An economic air pollution control model-application : photochemical smog in Los Angeles County in 1975

An economic air pollution control model, which determines the least cost of reaching various air quality levels, is formulated. The model takes the form of a general, nonlinear, mathematical programming problem. Primary contaminant emission levels are the independent variables. The objective function is the cost of attaining various emission levels and is to be minimized subject to constraints that given air quality levels be attained.

The model is applied to a simplified statement of the photochemical smog problem in Los Angeles County in 1975 with emissions specified by a two-dimensional vector, total reactive hydrocarbon, (RHC), and nitrogen oxide, (NO_x), emissions. Air quality, also two-dimensional, is measured by the expected number of days per year that nitrogen dioxide, (NO₂), and mid-day ozone, (O₃), exceed standards in Central Los Angeles.

The minimum cost of reaching various emission levels is found by a linear programming model. The base or "uncontrolled" emission levels are those that will exist in 1975 with the present new car control program and with the degree of stationary source control existing in 1971. Controls, basically "add-on devices", are considered here for used cars, aircraft, and existing stationary sources. It is found that with these added controls, Los Angeles County emission levels [(1300 tons/day RHC, 1000 tons /day NO_x) in 1969] and [(670 tons/day RHC, 790 tons/day NO_x) at the base 1975 level], can be reduced to 260 tons/day RHC (minimum RHC program) and 460 tons/day NO_x (minimum NO_x program).

"Phenomenological" or statistical air quality models provide the relationship between air quality and emissions. These models estimate the relationship by using atmospheric monitoring data taken at one (yearly) emission level and by using certain simple physical assumptions, (e. g., that emissions are reduced proportionately at all points in space and time). For NO₂, (concentrations assumed proportional to NO_x emissions), it is found that standard violations in Central Los Angeles, (55 in 1969), can be reduced to 25, 5, and 0 days per year by controlling emissions to 800, 550, and 300 tons /day, respectively. A probabilistic model reveals that RHC control is much more effective than NO_x control in reducing Central Los Angeles ozone. The 150 days per year ozone violations in 1969 can be reduced to 75, 30, 10, and 0 days per year by abating RHC emissions to 700, 450, 300, and 150 tons/day, respectively, (at the 1969 NO_x emission level).

The control cost-emission level and air quality-emission level relationships are combined in a graphical solution of the complete model to find the cost of various air quality levels. Best possible air quality levels with the controls considered here are 8 O₃ and 10 NO₂ violations per year (minimum ozone program) or 25 O₃ and 3 NO₂ violations per year (minimum NO₂ program) with an annualized cost of $230,000,000 (above the estimated $150,000,000 per year for the new car control program for Los Angeles County motor vehicles in 1975).

Death or taxes? The political economy of sanitation expenditure in nineteenth-century Britain

This thesis consists of three papers studying the relationship between democratic reform, expenditure on sanitation public goods and mortality in Britain in the second half of the nineteenth century. During this period decisions over spending on critical public goods such as water supply and sewer systems were made by locally elected town councils, leading to extensive variation in the level of spending across the country. This dissertation uses new historical data to examine the political factors determining that variation, and the consequences for mortality rates.

The first substantive chapter describes the spread of government sanitation expenditure, and analyzes the factors that determined towns' willingness to invest. The results show the importance of towns' financial constraints, both in terms of the available tax base and access to borrowing, in limiting the level of expenditure. This suggests that greater involvement by Westminster could have been very effective in expediting sanitary investment. There is little evidence, however, that democratic reform was an important driver of greater expenditure.

Chapter 3 analyzes the effect of extending voting rights to the poor on government public goods spending. A simple model predicts that the rich and the poor will desire lower levels of public goods expenditure than the middle class, and so extensions of the right to vote to the poor will be associated with lower spending. This prediction is tested using plausibly exogenous variation in the extent of the franchise. The results strongly support the theoretical prediction: expenditure increased following relatively small extensions of the franchise, but fell once more than approximately 50% of the adult male population held the right to vote.

Chapter 4 tests whether the sanitary expenditure was effective in combating the high mortality rates following the Industrial Revolution. The results show that increases in urban expenditure on sanitation-water supply, sewer systems and streets-was extremely effective in reducing mortality from cholera and diarrhea.