems were conducted, examining hydrophobic protein-lipid interactions during Sendai virus membrane fusion, and the kinetics of bacteriophage λ DNA injection.

Sendai virus glycoprotein interactions with target membranes during the early stages of fusion were examined using time-resolved hydrophobic photoaffinity labeling with the lipid-soluble carbene generator3-(trifluoromethyl)-3-(m-^(125 )I] iodophenyl)diazirine (TID). The probe was incorporated in target membranes prior to virus addition and photolysis. During Sendai virus fusion with liposomes composed of cardiolipin (CL) or phosphatidylserine (PS), the viral fusion (F) protein is preferentially labeled at early time points, supporting the hypothesis that hydrophobic interaction of the fusion peptide at the N-terminus of the F_1 subunit with the target membrane is an initiating event in fusion. Correlation of the hydrophobic interactions with independently monitored fusion kinetics further supports this conclusion. Separation of proteins after labeling shows that the F_1 subunit, containing the putative hydrophobic fusion sequence, is exclusively labeled, and that the F_2 subunit does not participate in fusion. Labeling shows temperature and pH dependence consistent with a need for protein conformational mobility and fusion at neutral pH. Higher amounts of labeling during fusion with CL vesicles than during virus-PS vesicle fusion reflects membrane packing regulation of peptide insertion into target membranes. Labeling of the viral hemagglutinin/neuraminidase (HN) at low pH indicates that HN-mediated fusion is triggered by hydrophobic interactions, after titration of acidic amino acids. HN labeling under nonfusogenic conditions reveals that viral binding may involve hydrophobic as well as electrostatic interactions. Controls for diffusional labeling exclude a major contribution from this source. Labeling during reconstituted Sendai virus envelope-liposome fusion shows that functional reconstitution involves protein retention of the ability to undergo hydrophobic interactions.

Examination of Sendai virus fusion with erythrocyte membranes indicates that hydrophobic interactions also trigger fusion between biological membranes, and that HN binding may involve hydrophobic interactions as well. Labeling of the erythrocyte membranes revealed close membrane association of spectrin, which may play a role in regulating membrane fusion. The data show that hydrophobic fusion protein interaction with both artificial and biological membranes is a triggering event in fusion. Correlation of these results with earlier studies of membrane hydration and fusion kinetics provides a more detailed view of the mechanism of fusion.

The kinetics of DNA injection by bacteriophage λ. into liposomes bearing reconstituted receptors were measured using fluorescence spectroscopy. LamB, the bacteriophage receptor, was extracted from bacteria and reconstituted into liposomes by detergent removal dialysis. The DNA binding fluorophore ethidium bromide was encapsulated in the liposomes during dialysis. Enhanced fluorescence of ethidium bromide upon binding to injected DNA was monitored, and showed that injection is a rapid, one-step process. The bimolecular rate law, determined by the method of initial rates, revealed that injection occurs several times faster than indicated by earlier studies employing indirect assays.

It is hoped that these studies will increase the understanding of the mechanisms of virus entry into cells, and to facilitate the development of virus-mimetic drug delivery strategies.

Optimal procurement and contracting with research and development

Government procurement of a new good or service is a process that usually includes basic research, development, and production. Empirical evidences indicate that investments in research and development (R and D) before production are significant in many defense procurements. Thus, optimal procurement policy should not be only to select the most efficient producer, but also to induce the contractors to design the best product and to develop the best technology. It is difficult to apply the current economic theory of optimal procurement and contracting, which has emphasized production, but ignored R and D, to many cases of procurement.

In this thesis, I provide basic models of both R and D and production in the procurement process where a number of firms invest in private R and D and compete for a government contract. R and D is modeled as a stochastic cost-reduction process. The government is considered both as a profit-maximizer and a procurement cost minimizer. In comparison to the literature, the following results derived from my models are significant. First, R and D matters in procurement contracting. When offering the optimal contract the government will be better off if it correctly takes into account costly private R and D investment. Second, competition matters. The optimal contract and the total equilibrium R and D expenditures vary with the number of firms. The government usually does not prefer infinite competition among firms. Instead, it prefers free entry of firms. Third, under a R and D technology with the constant marginal returns-to-scale, it is socially optimal to have only one firm to conduct all of the R and D and production. Fourth, in an independent private values environment with risk-neutral firms, an informed government should select one of four standard auction procedures with an appropriate announced reserve price, acting as if it does not have any private information.