Essays in mechanism design

This dissertation contains three essays on mechanism design. The common goal of these essays is to assist in the solution of different resource allocation problems where asymmetric information creates obstacles to the efficient allocation of resources. In each essay, we present a mechanism that satisfactorily solves the resource allocation problem and study some of its properties. In our first essay, ”Combinatorial Assignment under Dichotomous Preferences”, we present a class of problems akin to time scheduling without a pre-existing time grid, and propose a mechanism that is efficient, strategy-proof and envy-free. Our second essay, ”Monitoring Costs and the Management of Common-Pool Resources”, studies what can happen to an existing mechanism — the individual tradable quotas (ITQ) mechanism, also known as the cap-and-trade mechanism — when quota enforcement is imperfect and costly. Our third essay, ”Vessel Buyback”, coauthored with John O. Ledyard, presents an auction design that can be used to buy back excess capital in overcapitalized industries.

A comparison of the costs of operation of the motor bus, Birney safety car, and trolley bus on the local transportation routes in Pasadena

With the installation by the Pacific Electric Railway of a bus system in Pasadena to supplant most of its trolley lines, the problem of the comparison of the costs of the two systems naturally presented itself. The study here undertaken was originally started as just a comparison of the motor bus and Birney Safety Car, but as the work progressed it seemed advisable to include the trolley bus as well - a method of transportation that is comparatively new as far as development is concerned, but which seems to be finding increasing favor in the East.