Essays in mechanism design

This dissertation contains three essays on mechanism design. The common goal of these essays is to assist in the solution of different resource allocation problems where asymmetric information creates obstacles to the efficient allocation of resources. In each essay, we present a mechanism that satisfactorily solves the resource allocation problem and study some of its properties. In our first essay, ”Combinatorial Assignment under Dichotomous Preferences”, we present a class of problems akin to time scheduling without a pre-existing time grid, and propose a mechanism that is efficient, strategy-proof and envy-free. Our second essay, ”Monitoring Costs and the Management of Common-Pool Resources”, studies what can happen to an existing mechanism — the individual tradable quotas (ITQ) mechanism, also known as the cap-and-trade mechanism — when quota enforcement is imperfect and costly. Our third essay, ”Vessel Buyback”, coauthored with John O. Ledyard, presents an auction design that can be used to buy back excess capital in overcapitalized industries.

An economic approach to consumer product ratings

In three essays we examine user-generated product ratings with aggregation. While recommendation systems have been studied extensively, this simple type of recommendation system has been neglected, despite its prevalence in the field. We develop a novel theoretical model of user-generated ratings. This model improves upon previous work in three ways: it considers rational agents and allows them to abstain from rating when rating is costly; it incorporates rating aggregation (such as averaging ratings); and it considers the effect on rating strategies of multiple simultaneous raters. In the first essay we provide a partial characterization of equilibrium behavior. In the second essay we test this theoretical model in laboratory, and in the third we apply established behavioral models to the data generated in the lab. This study provides clues to the prevalence of extreme-valued ratings in field implementations. We show theoretically that in equilibrium, ratings distributions do not represent the value distributions of sincere ratings. Indeed, we show that if rating strategies follow a set of regularity conditions, then in equilibrium the rate at which players participate is increasing in the extremity of agents' valuations of the product. This theoretical prediction is realized in the lab. We also find that human subjects show a disproportionate predilection for sincere rating, and that when they do send insincere ratings, they are almost always in the direction of exaggeration. Both sincere and exaggerated ratings occur with great frequency despite the fact that such rating strategies are not in subjects' best interest. We therefore apply the behavioral concepts of quantal response equilibrium (QRE) and cursed equilibrium (CE) to the experimental data. Together, these theories explain the data significantly better than does a theory of rational, Bayesian behavior -- accurately predicting key comparative statics. However, the theories fail to predict the high rates of sincerity, and it is clear that a better theory is needed.

Sustainable IT and IT for sustainability

Energy and sustainability have become one of the most critical issues of our generation. While the abundant potential of renewable energy such as solar and wind provides a real opportunity for sustainability, their intermittency and uncertainty present a daunting operating challenge. This thesis aims to develop analytical models, deployable algorithms, and real systems to enable efficient integration of renewable energy into complex distributed systems with limited information.

The first thrust of the thesis is to make IT systems more sustainable by facilitating the integration of renewable energy into these systems. IT represents the fastest growing sectors in energy usage and greenhouse gas pollution. Over the last decade there are dramatic improvements in the energy efficiency of IT systems, but the efficiency improvements do not necessarily lead to reduction in energy consumption because more servers are demanded. Further, little effort has been put in making IT more sustainable, and most of the improvements are from improved "engineering" rather than improved "algorithms". In contrast, my work focuses on developing algorithms with rigorous theoretical analysis that improve the sustainability of IT. In particular, this thesis seeks to exploit the flexibilities of cloud workloads both (i) in time by scheduling delay-tolerant workloads and (ii) in space by routing requests to geographically diverse data centers. These opportunities allow data centers to adaptively respond to renewable availability, varying cooling efficiency, and fluctuating energy prices, while still meeting performance requirements. The design of the enabling algorithms is however very challenging because of limited information, non-smooth objective functions and the need for distributed control. Novel distributed algorithms are developed with theoretically provable guarantees to enable the "follow the renewables" routing. Moving from theory to practice, I helped HP design and implement industry's first Net-zero Energy Data Center.

The second thrust of this thesis is to use IT systems to improve the sustainability and efficiency of our energy infrastructure through data center demand response. The main challenges as we integrate more renewable sources to the existing power grid come from the fluctuation and unpredictability of renewable generation. Although energy storage and reserves can potentially solve the issues, they are very costly. One promising alternative is to make the cloud data centers demand responsive. The potential of such an approach is huge.

To realize this potential, we need adaptive and distributed control of cloud data centers and new electricity market designs for distributed electricity resources. My work is progressing in both directions. In particular, I have designed online algorithms with theoretically guaranteed performance for data center operators to deal with uncertainties under popular demand response programs. Based on local control rules of customers, I have further designed new pricing schemes for demand response to align the interests of customers, utility companies, and the society to improve social welfare.

Optimal procurement and contracting with research and development

Government procurement of a new good or service is a process that usually includes basic research, development, and production. Empirical evidences indicate that investments in research and development (R and D) before production are significant in many defense procurements. Thus, optimal procurement policy should not be only to select the most efficient producer, but also to induce the contractors to design the best product and to develop the best technology. It is difficult to apply the current economic theory of optimal procurement and contracting, which has emphasized production, but ignored R and D, to many cases of procurement.

In this thesis, I provide basic models of both R and D and production in the procurement process where a number of firms invest in private R and D and compete for a government contract. R and D is modeled as a stochastic cost-reduction process. The government is considered both as a profit-maximizer and a procurement cost minimizer. In comparison to the literature, the following results derived from my models are significant. First, R and D matters in procurement contracting. When offering the optimal contract the government will be better off if it correctly takes into account costly private R and D investment. Second, competition matters. The optimal contract and the total equilibrium R and D expenditures vary with the number of firms. The government usually does not prefer infinite competition among firms. Instead, it prefers free entry of firms. Third, under a R and D technology with the constant marginal returns-to-scale, it is socially optimal to have only one firm to conduct all of the R and D and production. Fourth, in an independent private values environment with risk-neutral firms, an informed government should select one of four standard auction procedures with an appropriate announced reserve price, acting as if it does not have any private information.

Essays on Correlated Equilibrium and Voter Turnout

This thesis consists of three essays in the areas of political economy and game theory, unified by their focus on the effects of pre-play communication on equilibrium outcomes.

Communication is fundamental to elections. Chapter 2 extends canonical voter turnout models, where citizens, divided into two competing parties, choose between costly voting and abstaining, to include any form of communication, and characterizes the resulting set of Aumann's correlated equilibria. In contrast to previous research, high-turnout equilibria exist in large electorates and uncertain environments. This difference arises because communication can coordinate behavior in such a way that citizens find it incentive compatible to follow their correlated signals to vote more. The equilibria have expected turnout of at least twice the size of the minority for a wide range of positive voting costs.

In Chapter 3 I introduce a new equilibrium concept, called subcorrelated equilibrium, which fills the gap between Nash and correlated equilibrium, extending the latter to multiple mediators. Subcommunication equilibrium similarly extends communication equilibrium for incomplete information games. I explore the properties of these solutions and establish an equivalence between a subset of subcommunication equilibria and Myerson's quasi-principals' equilibria. I characterize an upper bound on expected turnout supported by subcorrelated equilibrium in the turnout game.

Chapter 4, co-authored with Thomas Palfrey, reports a new study of the effect of communication on voter turnout using a laboratory experiment. Before voting occurs, subjects may engage in various kinds of pre-play communication through computers. We study three communication treatments: No Communication, a control; Public Communication, where voters exchange public messages with all other voters, and Party Communication, where messages are exchanged only within one's own party. Our results point to a strong interaction effect between the form of communication and the voting cost. With a low voting cost, party communication increases turnout, while public communication decreases turnout. The data are consistent with correlated equilibrium play. With a high voting cost, public communication increases turnout. With communication, we find essentially no support for the standard Nash equilibrium turnout predictions.

Microelectrode Implants for Spinal Cord Stimulation in Rats

Paralysis is a debilitating condition afflicting millions of people across the globe, and is particularly deleterious to quality of life when motor function of the legs is severely impaired or completely absent. Fortunately, spinal cord stimulation has shown great potential for improving motor function after spinal cord injury and other pathological conditions. Many animal studies have shown stimulation of the neural networks in the spinal cord can improve motor ability so dramatically that the animals can even stand and step after a complete spinal cord transaction.

This thesis presents work to successfully provide a chronically implantable device for rats that greatly enhances the ability to control the site of spinal cord stimulation. This is achieved through the use of a parylene-C based microelectrode array, which enables a density of stimulation sites unattainable with conventional wire electrodes. While many microelectrode devices have been proposed in the past, the spinal cord is a particularly challenging environment due to the bending and movement it undergoes in a live animal. The developed microelectrode array is the first to have been implanted in vivo while retaining functionality for over a month. In doing so, different neural pathways can be selectively activated to facilitate standing and stepping in spinalized rats using various electrode combinations, and important differences in responses are observed.

An engineering challenge for the usability of any high density electrode array is connecting the numerous electrodes to a stimulation source. This thesis develops several technologies to address this challenge, beginning with a fully passive implant that uses one wire per electrode to connect to an external stimulation source. The number of wires passing through the body and the skin proved to be a hazard for the health of the animal, so a multiplexed implant was devised in which active electronics reduce the number of wires. Finally, a fully wireless implant was developed. As these implants are tested in vivo, encapsulation is of critical importance to retain functionality in a chronic experiment, especially for the active implants, and it was achieved without the use of costly ceramic or metallic hermetic packaging. Active implants were built that retained functionality 8 weeks after implantation, and achieved stepping in spinalized rats after just 8-10 days, which is far sooner than wire-based electrical stimulation has achieved in prior work.