Sustainable energy solutions for irrigation and harvesting in developing countries

One of the critical problems currently being faced by agriculture industry in developing nations is the alarming rate of groundwater depletion. Irrigation accounts for over 70% of the total groundwater withdrawn everyday. Compounding this issue is the use of polluting diesel generators to pump groundwater for irrigation. This has made irrigation not only the biggest consumer of groundwater but also one of the major contributors to green house gases. The aim of this thesis is to present a solution to the energy-water nexus. To make agriculture less dependent on fossil fuels, the use of a solar-powered Stirling engine as the power generator for on-farm energy needs is discussed. The Stirling cycle is revisited and practical and ideal Stirling cycles are compared. Based on agricultural needs and financial constraints faced by farmers in developing countries, the use of a Fresnel lens as a solar-concentrator and a Beta-type Stirling engine unit is suggested for sustainable power generation on the farms. To reduce the groundwater consumption and to make irrigation more sustainable, the conceptual idea of using a Stirling engine in drip irrigation is presented. To tackle the shortage of over 37 million tonnes of cold-storage in India, the idea of cost-effective solar-powered on-farm cold storage unit is discussed.

Financial equilibrium, voting procedures, and coalition structures in allocational mechanisms

This thesis is comprised of three chapters, each of which is concerned with properties of allocational mechanisms which include voting procedures as part of their operation. The theme of interaction between economic and political forces recurs in the three chapters, as described below.

Chapter One demonstrates existence of a non-controlling interest shareholders' equilibrium for a stylized one-period stock market economy with fewer securities than states of the world. The economy has two decision mechanisms: Owners vote to change firms' production plans across states, fixing shareholdings; and individuals trade shares and the current production / consumption good, fixing production plans. A shareholders' equilibrium is a production plan profile, and a shares / current good allocation stable for both mechanisms. In equilibrium, no (Kramer direction-restricted) plan revision is supported by a share-weighted majority, and there exists no Pareto superior reallocation.

Chapter Two addresses efficient management of stationary-site, fixed-budget, partisan voter registration drives. Sufficient conditions obtain for unique optimal registrar deployment within contested districts. Each census tract is assigned an expected net plurality return to registration investment index, computed from estimates of registration, partisanship, and turnout. Optimum registration intensity is a logarithmic transformation of a tract's index. These conditions are tested using a merged data set including both census variables and Los Angeles County Registrar data from several 1984 Assembly registration drives. Marginal registration spending benefits, registrar compensation, and the general campaign problem are also discussed.

The last chapter considers social decision procedures at a higher level of abstraction. Chapter Three analyzes the structure of decisive coalition families, given a quasitransitive-valued social decision procedure satisfying the universal domain and ITA axioms. By identifying those alternatives X* ⊆ X on which the Pareto principle fails, imposition in the social ranking is characterized. Every coaliton is weakly decisive for X* over X~X*, and weakly antidecisive for X~X* over X*; therefore, alternatives in X~X* are never socially ranked above X*. Repeated filtering of alternatives causing Pareto failure shows states in X^n*~X^((n+1))* are never socially ranked above X^((n+1))*. Limiting results of iterated application of the *-operator are also discussed.