Analysis and optimization of stress wave propagation in two-dimensional granular crystals with defects

Granular crystals are compact periodic assemblies of elastic particles in Hertzian contact whose dynamic response can be tuned from strongly nonlinear to linear by the addition of a static precompression force. This unique feature allows for a wide range of studies that include the investigation of new fundamental nonlinear phenomena in discrete systems such as solitary waves, shock waves, discrete breathers and other defect modes. In the absence of precompression, a particularly interesting property of these systems is their ability to support the formation and propagation of spatially localized soliton-like waves with highly tunable properties. The wealth of parameters one can modify (particle size, geometry and material properties, periodicity of the crystal, presence of a static force, type of excitation, etc.) makes them ideal candidates for the design of new materials for practical applications. This thesis describes several ways to optimally control and tailor the propagation of stress waves in granular crystals through the use of heterogeneities (interstitial defect particles and material heterogeneities) in otherwise perfectly ordered systems. We focus on uncompressed two-dimensional granular crystals with interstitial spherical intruders and composite hexagonal packings and study their dynamic response using a combination of experimental, numerical and analytical techniques. We first investigate the interaction of defect particles with a solitary wave and utilize this fundamental knowledge in the optimal design of novel composite wave guides, shock or vibration absorbers obtained using gradient-based optimization methods.

Financial equilibrium, voting procedures, and coalition structures in allocational mechanisms

This thesis is comprised of three chapters, each of which is concerned with properties of allocational mechanisms which include voting procedures as part of their operation. The theme of interaction between economic and political forces recurs in the three chapters, as described below.

Chapter One demonstrates existence of a non-controlling interest shareholders' equilibrium for a stylized one-period stock market economy with fewer securities than states of the world. The economy has two decision mechanisms: Owners vote to change firms' production plans across states, fixing shareholdings; and individuals trade shares and the current production / consumption good, fixing production plans. A shareholders' equilibrium is a production plan profile, and a shares / current good allocation stable for both mechanisms. In equilibrium, no (Kramer direction-restricted) plan revision is supported by a share-weighted majority, and there exists no Pareto superior reallocation.

Chapter Two addresses efficient management of stationary-site, fixed-budget, partisan voter registration drives. Sufficient conditions obtain for unique optimal registrar deployment within contested districts. Each census tract is assigned an expected net plurality return to registration investment index, computed from estimates of registration, partisanship, and turnout. Optimum registration intensity is a logarithmic transformation of a tract's index. These conditions are tested using a merged data set including both census variables and Los Angeles County Registrar data from several 1984 Assembly registration drives. Marginal registration spending benefits, registrar compensation, and the general campaign problem are also discussed.

The last chapter considers social decision procedures at a higher level of abstraction. Chapter Three analyzes the structure of decisive coalition families, given a quasitransitive-valued social decision procedure satisfying the universal domain and ITA axioms. By identifying those alternatives X* ⊆ X on which the Pareto principle fails, imposition in the social ranking is characterized. Every coaliton is weakly decisive for X* over X~X*, and weakly antidecisive for X~X* over X*; therefore, alternatives in X~X* are never socially ranked above X*. Repeated filtering of alternatives causing Pareto failure shows states in X^n*~X^((n+1))* are never socially ranked above X^((n+1))*. Limiting results of iterated application of the *-operator are also discussed.

Stress and load calculation for unknown building

Not available.