The Voting Rights Act, Shelby County, and Redistricting: Improving Estimates of Racially Polarized Voting in a Multiple-Election Context

The Supreme Court’s decision in Shelby County has severely limited the power of the Voting Rights Act. I argue that Congressional attempts to pass a new coverage formula are unlikely to gain the necessary Republican support. Instead, I propose a new strategy that takes a “carrot and stick” approach. As the stick, I suggest amending Section 3 to eliminate the need to prove that discrimination was intentional. For the carrot, I envision a competitive grant program similar to the highly successful Race to the Top education grants. I argue that this plan could pass the currently divided Congress.

Without Congressional action, Section 2 is more important than ever before. A successful Section 2 suit requires evidence that voting in the jurisdiction is racially polarized. Accurately and objectively assessing the level of polarization has been and continues to be a challenge for experts. Existing ecological inference methods require estimating polarization levels in individual elections. This is a problem because the Courts want to see a history of polarization across elections.

I propose a new 2-step method to estimate racially polarized voting in a multi-election context. The procedure builds upon the Rosen, Jiang, King, and Tanner (2001) multinomial-Dirichlet model. After obtaining election-specific estimates, I suggest regressing those results on election-specific variables, namely candidate quality, incumbency, and ethnicity of the minority candidate of choice. This allows researchers to estimate the baseline level of support for candidates of choice and test whether the ethnicity of the candidates affected how voters cast their ballots.

Normal structures and automorphism groups of t-designs

Combinatorial configurations known as t-designs are studied. These are pairs ˂B, ∏˃, where each element of B is a k-subset of ∏, and each t-design occurs in exactly λ elements of B, for some fixed integers k and λ. A theory of internal structure of t-designs is developed, and it is shown that any t-design can be decomposed in a natural fashion into a sequence of “simple” subdesigns. The theory is quite similar to the analysis of a group with respect to its normal subgroups, quotient groups, and homomorphisms. The analogous concepts of normal subdesigns, quotient designs, and design homomorphisms are all defined and used.

This structure theory is then applied to the class of t-designs whose automorphism groups are transitive on sets of t points. It is shown that if G is a permutation group transitive on sets of t letters and ф is any set of letters, then images of ф under G form a t-design whose parameters may be calculated from the group G. Such groups are discussed, especially for the case t = 2, and the normal structure of such designs is considered. Theorem 2.2.12 gives necessary and sufficient conditions for a t-design to be simple, purely in terms of the automorphism group of the design. Some constructions are given.

Finally, 2-designs with k = 3 and λ = 2 are considered in detail. These designs are first considered in general, with examples illustrating some of the configurations which can arise. Then an attempt is made to classify all such designs with an automorphism group transitive on pairs of points. Many cases are eliminated of reduced to combinations of Steiner triple systems. In the remaining cases, the simple designs are determined to consist of one infinite class and one exceptional case.

Death or taxes? The political economy of sanitation expenditure in nineteenth-century Britain

This thesis consists of three papers studying the relationship between democratic reform, expenditure on sanitation public goods and mortality in Britain in the second half of the nineteenth century. During this period decisions over spending on critical public goods such as water supply and sewer systems were made by locally elected town councils, leading to extensive variation in the level of spending across the country. This dissertation uses new historical data to examine the political factors determining that variation, and the consequences for mortality rates.

The first substantive chapter describes the spread of government sanitation expenditure, and analyzes the factors that determined towns' willingness to invest. The results show the importance of towns' financial constraints, both in terms of the available tax base and access to borrowing, in limiting the level of expenditure. This suggests that greater involvement by Westminster could have been very effective in expediting sanitary investment. There is little evidence, however, that democratic reform was an important driver of greater expenditure.

Chapter 3 analyzes the effect of extending voting rights to the poor on government public goods spending. A simple model predicts that the rich and the poor will desire lower levels of public goods expenditure than the middle class, and so extensions of the right to vote to the poor will be associated with lower spending. This prediction is tested using plausibly exogenous variation in the extent of the franchise. The results strongly support the theoretical prediction: expenditure increased following relatively small extensions of the franchise, but fell once more than approximately 50% of the adult male population held the right to vote.

Chapter 4 tests whether the sanitary expenditure was effective in combating the high mortality rates following the Industrial Revolution. The results show that increases in urban expenditure on sanitation-water supply, sewer systems and streets-was extremely effective in reducing mortality from cholera and diarrhea.