The political econmoy of state government debt : an analysis of constitutional limitations (1961-1990)

Over the past decade, scholarly interest concerning the use of limitations to constrain government spending and taxing has noticeably increased. The call for constitutional restrictions can be credited, in part, to Washington's apparent inability to legislate any significant reductions in government expenditures or in the size of the national debt. At the present time, the federal government is far from instituting any constitutional limitations on spending or borrowing; however, the states have incorporated many controls on revenues and expenditures, the oldest being strictures on full faith and credit borrowing. This dissertations examines the efficacy of these restrictions on borrowing across the states (excluding Alaska) for the period dating from 1961 to 1990 and also studies the limitations on taxing and spending synonymous with the Tax Revolt.

We include socio-economic information in our calculations to control for factors other than the institutional variables that affect state borrowing levels. Our results show that certain constitutional restrictions (in particular, the referendum requirement and the dollar debt limit) are more effective than others. The apparent ineffectiveness of other limitations, such as the flexible debt limit, seem related to the bindingness of the limitations in at least half of the cases. Other variables, such as crime rates, number of schoolage children, and state personal income do affect the levels of full faith and credit debt, but not as strongly as the limitations. While some degree of circumvention can be detected (the amount of full faith and credit debt does inversely affect the levels of nonguaranteed debt), it is so small when compared to the effectiveness of the constitutional restrictions that it is almost negligible. The examination of the tax revolt era limitations yielded quite similar conclusions, with the additional fact that constitutional restrictions appear more binding than statutory ones. Our research demonstrates that constitutional limitations on borrowing can be applied effectively to constrain excessive borrowing, but caution must be used. The efficacy of these restrictions decrease dramatically as the number of loopholes increase.

Optimal procurement and contracting with research and development

Government procurement of a new good or service is a process that usually includes basic research, development, and production. Empirical evidences indicate that investments in research and development (R and D) before production are significant in many defense procurements. Thus, optimal procurement policy should not be only to select the most efficient producer, but also to induce the contractors to design the best product and to develop the best technology. It is difficult to apply the current economic theory of optimal procurement and contracting, which has emphasized production, but ignored R and D, to many cases of procurement.

In this thesis, I provide basic models of both R and D and production in the procurement process where a number of firms invest in private R and D and compete for a government contract. R and D is modeled as a stochastic cost-reduction process. The government is considered both as a profit-maximizer and a procurement cost minimizer. In comparison to the literature, the following results derived from my models are significant. First, R and D matters in procurement contracting. When offering the optimal contract the government will be better off if it correctly takes into account costly private R and D investment. Second, competition matters. The optimal contract and the total equilibrium R and D expenditures vary with the number of firms. The government usually does not prefer infinite competition among firms. Instead, it prefers free entry of firms. Third, under a R and D technology with the constant marginal returns-to-scale, it is socially optimal to have only one firm to conduct all of the R and D and production. Fourth, in an independent private values environment with risk-neutral firms, an informed government should select one of four standard auction procedures with an appropriate announced reserve price, acting as if it does not have any private information.